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ABSTRACT 
Artists hold their creative works dear.  Whether paintings, poems, or 
songs, their human creators treat them with special care and often desire that 
same care be exercised after death.  Some may wish to ban the use of a song in 
a television commercial.  Others may wish to stop their novel from being turned 
into an animated Disney movie.  But directing particular uses of property from 
the grave can be met with several objections and legal impediments.  The ob-
jections sound in alarmist responses to “dead hand control.”  The impediments 
include the Rule Against Perpetuities, uncertainty, capriciousness, and the re-
pugnancy of restraints on alienation.  This Article considers these and other 
recurring objections and impediments in one particular context and with one 
particular variety of creative works in mind: an author’s unpublished and pri-
vate letters to her friends.  A mechanism for achieving an artist’s restrictions 
over the use of her creative works after death is introduced in the form of a 
purpose trust.  Purpose trusts are typically utilized by pet owners to ensure the 
continued care and preservation of their pets after the owner’s death.  Purpose 
trusts are unique in that they lack ascertainable beneficiaries to enforce the 
trustee’s duties.  Many purpose trusts do not qualify as charitable trusts, which 
can be enforced by the state attorney general’s office.  Instead, a private “en-
forcer” must be provided.  Here, a noncharitable purpose trust designed to 
restrict access to an author’s private correspondence is introduced: a testa-
mentary trust hypothetically created under the terms of the Last Will and Tes-
tament of the celebrated twentieth-century American author Willa Cather. 
 
“Considering the circumstances, dead authors are a prolific group.” 
-  Eva E. Subotnik, Artistic Control After Death, 92 WASH. L. REV. 253, 
259 (2017) 
 
“I’ve got one! I’ve got a special purpose!” 
-  Steve Martin, as Navin Johnson, THE JERK (Universal Pictures, 1979) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Consider a songwriter who wants to ban the use of her music in adver-
tisements or an author intent on eliminating the possibility that her novel will 
be optioned to a filmmaker.  The law frowns upon these sorts of alienability 
limitations and use constraints.1  Property – including intellectual property – 
 
 1. See, e.g., JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF 
PROPERTY 279 (2d ed. 1895) (“Any provision restraining the alienation, voluntary or 
involuntary, of an estate in fee simple or an absolute interest in chattels real or personal, 
whether legal or equitable, is void”); Steven J. Horowitz & Robert H. Sitkoff, Uncon-
stitutional Perpetual Trusts, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1769, 1771 (2014) (“American law . . .  
imposes a handful of anti-dead hand public policy constraints . . . .”); Michael D. Kirby, 
Comment, Restraints on Alienation: Placing a 13th Century Doctrine in 21st Century 
Perspective, 40 BAYLOR L. REV. 413, 413 (1988) (“[T]he concept of free alienability is 
2
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comes with an assorted bundle of use and alienability rights.2  The law detests 
unreasonable restraints on alienability.3  Courts have deterred owners from 
placing use limitations on property that bind future owners.4  Restraints on al-
ienation are said to be repugnant, as are future interests that vest too remotely.5  
The dead hand is feared and the living hand is protected.6  Exceptions can be 
noted, such as short-term use limitations between contracting parties, equitable 
servitudes, and the nearly extinct determinable estates.7  These exceptions, 
however, are generally present either in commercial or charitable contexts.8  In 
the private noncharitable donative context, which we will be concerned in the 
pages that follow, use and alienability limitations are more closely scrutinized.9  
 
a cornerstone of modern Anglo-American civilization . . . .”); see also Dunlop v. Dun-
lop’s Ex’rs, 132 S.E. 351, 354 (Va. 1926) (holding that an attempt to condition a devise 
of a business with a requirement that the devisee share three-fourths of the sale proceeds 
with other heirs if the business was later sold constitutes an unreasonable restraint, re-
pugnant to the estate, and was therefore void). 
 2. E.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979); Phila. Eagles 
Football Club, Inc. v. City of Phila., 823 A.2d 108, 123–24 (Pa. 2003); JOHN G. 
SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW 5 (3d ed. 2012).  Typically, the four 
most important property rights are rights to exclude, transfer (i.e., alienate), pos-
sess/use, and destroy.  Id. 
 3. E.g., In re Jeromos’ Will, 166 N.Y.S.2d 959, 959 (Sur. Ct. 1957) (holding that 
a devise of realty with the limitation that “he can dispose of the house only to his daugh-
ter” was void as an attempt to limit the devisee’s power of alienation). 
 4. See Kirby, supra note 1, at 415–29 (surveying decisions invalidating re-
straints).  For example, an absolute conveyance subject to the condition that the prem-
ises only be used for residential purposes is void.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: 
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.4 cmt. b, illus. 4 (AM. LAW. INST. 1981); see also William 
A. Drennan, Wills, Trusts, Schadenfreude, and the Wild, Wacky Right of Publicity: Ex-
ploring the Enforceability of Dead-Hand Restrictions, 58 ARK. L. REV. 43, 59–66 
(2005) (explicating the relevant factors in the enforceability of use restrictions). 
 5. See Potter v. Couch, 141 U.S. 296, 315 (1891) (“[A] restriction, whether by 
way of condition or of devise over, not forbidding alienation to particular persons or 
for particular purposes only, but against any and all alienation whatever during a limited 
time, of an estate in fee, is likewise void, as repugnant to the estate devised to the first 
taker . . . .”); Carter v. Berry, 140 So. 2d 843, 846 (Miss. 1962) (“[RAP] is a rule inval-
idating interests [that] vest too remotely.”). 
 6. See Daniel A. Farber, The Dead Hand of the Architect, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 245, 249 (1996) (concluding, in a different context, that to “be[] governed by 
the dead hand may be inevitable, but we need not submit to rule by ghosts”). 
 7. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.5 (AM. LAW. INST. 
1998) (reasoning that “[a]n otherwise valid servitude is valid even if it indirectly re-
strains alienation by limiting the use that can be made of property”). 
 8. See, e.g., In re Succession of Baltazor, 540 So. 2d 1295, 1297 (La. Ct. App. 
1989) (noting that although transfer restrictions on corporate stock are enforceable, they 
are strictly construed); Animal Rescue League of Boston v. Bourne’s Assessors, 37 
N.E.2d 1019, 1022 (Mass. 1941) (explaining that donors may make unrestricted or re-
stricted gifts to charity). 
 9. E.g., B. C. & H. Corp. v. Acme Mkts., Inc., 19 Pa. D. & C.3d 419, 428 (C.P. 
1980) (“Our society, built as it is upon the private ownership of property, prizes as a 
3
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This Article is concerned specifically with use restrictions in the private non-
charitable donative context. 
In the commercial context, use limitations often reorder rather than indef-
initely, suspend, or destroy rights in property.10  Thus, for example, a landlord 
might withhold from her tenant the right to use the premises for particular pur-
poses, but the right is reordered, not destroyed.  With commercial transactions, 
use or alienability limitations might be exchanged or sold.11  That is, the limi-
tations are bargained for.  In the charitable context, use restrictions might also 
be considered through a contract lens, despite the lack of consideration.12  A 
restricted charitable gift might be also viewed in a “but for” context: The donor 
might not make a gift unless the donor is able to dictate the future use of it by 
a charitable organization.13  If we want to encourage charitable giving, a greater 
array of enforceable use limitations serves this end.14 
 
basic right and social value the freedom to transfer private property without restriction 
. . . .”). 
 10. Compare Iglehart v. Phillips, 383 So. 2d 610, 617–18 (Fla. 1980) (voiding a 
repurchase option for an unlimited period and fixed price as an unreasonable restraint 
on alienation), with Sandpiper Dev. & Constr., Inc. v. Rosemary Beach Land Co., 907 
So. 2d 684, 686–87 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (upholding a six-year repurchase option 
for a fixed price).  See also, e.g., Spanish Oaks, Inc. v. Hy-Vee, Inc., 655 N.W.2d 390, 
399–400 (Neb. 2003) (rejecting a claim that a sublease provision barring further sub-
letting to any grocery or discount store constitutes an unreasonable restraint on aliena-
tion). 
 11. See Richard A. Epstein, All Quiet on the Eastern Front, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 
555, 560 (1991) (identifying one aim of the law as “determin[ing] an initial set of prop-
erty rights from which subsequent bargains can go forward” and another as “facili-
tat[ing] the voluntary exchanges of property rights – the law of contracts”). 
 12. E.g., William A. Drennan, Charitable Naming Rights Transactions: Gifts or 
Contracts?, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1267, 1291 (2016) (noting that conditional charity 
gifts “create[] an extreme, all-or-nothing situation, where either the donee keeps the 
gift or the gift reverts to the donor” when the condition is breached by the donee); see 
also William P. Sullivan, The Restricted Charitable Gift as Third-Party-Beneficiary 
Contract, 52 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 79, 85 (2017) (recognizing, with regards to 
restricted charitable gifts, that “[c]ontract gives effect, within broad limits, to the con-
sensual arrangements of private parties”). 
 13. See Sullivan, supra note 12, at 82–83 (“[T]he restricted charitable gift is a deal 
– a third-party-beneficiary contract in which the donor transfers property to the charity 
in consideration of the charity’s promise to respect the donor’s restriction on the use of 
that property.”). 
 14. E.g., Perin v. Carey, 65 U.S. 465, 494–95 (1860) (emphasizing that a gift of 
property coupled with alienation limitations is permitted if it is a charitable gift); see 
also Lee Bollinger, Foreword to JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT: 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS IN CULTURAL TREASURES, at xiii (2001) (“[T]ax laws also 
help prime the pump of charitable instincts . . . .”); Allison Anna Tait, The Secret Econ-
omy of Charitable Giving, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1663, 1715–16 (2015) (“[C]ommentators 
have speculated that by failing to uphold donor terms and intent, courts may remove 
incentives . . . to philanthropy . . . .”).  See also, e.g., Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. 539, 
4
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In the private noncharitable donative context, lengthy or even permanent 
suspensions of use rights are harder to justify and – predictably – more difficult 
to achieve.15  Conveying property to a private donee while withholding a par-
ticular use right can be seen as an attempt to destroy the property, in part.16  
Withholding a particular use right in effect destroys a particular thread of the 
property.  Consider the owner of a 1963 Ford Thunderbird who has meticu-
lously restored the car to its original condition and wants to ban future owners 
from adding garish chrome wheels, aftermarket tricks, or modern conveniences 
like antilock brakes.  Withholding a donee’s right to modify the 1963 Thunder-
bird would, if enforceable, destroy a noteworthy stick within the bundle of 
property rights accompanying its ownership: automobile modification rights.  
A car forever lacking any modification rights would also complicate the future 
owners’ ability to sell the car.17  Marketability would be impacted.  For these 
reasons, an attempt to withhold modification rights is likely unenforceable.  
Although one might extract this concession with a contractual promise from 
the donee (a promise not to modify the car),  a contractual use limitation will 
degrade and dissipate as ownership of the car changes hands because future 
owners will not be in privity of contract with the earlier owner.18  Alternatively, 
vesting one person with ownership of the car and another with the modification 
 
550 (1867) (“By the law of this commonwealth, as by the law of England, gifts to char-
itable uses are highly favored, and will be most liberally construed in order to accom-
plish the intent and purpose of the donor . . . .”). 
 15. See, e.g., Goodman v. Andrews, 213 N.W. 605, 606 (Iowa 1927) (holding that 
a restriction within a deed suspending the power to sell the land for twenty years is 
void); Sipko v. Koger, Inc., 70 A.3d 512, 520 (N.J. 2013) (rejecting the contention that 
a gift of stock had been made conditional upon the donee’s continued employment by 
the company); Troxel v. Bishop, 201 S.W.3d 290, 296 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006) (empha-
sizing that to make a gift, “[a]ll dominion and control over the property must be released 
by the owner”). 
 16. See, e.g., Shenandoah Valley Nat’l Bank v. Taylor, 63 S.E.2d 786, 791 (Va. 
1951) (noting that doling out payment to individual schoolchildren delivered with an 
admonition to use the funds only in furtherance of education “would be wholly impo-
tent and of no avail”). 
 17. See, e.g., Johnson v. Preston, 80 N.E. 1001, 1006 (Ill. 1907) (“To transfer a 
fee and at the same time to restrict the free alienation of it, is to say that a party can give 
and not give, in the same breath.”); Cast v. Nat’l Bank of Commerce Tr. & Sav. Ass’n, 
183 N.W.2d 485, 489 (Neb. 1971) (“It seems to us that a condition attached to a fee 
simple title which has for its purpose the satisfaction of a whimsical obsession or an 
expression of testator’s vanity ought not be permitted . . . .”); see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.1 cmt. j (AM. LAW. INST. 
2001) (“A purported gift of an interest that is subject to a valid restraint on alienation 
is ineffective because the donor lacks the power to make the purported gift.”). 
 18. See, e.g., Bri-Den Constr. Co. v. Kapell & Kostow Architects, P.C., 867 
N.Y.S.2d 437, 438 (App. Div. 2008) (holding contractual privity or its equivalent is 
necessary to enforce a promise). 
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rights to that car would likely fail from the outset.19  Controlling the “fate of 
things” once they have left an owner’s hands is not easy.20 
With an inter vivos or testamentary transfer of property,21 the donor who 
wishes to dictate the future uses of the property will typically be frustrated by 
rules that value the free alienability of wealth, property, and ideas more than 
the whims of a former owner, especially a deceased one.22  The ability of au-
thors to shape property rights in their creative works from the grave is – un-
happily – slight.23  Thus, a testamentary gift of one’s diary to a legatee with 
instructions to share it only with close family members might be disregarded.24  
 
 19. The numerus clausus principle limits this fragmentation of ownership of prop-
erty and property interests so as to promote their free alienability.  Michael A. Heller, 
The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1176–78 (1999); see also 
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: 
The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 8 (2000) (“The existence of unusual 
property rights increases the cost of processing information about all property rights.”).  
Imagine the drag on marketplace transactions were one to risk purchasing a 1963 Thun-
derbird with an eye towards restoring and updating the car only to find out later that 
another individual holds the modification rights to the car.  For this reason, and perhaps 
others, attempts to create a new estate in property and diffuse ownership in ways not 
already mapped out (e.g., concurrent ownership or determinable estates) will be unsuc-
cessful.  See, e.g., Avihay Dorfman, Property and Collective Undertaking: The Princi-
ple of Numerus Clausus, 61 U. TORONTO L.J. 467, 502–03 (2011) (asserting that nu-
merus clausus serves to enhance the legitimation of political authority by retaining con-
trol over the introduction of new forms of property ownership); accord Johnson v. 
Whiton, 34 N.E. 542, 542 (Mass. 1893) (invalidating a devise to “Sarah A. Whiton and 
her heirs on her father’s side,” reasoning that “[a] man cannot create a new kind of 
inheritance” but also noting that “[i]t is not too much to say that it would be plainly 
contrary to the policy of the law of Massachusetts to deny the power of Sarah A. Whiton 
to convey an unqualified fee.”).  “To maintain a finite set of categories, numerus clau-
sus must eliminate idiosyncratic property interests.”  Meredith M. Render, The Concept 
of Property, 78 U. PITT. L. REV. 437, 444 (2017). 
 20. See Bollinger, supra note 14, at xii; SAX, supra note 14, at 9 (“Ownership is 
not just an economic interest, . . . [i]t can also involve a claim of entitlement to decide 
the fate of an object.”). 
 21. E.g., In re Estate of O’Brien v. Robinson, 749 P.2d 154, 157–58 (Wash. 1988) 
(en banc) (contrasting the “delivery” requirement for inter vivos gifts with wills act 
compliance for testamentary gifts). 
 22. These rules include limitations contrary to public policy, RAA, the repugnancy 
of restraints on alienation, and RAP.  LEWIS M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD 
HAND 33 (1955); see also infra Section II.D. 
 23. See, e.g., Colonial Tr. Co. v. Brown, 135 A. 555, 564 (Conn. 1926) (invalidat-
ing provisions in a will restricting the erection of buildings more than three stories tall 
and forbidding leases of more than a year on certain property); Will of Pace, 400 
N.Y.S.2d 488, 493–94 (Sur. Ct. 1977) (setting aside provisions in a will forbidding the 
construction of a garage on the testator’s property). 
 24. Even if withholding a particular property right (e.g., the right to share the diary 
with anyone other than close family members) is permissible, the withheld property 
right would then pass pursuant to the residuary clause of the will, with the result being 
that one person may own the diary – less the wide sharing rights – while another – the 
6
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An inter vivos gift of a painting to a friend with the admonition never to loan 
it to a gallery might be unenforceable.25  This Article aims to identify a mech-
anism by which these kinds of targets can be met.  It is particularly sensitive to 
honoring the creator’s use limitations in question – an artist and her painting, 
the lyricist and her song, or the author and her novel.26  It will attempt to un-
earth enforceable private donative use restriction rights through the use of a 
trustee charged with overseeing the use and enjoyment of creative works and 
imbued with the values and objectives of their author.  As detailed in the next 
Part, artist-imposed use limitations over creative works are not uncommon.  
These impulses might even be seen as a natural outgrowth of the creative pro-
cess. 
II. DISCUSSION 
Several examples of artist-imposed use limitations that might be consid-
ered as natural expressions of the creative process – from Tennessee Williams 
to James Joyce – follow.27  From these examples, this Part constructs a hypo-
thetical problem: the aims of author Willa Cather with regards to her un-
published and private letters.28  This is a hypothetical problem but also a gen-
uine one insofar as Willa Cather did in fact desire certain use limitations over 
 
residual legatee – will own the rights to share the diary with anyone.  If the residual 
legatee sells the wide sharing rights to the owner of the diary, then the diary owner will 
be able to share the diary with anyone. 
 25. Most of the artwork-limitations jurisprudence arises out of charitable gifts.  
See, e.g., Georgia O’Keefe Museum v. Cty. of Santa Fe, 62 P.3d 754, 768 (N.M. 2002) 
(considering donations “restricted to educational, exhibition and acquisition pur-
poses”).  Restricted charitable gifts must be distinguished from private donative be-
quests.  See discussion of charitable gifts infra Section II.C.1. 
 26. See Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Au-
tonomy in United States and Continental Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. 
L.J. 1, 77–78 (1994) (recognizing a “personal connectedness to one’s original works”). 
 27. See infra Section II.A; see also Jessica Gelt, Authenticity in Casting: From 
‘Colorblind’ to ‘Color Conscious,’ New Rules Are Anything but Black and White, L.A. 
TIMES (July 13, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/arts/la-ca-cm-authentic-
ity-in-casting-20170713-htmlstory.html; Blake Morrison, Up in Smoke: Should an Au-
thor’s Dying Wishes Be Obeyed?, GUARDIAN (Mar. 10, 2018), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/books/2018/mar/10/up-in-smoke-should-an-authors-dying-wishes-be-obeyed 
(citing examples of authors, such as Michel Foucault, who wished that their un-
published works remain unpublished and others, such as Samuel Beckett, who opposed 
modifications to their narratives).  “Who has the right to tell what stories?  And who 
gets to make that decision?”  Gelt, supra. 
 28. See infra Section II.F. 
7
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her letters.29  Those limitations, however, were disregarded by her successors.30  
In articulating and navigating how her aims might have been achieved, an ex-
plication of trust law is required.31  A framing of a particular sort of trust – a 
noncharitable purpose trust – comes next.32  The numerous legal barriers and 
challenges to achieving Willa Cather’s objectives must also be identified.33  Fi-
nally, a resolution to these barriers and a particular testamentary trust for these 
objectives will be outlined.34 
A. Artistic Sensibilities and the Desire to Preserve and Obscure 
When Tennessee Williams, the author of A Streetcar Named Desire, died 
in 1983, he left a will that provided, 
It is my wish that no play which I shall have written shall, for the pur-
pose of presenting it as a first-class attraction on the English-speaking 
stage, be changed in any manner, whether such change shall be by way 
of completing it, or adding to it, or deleting from it, or in any other way 
revising it, except for the customary type of stage directions. . . .  To the 
extent that I can legally do so, no party who shall acquire any rights in 
any play, poem, or literary work of mine shall have the right to make or 
authorize the making of any changes in any play . . . .35 
Tennessee Williams wished to impose no-modification restrictions on his 
plays.  Because the restrictions were framed as a “wish,” the drafter of his will 
likely recognized that the restrictions could not be legally enforced.36  How-
 
 29. Willa Cather expressly directed in her will for her successors to not publish 
personal letters.  Jennifer Schuessler, O Revelations! Letters, Once Banned, Flesh Out 
Willa Cather, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2013), https://www.ny-
times.com/2013/03/22/books/willa-cather-letters-to-be-published-as-an-anthol-
ogy.html. 
 30. Cather died in 1947, and her prohibition of letter publication was followed for 
nearly seventy years before The Selected Letters of Willa Cather, containing 566 letters, 
was published in 2013.  Id.  In the preface of that publication, the editors, Janis Stout 
and Andrew Jewell, “acknowledge that publication of the letters ‘flagrantly’ violates 
Cather’s wishes, expressed in a will that partially expired in 2011 with the death of her 
nephew and second executor, Charles Cather.”  Id. 
 31. See infra Section II.B. 
 32. See infra Section II.C.2; Section II.E. 
 33. See infra Section II.D. 
 34. See infra Section II.F. 
 35. LUCY A. MARSH, PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF THE LAW: WILLS, TRUSTS, AND 
ESTATES 18 (1998). 
 36. See, e.g., In re Estate of Brill v. Phillips, 76 So. 3d 695, 695, 701 (Miss. 2011) 
(en banc) (construing a holographic will’s devise “with the understanding” that the de-
visee would take care of the testator’s mother to be precatory).  But see Colton v. Col-
ton, 127 U.S. 300, 315–17, 321–22 (1888) (construing a devise wherein the testator did 
8
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ever, merely precatory instructions may accomplish an author’s aims.  A testa-
mentary “hope,” “wish,” or “desire” about a testator’s aims conveyed to his 
devisees could work, though not in a legal sense.37  It could represent a de facto 
– though not a de jure – solution.  As a legal matter, precatory instructions are 
unenforceable.38  Still, so long as the devisee continues to honor the deceased 
author’s instructions, the author’s objectives are met.  A testator’s request to 
avoid optioning a novel’s film rights may work, at least as long as the legatee 
remains under the testator’s influence.  This kind of chiding should not be ig-
nored solely on account of its legal flimsiness.  Choosing the right person – a 
“literary executor” – and delivering clear instructions may achieve the author’s 
objectives.39  A literary executor who shares the testator’s values and abides by 
the decedent’s wishes can be considered as an alternative to an unenforceable 
admonishment.  Indeed, a resolute executor oftentimes abides by the testator’s 
advice and wishes.40  A nonbinding “ethical will” imposed upon a trustworthy 
 
“recommend to her the care and protection of [his] mother and sister” as creating an 
enforceable trust). 
 37. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 
18.1 cmt. e (AM. LAW. INST. 2010) (“Words that merely express a suggestion, hope, or 
desire that a transferee of property will make a certain disposition thereof do not, in the 
absence of other circumstances, impose an obligation on the transferee to follow the 
transferor’s suggestion, i.e., to create a trust.”). 
 38. See Alyssa A. DiRusso, He Says, She Asks: Gender, Language, and the Law 
of Precatory Words in Wills, 22 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 6–14 (2007) (“When language 
is ‘advisory’ rather than ‘mandatory’ the direction does not establish a trust, but rather 
it establishes a [conditional] gift . . . .”). 
 39. Technically, there is no such office as a “literary executor” recognized under 
state probate codes.  Woodhouse v. Cohen, 101 N.Y.S.2d 675, 676 (Sup. Ct. 1950) 
(“[T]here is no such entity in the law.”); Cheryl E. Hader, Making the Intangible Tan-
gible: Planning for Intellectual Property, 29 EST. PLAN. 574, 575 (2002) (“A literary 
or art executor . . . is not judicially appointed and, therefore, has no legal authority to 
enter into transactions involving estate assets.”).  But see Ian Hamilton, Foreword to 
KEEPERS OF THE FLAME: LITERARY ESTATES AND THE RISE OF BIOGRAPHY viii (1992) 
(describing the literary executor thusly: “there is the gem-like flame of art and there is 
the private bonfire, ‘the trustful guardian of secret matters’”).  Despite a literary or art 
executor not inherently having legal authority, such individual “may be designated ex-
ecutor solely for the purpose of administering literary property.”  Woodhouse, 101 
N.Y.S.2d at 676.  A “literary executor” therefore is “[a] limited-purpose executor ap-
pointed to manage copyrighted materials in an estate.”  Literary executor, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  See also UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-709 (UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 2010) (“Except as otherwise provided by a decedent’s will, every personal 
representative has a right to, and shall take possession or control of the decedent’s prop-
erty . . . .”). 
 40. Willa Cather’s executor, Edith Lewis, adhered to Cather’s ethical admonish-
ments for the rest of Lewis’ life.  See infra Section II.F.  Regardless of her formal legal 
powers or role, Violette de Mazia clearly represented Dr. Albert Barnes’ “literary ex-
ecutor.”  See infra Section II.D.3. 
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survivor might preserve and articulate a testator’s unenforceable recommenda-
tions.41 
Other testators besides Tennessee Williams have attempted to legally 
bind future owners’ uses and alienation of their intellectual property creations. 
When the founder of the Beastie Boys died in 2012, his will emphatically di-
rected that his music never be used for advertising purposes.42  The Beastie 
Boys’ composer expressed these use limitations vigorously – in a handwritten 
addition.43  Similarly, J.D. Salinger emphatically restrained his heirs from ever 
licensing film rights to A Catcher in the Rye.44  And Willa Cather begged for 
 
 41. See Zoe M. Hicks, Is Your (Ethical) Will in Order?, 33 AM. C. TR. EST. COUNS.  
J. 154, 155 (2007) (“Some of the most common themes in ethical wills are exhortations 
to care for the community, expressions of love to the family, caring for loved ones and 
pets, statements of faith and beliefs, gratitude, and exhortation and encouragement to 
the family.”). 
 
An ethical will is not considered a legal document in the same way as a last will 
and testament, a holographic will, or a living will.  Rather, ethical wills are tools 
that communicate intangible gifts that come from the heart.  Some scholars con-
sider an “ethical will” to be any writing that imparts personal values, lessons, 
and experiences to future generations.  Ethical wills tend to encompass several 
different functions: family history, personal story, or explication of a person’s 
value system.  When one drafts an ethical will, that person is able to 
acknowledge that there is more to his or her legacy than the wealth and tangible 
goods acquired throughout life.  It allows the author the freedom to convey per-
sonal quirks and life passions. 
 
Cindy E. Faulkner, Happily Ever After: An Ethical Will May Be a Step on That Journey, 
12 T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 451, 451–52 (2010) (footnotes omitted). 
 42. Wendy S. Goffe, Part of Beastie Boy Adam Yauch’s Will, Banning Use of Mu-
sic in Ads, May Not Be Valid, FORBES (Aug. 13, 2012, 6:23 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/deborahljacobs/2012/08/13/part-of-beastie-boy-adam-
yauchs-will-banning-use-of-music-in-ads-may-not-be-valid/#34472b7e7698.  The will 
provided: “Notwithstanding anything to the contrary, in no event may my image or 
name or any music or any artistic property created by me be used for advertising pur-
poses.”  RJ Cubarrubia, Adam Yauch’s Will Prohibits Use of His Music in Ads, 
ROLLING STONE (Aug. 9, 2012), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/adam-
yauchs-will-prohibits-use-of-his-music-in-ads-20120809.  A copy of the will was ob-
tained by Rolling Stone.  Id.  “The phrase ‘or any music or any artistic property created 
by me’ was added in handwriting.”  Id. 
 43. See Cubarrubia, supra note 42. 
 44. Denise S. Rahne & Shira T. Shapiro, Practical Considerations for Valuing 
Intellectual Property Assets in Estate Planning,  PROB. & PROP., July/Aug. 2017, at 8, 
13; see also Matt Goldberg, 1957 Letter from J.D. Salinger Explains Why Catcher in 
the Rye Wouldn’t Work as a Movie, COLLIDER (Feb. 23, 2012), http://col-
lider.com/catcher-in-the-rye-movie-rejection-jd-salinger/ (averring that as to Salin-
ger’s justifications for refusing to license movie rights to Catcher in the Rye during his 
lifetime, “Salinger could have simply responded, ‘Fuck you.  That’s why,’ and it would 
be a respectable answer”).  “[T]he original dreamer should always have the final say.”  
Id. 
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her letters to forever remain unseen.45  These are all examples of a copyright 
owner wishing to reduce the range of uses of their property after it passes to 
their devisees. 
Less commonly, a copyright owner might wish to bind future owners to 
more expansive uses than they might otherwise prefer.  The poet Ezra Pound 
once proposed that “the heirs of an author should be powerless to prevent the 
publication of his works . . . .”46  President Harding’s heirs blocked publication 
of the President’s love letters to a mistress for many years.47  One suspects that 
Harding himself might have agreed with his heirs’ decision.48  But when the 
heirs of Dr. Martin Luther King sought to curtail the republication of “I Have 
a Dream,” some wondered if Dr. King would have preferred more liberal uses 
of his intellectual properties than his heirs were willing to extend.49  We can 
speculate that Dr. King would have liked to grant greater use and reprinting 
rights of his works.50  Similarly, Stephen Joyce, James Joyce’s sole heir, has 
been notoriously restrictive in granting rights to Ulysses, Finnegan’s Wake and 
other works of his late grandfather.51  Stephen Joyce once stated he would no 
longer grant permission to quote from anything James Joyce ever wrote.52  Ste-
phen Joyce sued sponsors of a nonprofit who wished to produce a webcast with 
 
 45. WILLA CATHER IN PERSON 171 (L. Brent Bohlke ed., 1986) [hereinafter 
Bohlke].  “[Cather’s] will absolutely restricts the publication of any of her correspond-
ence.”  Id. 
 46. Ezra Pound, Copyright and Tariff, NEW AGE, Oct. 3, 1918, at 363, https://li-
brary.brown.edu/pdfs/1140814666999565.pdf. 
 47. FRANCIS RUSSELL, THE SHADOW OF BLOOMING GROVE: WARREN G. HARDING 
IN HIS TIMES 658 (1968); Kenneth W. Duckett, How Some Were Burned . . . , AM. 
HERITAGE,  Feb. 1965, https://www.americanheritage.com/content/how-some-were-
burned%E2%80%A6. 
 48. See James M. Lindgren, Playing Darts with a Rembrandt: Public and Private 
Rights in Cultural Treasures, 87 J. AM. HIST. 1088, 1088 (2000) (reviewing SAX, supra 
note 14).  It was quite a “large cache of love letters.”  Id.  Some of the love letters were 
finally released in 2014.  See id. 
 49. SAX, supra note 14, at 146–48.  Cf. Craig Fehrman, The Last Word, NEW 
REPUBLIC (Oct. 11, 2011), https://newrepublic.com/article/96122/vonnegut-shields-
and-so-it-goes-estate (explaining how Kurt Vonnegut seemed happy when writers used 
his work, even sending University of Northern Iowa’s English Professor Jerome Klin-
kowitz a letter granting him “unrestricted permission to quote anything I ever said or 
wrote, at any length, and without notice or compensation;” however, those running 
Vonnegut’s estate have restricted use of his work only to those with express permission 
from Vonnegut.). 
 50. See David Plotz, Content Is King, SLATE (Mar. 16, 1997, 3:30 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/assessment/1997/03/con-
tent_is_king.html (criticizing the Martin Luther King Jr. family’s profit-driven aggres-
siveness as inconsistent with Martin Luther King’s values of selflessness). 
 51. See D.T. Max, The Injustice Collector, NEW YORKER (June 19, 2006), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2006/06/19/the-injustice-collector. 
 52. Id.; RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW: THE RISING POWER OF THE 
AMERICAN DEAD 145 (2010). 
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readings from Ulysses; Joyce’s denials have been termed “explicitly capri-
cious.”53  Stephen Joyce has even burned a number of his grandfather’s let-
ters.54  Perhaps James Joyce would have preferred less of a postmortem “stran-
glehold” on his works.55  The author’s desires to control the use and alienation 
of his works can thus operate in two directions, both tighter and looser, but 
those desires can only be ensured if the law will recognize them. 
Professor Eva Subotnik has authored important work on post-obit copy-
right controls.56  She has noted, for the most part, that authors cannot control 
their works after they die.57  Yet many of them would like to do just that.  Grant-
ing creators reasonable control of their works, at least during the operable pe-
riod of copyright protections after death, is a worthy aim.58  One way of en-
forcing this control is by means of a noncharitable purpose trust.59  We might 
 
 53. Id. 
 54. SAX, supra note 14, at 138. 
 55. See MADOFF, supra note 52, at 145. 
 56. Eva E. Subotnik, Artistic Control After Death, 92 WASH. L. REV. 253 (2017) 
[hereinafter Subotnik, Artistic]; Eva E. Subotnik, Copyright and the Living Dead?: 
Succession Law and the Postmortem Term, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 77, 79 (2015) [here-
inafter Subotnik, Copyright]. 
 57. Subotnik, Artistic, supra note 56, at 260.  “This is because, to state the obvious, 
authors largely are not in a position to control their works or their reputations after they 
die.”  Id. 
 58. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012) (copyright extends seventy years after an au-
thor’s death). 
 59. The idea of using purpose trusts to enhance creator-autonomy over creative 
works appears to be a new one, but at least one artist has created an artwork that itself 
incorporates a purpose trust.  See Alexander A. Bove, Jr. & Ruth Mattson, The Purpose 
Trust: Drafting Becomes a Work of Art, 43 EST. PLAN. 26, 26-27 (2016).  Bove and 
Mattson describe the work in a SoHo gallery comprised of two large frames and twenty-
six pages of text: 
 
An artist engaged the authors’ firm to draft a trust, the purpose of which was 
the trust itself.  More specifically, the trust purposes were to hold property and 
to present the trust as a ‘statement emphasizing the continuing impact of slavery 
in the United States and encouraging federal and corporate programs of repara-
tion. 
 
The trust was funded with stock from a company that has admitted to benefitting 
financially from slavery in the U.S.  The trust directs that the stock will be held 
until the federal government makes an official act of financial reparation for 
slavery.  At that time, the trust will distribute its funds in a manner consistent 
with the act of reparation, and its purpose will have been fulfilled.  The trust 
also provides for the display of the trust instrument itself as a statement. 
 
Id. at 27 (footnotes omitted).  For other innovative uses of a purpose trust, see Igor 
Levenberg, Note, Personal Revival Trusts: If You Can’t Take It with You, Can You 
Come Back to Get It?, 83 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1469, 1496–99 (2009) (considering the 
use of a purpose trust to maintain the preservation of a “cryonaut” in suspended anima-
tion after death until medical technology advances to a sufficient point, whereupon the 
12
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call a purpose trust designed to hold and maintain a particular form of control 
over copyrighted works an “artistic vision trust.”  The trust would create ex-
pansive postmortem moral rights for the authors and artists via the text of a 
trust instrument.60  Some non-U.S. jurisdictions do recognize “moral rights”61 
– and some even permit the rights to be enforced post-mortem.62  Moral rights 
 
trust could “be terminated upon their revival and the trust funds dispersed to their re-
vived selves”). 
 60. See Martin A. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of 
Artists, Authors and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 554–55 (1940) (noting that the 
doctrine of moral rights which protects the personal – and not merely economic – rights 
of the artist, known in France as “droit moral,” has received “scant recognition in the 
United States).  The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA) was enacted to protect 
creative work but has limited protections.  See Pub. L. No. 101–650, 104 Stat. 5089, 
51283–33 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–122 (2012)); see also Carter v. 
Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 83–88 (2d Cir. 1995) (permitting alteration of art-
work).  Instead, aggrieved artists in the United States are typically limited to remedies 
based on “copyright, unfair competition, invasion of privacy, defamation, and breach 
of contract.”  Carter, 71 F.3d at 82.  These doctrines may be inadequate.  See e.g., Crimi 
v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813, 819 (Sup. Ct. 1949) (holding that 
destruction of a mural did not violate the artist’s rights because no rights in the mural 
were reserved by contract); cf. Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen 
[RGZ] 1912, 9 DROIT D’AUTEUR 397 (Ger.), cited in Roeder, supra, at 554 (holding 
that an owner would not be permitted to drape the nude figures in a purchased mural).  
But see, e.g., Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 24–25 (2d Cir. 1976) (granting 
a preliminary injunction of an edit broadcast of the Monty Python group because the 
edited version impaired the integrity and distorted the group’s work).  Alternatively, 
state law remedies might be considered.  E.g., The 1979 California Art Preservation 
Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 987 (West 2018); New York’s Artists’ Authorship Rights Act, 
N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW. § 14.03 (McKinney 2018), preempted by statute, 
VARA, Pub. L. No. 101–650, 104 Stat. 5089, 51283–33 (codified as amended at 17 
U.S.C. §§ 101–122 (2012), as recognized in Bd. of Managers of Soho Int’l Arts Condo. 
v. City of New York, No. 01 CIV.1226 DAB, 2003 WL 21403333, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 17, 2003)). 
 61. Jennifer Pitino explains, 
 
The term “moral rights” derives from an 18th century French legal concept (le 
droit moral) of the non-economic, spiritual and personal interests which exist 
in creative works, independent of the artist’s copyright interests.  The underly-
ing theory of moral rights arose from the belief that in creating a work of art, 
the artist injects his or her spirit into the work.  Consequently, mora[l] rights 
dictate that the integrity of the work should be protected and preserved as a 
moral service to the artist. 
 
Jennifer Pitino, Art Ownership Requires an Understanding of Moral Rights, 59 ADVOC. 
32, 32 (2016) (footnotes omitted).  “[M]oral rights cannot be sold, transferred or be-
queathed, and terminate upon the death of the artist.”  Id. at 33. 
 62. See Jane C. Ginsburg, French Copyright Law: A Comparative Overview, 36 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 269, 276 (1989) (“French law . . . addresses problems re-
garding divulgation of works unpublished at the time of their authors’ deaths.”); James 
M. Treece, American Law Analogues of the Author’s “Moral Right”, 16 AM. J. COMP. 
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give copyright a degree of inalienability by tacking the rights permanently to 
the author himself and treating creative works “as inalienable extensions of the 
author’s personality.”63  For example, moral rights would permit director John 
Huston’s estate to obtain an injunction against a broadcast of a colorized ver-
sion of one of his black and white films.64  Moral rights recognize the preser-
vation of artistic sensibilities.65  No expansive moral rights are recognized to 
any sufficient degree in the United States.66 
There are legitimate policy arguments for and against allowing greater 
postmortem artistic control.67  This Article’s bias is firmly in the camp of the 
artists.68  An author’s clearly articulated limitations for her works ought to be 
legally enforceable rather than mere precatory musings.69  Copyright is not per-
petual.  Since copyrighted works typically enter the public domain seventy 
years after the author’s death, the term of dead hand control over published 
 
L. 487, 505 n.67 (1968) (noting that eighteen of fifty-five jurisdictions surveyed pro-
vided for perpetual moral rights); Colleen P. Battle, Note, Righting the ‘Titled Scale’: 
Expansion of Artists’ Rights in the United States, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 441, 474 (1986) 
(noting that courts have “acknowledg[ed] the existence of the doctrine of moral right 
and its integrity component in many European and Latin American countries” when 
evaluating claims). 
 63. Netanel, supra note 26, at 2. 
 64. Robert C. Bird & Lucille M. Ponte, Protecting Moral Rights in the United 
States and the United Kingdom: Challenges and Opportunities Under the U.K.’s New 
Performances Regulations, 24 B.U. INT’L L.J. 213, 232–33 (2006). 
 65. See Netanel, supra note 26, at 2 (“[T]he moral right entitles an author . . . to 
block publication, determine how authorship is attributed, and prevent material changes 
in, or uses of, the work that are repugnant to the author’s artistic conception.”). 
 66. 1 LINDEY ON ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS § 1:34, Westlaw 
(database updated Apr. 2018).  See also 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012) (articulating limited 
moral rights).  But see, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(c)(1) (West 2018) (prohibiting “any 
physical defacement, mutilation, alteration, or destruction of a work of fine art”). 
 67. See Subotnik, Artistic, supra note 56, at 292–302. 
 68. “It is this country’s lack of respect for the deceased author of literature and the 
historical belief that protection of works of literature should extend no further than is 
necessary to compensate the author, that create a harrowing plight for today’s authors.”  
Donald Francis Madeo, Note, Literary Creation and American Copyright Law: Au-
thors’ Wishes Hardly Resting in Peace, 5 HOFSTRA PROP. L.J. 179, 179 (1992). 
 69. For example, Tennessee Williams’ “wish” concerning the production of his 
plays (see infra at text accompanying note 35) would typically be construed as unen-
forceable precatory instructions and not binding except in the moral sense.  See, e.g., 
In re Carleton, 432 N.Y.S.2d 441, 451–52 (Sur. Ct. 1980) (holding a directive to an 
executor “to see that a small gift be made” is precatory and unenforceable given in 
indefiniteness of the amount); In re Stinson’s Estate, 81 A. 207, 208 (Pa. 1911) 
(“[W]hen precatory words are used merely for the purpose of advising or influencing, 
or as expressive of a wish or desire that the legatee or devisees make a certain use of 
the testator’s bounty, they are not obligatory.”).  Authors can also simply “lead by ex-
ample” during their lives as a way of influencing their heirs’ use of inherited copy-
righted works.  Subnotnik, Artistic, supra note 56, at 262–63. 
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works expires within that time frame.70  Moreover, the nature of the property 
under consideration weighs in favor of dead hand control.  Artistic works are 
creations of the author.71  Many of us would be more sympathetic with J.D. 
Salinger banning a Pixar production of Catcher in the Rye than a farmer who 
wants to stop her heirs from rotating crops on her fields.72  A novel belongs 
more to its author than a farm to its owner.73  The farmland existed before the 
farmer, but J.D. Salinger summoned Holden Caulfield with his mind and his 
pen.74  Furthermore, real property has greater scarcity than creative works.75  It 
is often said of realty that “they aren’t making any more of it,”76 while new 
artistic works are produced every day.  Real property also directly supports 
 
 70. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012). 
 71. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2012).  “The authors of a joint work are co-owners of 
copyright in the work.”  Id. 
 72. See Egerton v. Brownlow (1853) 10 Eng. Rep. 359 (HL) at 417.  There, the 
court reasoned that 
 
[t]he owner of an estate may himself do many things which he could not (by a 
condition) compel his successor to do.  One example is sufficient.  He may leave 
his land uncultivated, but he cannot by a condition compel his successor to do 
so.  The law does not interefere [sic] with the owner and compel him to cultivate 
his land, (though it be for the public good that land should be cultivated) . . . . 
 
Id.; see also WILLIAM SHEPPARD, THE TOUCHSTONE OF COMMON ASSURANCES BEING 
A PLAIN AND FAMILIAR TREATISE ON CONVEYANCING § 132 (8th ed. 1826), https://ar-
chive.org/stream/touchstoneofcomm01shepuoft#page/n269 (“[I]f one grant his land to 
[a grantee] on condition that he (being a husbandman) shall not sow his arable land; 
this condition is void.”). 
 73. Cf. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 124 (8th ed. 2014) (querying whether 
an individual’s personal choice not to donate their own organs at death should be ana-
lyzed under the public policy objection to testator instructions to destroy property).  
Like creative works owned by their authors, one’s own organs touch on more personal 
concerns than real property owned by a landowner.  Accordingly, greater latitude in 
testamentary instructions to destroy one’s diary ought to attach than to an instruction to 
destroy one’s house.  But see Netanel, supra note 26, at 9 (“Copyright is a privilege 
designed to serve the public interest, not an entitlement arising from the fact of crea-
tion.”). 
 74. See United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224, 250 (1897) (“The inven-
tor is one who has discovered something of value.  It is his absolute property.”). 
 75. The scarcity of real property gives resonance to assertions such as that “prop-
erty’s role in a democratic society . . . [is] allowing some degree of equal access . . . .”  
See Carla Spivack, Democracy and Trusts, 42 ACTEC L.J. 311, 339 (2017).  Opening 
up creative works or an author’s private correspondence to “some degree of equal ac-
cess” even prior to the expiration of federal and common law copyright protections 
seems much less urgent.  See id.  To be fair, though, many real property owners hold 
equally strong sentiments about the future uses of their property. 
 76. John A. Ragosta, Trade and Agriculture, and Lumber: Why Agriculture and 
Lumber Matter, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 413, 418 (2005). 
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more fundamental human needs (e.g., food, shelter, energy) than works of fic-
tion, so perhaps a greater range of latitude for artists to curb future uses of their 
works than owners of real property is in order.77 
Occasionally, an artist will want to do more than ban particular uses of 
his creation.  Sometimes, the artist will want to conceal an unpublished work.78  
 
 77. Compare Brown v. Burdett (1882) 47 LT 94 (Ch) at 96 (invalidating a trust 
provision directing the trustee to board up the grantor’s home for twenty years before 
distributing it to remainderman as “useless”), and Eyerman v. Mercantile Tr. Co., 524 
S.W.2d 210, 212, 217 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (invalidating a directive to an executor to 
raze a home as “capricious” and “senseless” and finding that no motive was evidenced), 
and Will of Pace, 400 N.Y.S.2d 488, 492–93 (Sur. Ct. 1977) (characterizing a provision 
to demolish two houses as “unnecessary”), and In re Meksras Estate, 63 Pa. D. & C.2d 
371, 371, 373 (C.P. Phila. Cty. 1974) (invalidating decedent’s request to be buried with 
her jewelry, reasoning that it would create “a great potential for public harm” i.e., grave 
robbing), with Nat’l City Bank v. Case W. Reserve Univ., 369 N.E.2d 814, 818–19 
(Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1976) (upholding a testamentary directive to raze a home after eval-
uating the testator’s purpose).  In National City Bank, testimony was received indicat-
ing that the 
 
surrounding neighborhood had changed over the years from exclusively resi-
dential to one where the older houses were being converted to other uses, nurs-
ing homes, business offices, rooming houses, and that she did not want her 
house to be used for such purposes, that she had a great affection for it, that she 
felt in view of the location, the size of the house, the expense of upkeep, that it 
had no future as a residential property and that, therefore, she wanted it de-
stroyed. . . .  [S]he did not enumerate the various non-residential purposes that 
other houses in the locality had been converted to, but referred to it, generally, 
but it was the use of the house for other than residential purposes that she felt 
she did not want the home that meant so much to her converted to. 
 
Nat’l City Bank, 369 N.E.2d at 816–17; accord In re Beck, 676 N.Y.S.2d 838, 841 (Sur. 
Ct. 1998) (respecting a testamentary wish to demolish a home in view of the decedent 
having “personally treasured” the property).  The Pace court, by contrast, speculated 
that the testator’s demolition instruction “was apparently to memorialize the property 
by having it remain vacant for the term of the trust” and noted that “absurd” directives 
would not be enforced.  Pace, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 491, 493.  Demolition or destruction 
can be contrasted with preservation of property without regard to any societal or indi-
vidual benefit.  See MARSH, supra note 35, at 76 (describing Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes’ fourth and last codicil to his will, which “allowed the Executor to keep open 
the residences which Holmes owned, and to continue paying the employees ‘for such 
time as, in his absolute discretion, he may deem necessary . . . without any obligation 
to utilize said residences for the production of income’”).  
 78. Destruction of a chattel – jus abutendi – is generally permissible as an inherent 
property right (a form of use and enjoyment).  See JOHN HERBERT WILLIAMS & 
WILLIAM MORSE CROWDY, GOODEVE’S MODERN LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 17 (5th 
ed. 1912); see also, e.g., In re Estate of Jones, 389 A.2d 436, 438 (N.H. 1978) (noting 
that where testator leaves farm to charity for the protection of forests, a discretionary 
power to raze farm buildings may be reasonable).  The owner’s motivations are seldom 
examined.  Thus, for example, the heir of American artist Robert Henri could – and did 
– destroy around 550 of what she deemed inferior paintings in order to prop up the 
16
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Access limitations to creative works can represent similar aesthetic restraints 
to other use limitations: they can represent an important aspect of an author’s 
vision for their creation.  In 1972, Jerry Lewis made a film titled The Day the 
Clown Cried in which he starred as a German clown named Helmut Doork.79  
The clown, as retribution for mocking Hitler, was assigned to entertain children 
before they were murdered in gas chambers.80  The film has never been re-
leased or made available to the public.81  Lewis said it was a bad film and that 
he was embarrassed by it.82  Yet he seems to have had some pride in it notwith-
standing that the film was never fully completed; it survives as an unfinished 
rough cut.83  Only a very small number of people have seen the film, although 
a thirty-minute segment was recently leaked onto the Internet.84  Lewis retained 
 
demand and price of her remaining collection.  SAX, supra note 14, at 146.  An owner 
of a Jackson Pollock painting may cut it up into bits, selling those bits for more than he 
could have sold the intact work.  Julius S. Held, Alteration and Mutilation of Works of 
Art, 62 S. ATLANTIC Q. 1, 14 (1963).  Testamentary directive to destroy animals have 
not been well received.  Abigail J. Sykas, Note, Waste Not, Want Not: Can the Public 
Policy Doctrine Prohibit the Destruction of Property by Testamentary Direction?, 25 
VT. L. REV. 911, 939–43 (2001) (discussing testamentary directives to destroy ani-
mals).  The underlying motives of a testator to direct a pet’s euthanasia might vary from 
feeling the pet could not adapt to a life without its owner to concerns that no one would 
adopt it and that it might be euthanized anyway.  BARRY SELTZER & GERRY W. BEYER, 
FAT CATS & LUCKY DOGS: HOW TO LEAVE (SOME OF) YOUR ESTATE TO YOUR PET 64 
(Jim Bee ed., 2010).  “Courts are notoriously unsympathetic to people who request 
healthy animals to be euthanized, however.”  Id. (citing a Canadian man’s testamentary 
directive to have his “horses shot by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and then bur-
ied.”).  The killing of an animal, however, will not uniformly be construed as the de-
struction of property.  Cattle who are slaughtered as a prerequisite to turning their flesh 
into marketable hamburgers are not being destroyed; indeed, the cattle as chattels are 
being improved, commercially speaking. 
 79. Bruce Handy, Jerry Goes to Death Camp!, SPY, May 1992, at 40, 42 [herein-
after, Handy I]. 
 80. Id. at 42.  Handy describes the film’s plot: “An unhappy German circus clown 
is sent to a concentration camp and forced to become a sort of genocidal Pied Piper, 
entertaining Jewish children as he leads them to the gas chambers.”  Id. 
 81. Alison Cooper, Why Was ‘The Day the Clown Cried’ Never Released?, 
HOWSTUFFWORKS, https://entertainment.howstuffworks.com/why-was-day-clown-
cried-never-released.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2018). 
 82. Melissa Locker, Jerry Lewis’s Holocaust Movie May Finally See the Light of 
Day, VANITY FAIR (Aug. 8, 2015, 1:49 PM), https://www.vanityfair.com/holly-
wood/2015/08/jerry-lewis-holocaust-clown-movie.  Lewis has also said, “It’s [either] 
better than Citizen Kane or the worst piece of shit that anyone ever loaded on the pro-
jector.”  Id. 
 83. Bruce Handy, The French Film Critic Who Saw Jerry Lewis’s Infamous Hol-
ocaust Movie – and Loved It, VANITY FAIR (Aug. 21, 2017, 11:00 AM), 
https://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2017/08/jerry-lewis-day-the-clown-cried-hol-
ocaust-movie-review. 
 84. Mahita Gajanan, Thirty Minutes of Jerry Lewis’s The Day the Clown Cried 
Released Online, VANITY FAIR (June 18, 2016, 2:31 PM), https://www.vani-
tyfair.com/hollywood/2016/06/watch-jerry-lewis-the-day-the-clown-cried.  According 
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only a single film print and kept it hidden in his office;85 the internet-released 
segment was cobbled together from various sources including title cards and a 
German documentary on the film.86  After Lewis’ death in 2017, it was reported 
that he donated his copy of the film to the Library of Congress in exchange for 
a covenant not to show the film until 2025.87  Lewis’ estate retained the copy-
right.88  The Library of Congress received title to the tangible copy from Lewis’ 
briefcase.89 
An artist’s desire to preserve and secrete an artistic creation (for fifty-two 
years in the case of The Day the Clown Cried) is somewhat uncommon.  But 
Lewis’ desires are understandable given his simultaneous feelings of embar-
rassment and measured satisfaction about his film.  In the case of an artist’s 
private letters, desires to preserve and suppress are both more likely and more 
sympathetic.  There are privacy objectives present, after all.  Opera composer 
Giuseppe Verdi questioned the public interest in an artist’s private letters: 
Why should anyone drag out a musician’s letters?  They are always 
written in haste, without care, without his attaching any importance to 
them, because he knows that he has no reputation to sustain as a writer.  
Isn’t it enough that he should be booed for his music?  No, sir!  The 
letters too!  Oh, what a plague fame is!  The poor little great celebrated 
men pay dearly for popularity.  Never an hour of peace for them, either 
in life or in death.90 
 
to Lewis, only he, his father, and his manager have seen the film.  Chris Nashawaty, 
The Day Jerry Lewis (Finally) Talked About the Day the Clown Cried, ENT. WKLY. 
(Aug. 19, 2013, 9:54 PM), http://ew.com/movies/2013/08/19/jerry-lewis-day-clown-
died/. 
 85. Handy I, supra note 79, at 43.  It allegedly is kept in a Louis Vuitton briefcase 
for safe keeping.  Id. 
 86. Gajanan, supra note 84. 
 87. Lou Lumenick, You’ll Finally Be Able to See Jerry Lewis’s Holocaust Film – 
in 2024, N.Y. POST (Aug. 10, 2015, 11:58 AM), http://nypost.com/2015/08/10/youll-
finally-be-able-to-see-jerry-lewis-holocaust-film-in-2024/.  Note that the use and alien-
ability limitations are temporary and arise out of a contractual relationship between 
Jerry Lewis and the Library of Congress.  The promisor agreed to the use limitations in 
exchange for other value. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See Handy I, supra note 79, at 43. 
 90. GEORGE MARTIN, VERDI: HIS MUSIC, LIFE AND TIMES 95 (1963).  Verdi wrote 
these words as a sixty-eight-year-old in response to a friend’s gift to him of a biograph-
ical article on Vincenzo Bellini.  Id.; cf. SAX, supra note 14, at 139 (“[Stephen Joyce] 
added the following interesting perspective: . . .  ‘[W]hy cannot [private] papers and 
letters be locked up, embargoed, or access be limited to scholars only?”‘). 
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Nebraska-raised novelist Willa Cather (1873-1947)91 wished her private 
letters to remain private.  The seventh paragraph of her will asked her succes-
sors to “prevent any ‘dramatization’ of her works and to prevent ‘publication 
in any form whatsoever, of the whole, or any part of any letter or letters written 
by me in my lifetime.’”92  Her wishes were recently disregarded with the sup-
port of her estate’s executors.93  Would it be possible to better achieve Cather’s 
aims?  Let us assume that Cather had engaged an estate planning attorney with 
instructions that her unpublished, private correspondence remain hidden and 
viewed only sparingly by students and scholars after her death.94  In our hypo-
thetical, Cather does not desire to destroy the correspondence, and any instruc-
tion to her executor to burn her letters may be unenforceable on grounds of 
public policy anyway since postmortem destruction instructions often fail.95  
She does instruct the letter recipients, however, to destroy her letters – some 
do so, others do not.96 
 
 91. Chronology, WILLA CATHER ARCHIVE, https://cather.unl.edu/life.chronol-
ogy.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2018). 
 92. Andrew Jewell, Why Obscure the Record?: The Psychological Context of 
Willa Cather’s Ban on Letter Publication, 40 BIOGRAPHY 399, 399–400 (2017). 
 93. See THE SELECTED LETTERS OF WILLA CATHER (Andrew Jewell & Janis Stout 
eds., 2013) [hereinafter SELECTED LETTERS]; see also Jewell, supra note 92, at 401. 
 94. Willa Cather in fact made this request.  See Introduction to SELECTED 
LETTERS, supra note 93, at x.  Some may suspect that she worried that the correspond-
ence might reveal her sexual orientation or other private matters.  See, e.g., Phillip 
Knightley, T.E. Lawrence, in THE CRAFT OF LITERARY BIOGRAPHY 154, 155-56 (Jef-
frey Meyers ed., 1985) (explaining T.E. Lawrence’s brother’s decision to lift an em-
bargo on private letters revealing how T.E. Lawrence paid an army mate to flagellate 
him was based upon a belief the papers would explain the event sympathetically – 
“[t]he beatings were intended to achieve a subjection of the body by methods advocated 
by the saints”); SAX, supra note 14, at 141 (highlighting how Henry James “burn[ed] 
letters in his possession and instruct[ed] his executor to do the same”); Adam J. Hirsch, 
Bequests for Purposes: A Unified Theory, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 33, 76 n.157 (1999) 
[hereinafter Hirsch, Bequests] (describing the Valley of the Dolls’ author, Jacqueline 
Susaan’s request to her executor to destroy her diary to avoid “embarrass[ing] those 
mentioned within it”). 
 95. See In re Scott’s Will, 93 N.W. 109, 109 (Minn. 1903) (assuming arguendo 
that a codicil directing the destruction of money would be void); see generally Lior 
Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781 (2005); see sources cited 
supra notes 78–79.  The instruction to an executor to destroy letters also runs the risk 
that the executor will simply disregard the instruction, and no one seems to have stand-
ing to enforce the directive.  See SAX, supra note 14, at 45–47 (detailing how W.H. 
Auden’s and Franz Kafka’s instructions to their respective executors to burn their let-
ters were ignored).  The solution to this defect – the lack of anyone who might be 
harmed by an otherwise enforceable use or alienability restriction – is a “purpose trust 
enforcer,” which is discussed infra Section II.C.2.d. 
 96. Willa Cather actually made this request as well.  Bohlke, supra note 45, at 171.  
Some of her correspondents complied with Cather’s request to destroy her letters, but 
others predictably disobeyed her and instead “contributed the letters to various collec-
tions across the country.”  Id. 
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The twentieth century boasts a complex evolution of copyright terms, so 
let us further assume today’s copyright laws apply and  avoid any possible issue 
with “will-bumping.”97  We can safely conclude that federal copyright protec-
tions for any published Cather writings extend seventy years beyond Cather’s 
death (thus, lapsing in 2018).98  As to her unpublished, private letters, common 
law copyright will attach indefinitely or at least as long as they remain un-
published.99  To further streamline the problem, we will also assume that Ca-
ther destroyed letters written to her by others and that her concern is focused 
on letters she authored and retained copies of before mailing.  We will also 
assume that Cather retained all copyright privileges to her own letters despite 
having mailed the physical originals to her addressees.100  In common law, first 
publication copyright ends only upon the distribution of a writing.101  Common 
 
 97. “Will-bumping” refers to the circumstances “where an author of a work cre-
ated prior to 1978 devises his or her entire copyright interest to a person or persons 
other than the surviving spouse, children, executors, or next of kin.”  Michael Rosen-
bloum, Note, Give Me Liberty and Give Me Death: The Conflict Between Copyright 
Law and Estates Law, 4 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 163, 188 (1996).  The term was coined by 
Professor Francis Nevins.  Id. at 187 n.142 (citing Francis M. Nevins, Jr., The Magic 
Kingdom of Will-Bumping: Where Estates Law and Copyright Law Collide, 35 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 77, 78 (1988)). 
 98. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012).  Private correspondence is neither a “work for hire” 
nor pseudonymous works, which would enjoy a different copyright term enduring from 
the date of initial publication.  Id. § 302(c).  Indeed, the federal copyright protections 
for Cather’s letters did end in 2018.  The Complete Letters of Willa Cather: Introduc-
tion, WILLA CATHER ARCHIVE, https://cather.unl.edu/letters/about (last visited Sept. 1, 
2018) (“In 2018, Cather’s letters enter into the public domain . . . .”). 
 99. See 17 U.S.C. § 104(a) (2012) (providing that unpublished copyrightable 
works “are subject to protection under this title”).  “Ownership of a document does not 
automatically carry with it the Common Law Copyright [, but] a sale of all rights to an 
artistic work by the owner will ordinarily include the right not only of ownership [] but 
also the Common Law Copyright . . . .”  Rosenberg v. Zimet, 913 N.Y.S.2d 547, 549 
(Sup. Ct. 2010). 
 100. “A copyright is separate and distinct from ownership . . . .”  Rosenberg, 913 
N.Y.S.2d at 549; accord Pushman v. N.Y. Graphic Soc., Inc., 39 N.E.2d 249, 251 
(1942) (reasoning that an artist’s sale of his painting impliedly includes the reproduc-
tion rights). 
 101. Chamberlain v. Feldman, 89 N.E.2d 863, 865 (N.Y. 1949); see also Walker v. 
Time Life Films, Inc., 1983 WL 37482, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 18, 1983) (“Although 
Common law copyright in an unpublished work lasts indefinitely, it is extinguished 
immediately upon publication of the work by the author.”). 
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law copyright protection is therefore indefinite.102  Federal copyright protec-
tions are not.103  In our hypothetical, Willa Cather’s objective is quite simple: 
She wishes to preserve and tightly regulate the disclosure of her letters.  She 
wants to limit disclosure to serious scholars and students.  She does not want 
her private correspondence being leered at by those with merely prurient inter-
ests.  She wants the same dignified access to be ensured after her death as she 
exercised during life.104 
There are several categories of property embedded in this example.  The 
physical letters themselves – many of which are stored in archives across the 
country105 – need to be indexed.  First, there are the Cather’s self-authored let-
ters exclusively in her own possession; second, there are those letters held by 
both Cather (as a copy) and the recipient (the original).  We can also consider 
the physical letters themselves (tangible chattels) separately from the copy-
rights in the letters’ texts (intangible intellectual property).106  In sum, there are 
a total of four classes of property: the tangible unpublished works in joint cus-
tody, the tangible unpublished works in Cather’s sole possession, and the in-
tellectual property rights in those two classes.107  These four classes of property 
will be referred to simply as her “letters.”  As Cather’s lawyers, we will be 
incapable of controlling the physical copies in the hands of the letter recipients.  
 
 102. See Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 244 N.E.2d 250, 254 (N.Y. 
1968) (“Common-law copyright is the term applied to an author’s proprietary interest 
in his literary or artistic creations before they have been made generally available to the 
public.”); Chamberlain, 89 N.E.2d at 865 (observing that common law copyright per-
mits an author “to keep meritorious literary achievement out of the public domain for 
[a] long a time” but decline to “express[] any views of our own as to the advisability of 
permitting literary flowers so to blush unseen”); Walker, 1983 WL 37482, at *2. 
 103. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (expiring seventy years after the author’s death). 
 104. See Jewell, supra note 92, at 420 (speculating that Cather banned the publica-
tion of her letter because “the future could not and should not be entrusted with her 
personal correspondence, especially those hundreds of letters written to family and 
friends that revealed her relatively unguarded self”). 
 105. Robert Thacker, Four “New” Cather Letters to Annie Fields at the Huntington 
Library, WILLA CATHER ARCHIVE, https://cather.unl.edu/cs003_letters.html (last vis-
ited Sept. 1, 2018). 
 106. The tangible paper and text and the copyright thereto are severable and sepa-
rate property interests.  Henry Bill Pub. Co. v. Smythe, 27 F. 914, 923–24 (S.D. Ohio 
1886).  For example, I own a copy of Willa Cather’s novel Death Comes for the Arch-
bishop.  I do not own the right to make copies of it, license the creation of derivative 
works, etc., but I can freely alienate my physical copy.  See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012) 
(providing that the owner of a copy of a copyrighted work “is entitled, without the 
authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that 
copy”). 
 107. The fact that Willa Cather mailed the letters to their recipients does not mean 
that the letters were “published” for copyright purposes; they remain unpublished after 
being deposited in the U.S. Mail.  See Zachary v. W. Publ’g Co., 143 Cal. Rptr. 34, 44 
(Ct. App. 1978) (concluding that an author retained common law copyright protections 
to drawings of a kite design because filing for a patent of the same did not constitute 
publication). 
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Even though the recipients do not hold the copyright, the recipients’ ability to 
allow access and permit selective quoting from them may be permissible under 
copyright’s fair use doctrine.108  Our focus will be on Cather’s physical letters 
in Cather’s exclusive control and their copyright.  Although today most of Ca-
ther’s letters are available to anyone with an internet connection,109 our hypo-
thetical considers an alternative reality where her privacy concerns might be 
better implemented. 
The simplest or most obvious technique by which we could try to achieve 
Willa Cather’s aims would be for her to saddle these tangible and intangible 
assets with use and alienability restrictions like the donor of the 1963 Thunder-
bird attempted to withhold modification rights to the car from its donee.  Could 
Cather simply proclaim what she permits and does not permit with regards to 
her letters after her death?  Could she devise the letters but withhold rights to 
share or disseminate them widely?  These attempts would likely be ineffective 
 
 108. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (“The fact that a work is unpublished shall not 
itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above 
factors.”); Matthew Sag, The Prehistory of Fair Use, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1371, 1371 
(2011) (“[A]cademics, critics, journalists, teachers, film makers, fan-fiction writers, 
and technology companies all rely on the fair use doctrine to give them a certain amount 
of freedom in dealing with other people’s copyrights.”). 
 109. See The Complete Letters of Willa Cather: Introduction, supra note 98.  The 
archive explains, 
 
Willa Cather’s will, executed in 1943, requested that her letters not be pub-
lished in whole or in part, a request that was honored for over 65 years.  In 2009, 
however, the literary trust created by Cather’s will ceased to function, and a 
new entity was created to manage Cather’s literary properties.  The Willa Cather 
Trust, a partnership between the education-centered Willa Cather Foundation 
and the University of Nebraska Foundation, decided that the time had come to 
acknowledge Cather’s importance to the greater culture and allow her letters to 
be published.  The Trust implemented this change of policy, effective in 2011 . 
. . .  
 
. . . . 
 
In 2018, Cather’s letters enter into the public domain, allowing for unre-
stricted publication of these once heavily-restricted documents.  Our edition of 
The Complete Letters of Willa Cather honors the wide range of readers and 
scholars interested in Cather’s work by providing free, open access to the texts 
of the letters and the treasure of information they contain. . . . As the title indi-
cates, The Complete Letters of Willa Cather aims to publish all of Cather’s 
known surviving correspondence, which currently is approaching 3,100 letters.  
These letters are held in nearly 90 different repositories around the world.  Ra-
ther than wait until all of the letters are ready for publication in the edition – 
which we currently believe will be in 2021 – we have decided to publish groups 
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as constituting “waste” or violating other doctrines favoring free alienability.110  
Cather might caution her devisees about sharing the letters with individuals 
other than serious scholars and students.  Mere precatory instructions, however, 
are insufficient.111  Attempts at binding admonitions that withhold publication, 
alienation, or use rights to her letters are unenforceable.112  This Section pro-
poses that a purpose trust that holds the letters as its res could largely accom-
plish the novelist’s objective of keeping her letters mostly private.113  A non-
charitable purpose trust could accomplish Cather’s aims. 
What is most interesting is not Willa Cather’s conveyance of her objec-
tives to the right literary executor, but rather Willa Cather’s creation of an ar-
tificial person – a trust – that she shapes and constructs.114  Properly drafted, 
 
 110. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 123 (1976) (declaring congressional ad-
herence to “[t]he principle of unlimited alienability of copyright”); see also, e.g., Gan-
gemi v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Fairfield, 763 A.2d 1011, 1017 (Conn. 2001) 
(characterizing a “no rental condition” as violating “the policy against economic waste” 
because it results in a “significant differential in value” without a “legal or useful pur-
pose in doing so”); Daniel Martin, Note, Dispersing the Cloud: Reaffirming the Right 
to Destroy in a New Era of Digital Property, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 467, 479 (2017) 
(“[I]n the late twentieth century and up to the present, courts and commentators began 
to reexamine the right to destroy.”). 
 111. See Bohlke, supra note 45, at 172 (noting the letters of Willa Cather that have 
been published “whet the appetite in such a way that one can only hope her complete 
extant correspondence might be made available soon”). 
 112. E.g., Durbin v. Durbin, 153 N.E.2d 706, 710 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957) (“[A]ny 
attempt to restrict the right of the holder to alienate his interest is null and void.”) (ci-
tation omitted); Nashville, C. & S. L. Ry. v. Bell, 39 S.W.2d 1026, 1028 (Tenn. 1931) 
(“[A] condition in a grant of a fee which restrains all power of alienation is void . . . .”).  
“Property law disfavors restraints on alienation and dead-hand control by prior own-
ers.”  United States v. Evans, 844 F.2d 36, 42 (2d Cir. 1988).  And use limitations may 
be construed as disabling restraints.  E.g., Casey v. Casey, 700 S.W.2d 46, 47–49 (Ark. 
1985) (holding void a devise of certain property to the testator’s son with the limitation 
that the son’s estate should terminate if the son’s daughter ever became the owner or 
tenant of the property or if she were ever a guest upon the property for more than one 
week per year).  This “principle [that] prevents a person from imposing restraints on 
alienation inconsistent with the nature of the estate given applies equally to personal 
and to real estate, and general restraint on the alienation of articles, things, and chattels, 
except when a very special kind of property is involved . . . .”  Durbin, 153 N.E.2d at 
710 (alteration in original). 
 113. See generally Kenneth D. Crews, Fair Use of Unpublished Works: Burdens of 
Proof and the Integrity of Copyright, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (1999) (explicating fair use 
doctrine in connection with unpublished manuscripts). 
 114. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. a (AM. LAW. INST. 2001) (“In-
creasingly, modern common-law and statutory concepts and terminology tacitly recog-
nize the trust as a legal ‘entity,’ consisting of the trust estate and the associated fiduciary 
relation between the trustee and the beneficiaries.”); see also Edward C. Halbach, Jr., 
Uniform Acts, Restatements, and Trends in American Trust Law at Century’s End, 88 
CAL. L. REV. 1877, 1882 (2000) (“[T]ax law . . . has long treated the typical trust as an 
entity separate from the person who serves as trustee.”).  But see Deborah S. Gordon, 
Trusting Trust, 63 U. KAN. L. REV. 497, 512–14 (2015) (summarizing the theoretical 
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the trust will itself hold and exhibit Cather’s artistic vision because it will have 
been stitched into the trust’s fabric.  A thoughtfully drafted trust will result in 
the creation of a new owner that has been programmed with Cather’s artistic 
values.  In a sense, Cather will have infused her artistic values into her trust.  
She will have embodied in her trustee “a special kind of qualified, obligation-
bearing ownership.”115  This trust can take the form of a testamentary trust 
within the text of Cather’s Last Will and Testament. 
Before diagramming this idea of an artistic virtue trust as a means by 
which Willa Cather might achieve postmortem control over her private corre-
spondence, an excursion into the background and development of purpose 
trusts is required.116  Purpose trusts – trusts designed to accomplish an aim ra-
ther than benefit a beneficiary – had a rather difficult birth, opposing, as they 
do at several key points, the law’s disfavor of property use limitations and trust 
 
scholarship of Professors John Langbein, Robert Sitkoff, and David Horton).  I submit 
that transactional and relational ways of viewing purpose trust, in particular, are less 
helpful than entity models because of the more difficult conceptual problems of visu-
alizing the relationship between the trustee and a noncharitable purpose.  See James L. 
Musselman, Separate but Equal: Proposal for Harmonizing the Rules for Marital 
Property Characterization of Beneficial Interests in and Distributions from Trusts with 
Those Applicable to Similar Types of Property, 5 EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 
55, 69 (2012) (“[Some] appellate courts have effectively treated trusts as separate legal 
entities for purposes of marital property characterization of beneficial interests in trusts 
and undistributed trust income, but the courts have not done so in characterizing trust 
income distributed by the trustee to the beneficiaries.”). 
 115. SAX, supra note 14, at 6.  Professor Sax was referring to the kind of title on 
owner enjoyed in the Middle Ages to a religious relic.  Id.  Relics could be owned by 
private individuals, but because of the religious significance to the community, “owners 
were required to protect them in various ways – for example, by safeguarding them 
from danger (not displaying them when going into battle), or by depositing them in a 
secure and appropriately dignified place such as a religious institution.”  Id.  Professor 
Sax contrasts this flavor of title with the general treatment: unqualified ownership that 
“enables owners to exercise unbridled power over owned objects, whatever the loss to 
science, scholarship, or art.”  Id. at 3. 
 116. Here – and elsewhere – I am particularly indebted to Professor Ausness’s com-
prehensive article.  See generally Richard C. Ausness, Non-Charitable Purpose Trusts: 
Past, Present, and Future, 51 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 321 (2016).  Other particu-
larly noteworthy purpose trust scholars are Professor Adam Hirsch and practicing at-
torney/scholar Alexander Bove.  See generally Hirsch, Bequests, supra note 94; Adam 
J. Hirsch, Delaware Unifies the Law of Charitable and Noncharitable Purpose Trusts, 
36 EST. PLAN. 13 (2009) [hereinafter Hirsch, Delaware Unifies]; Adam J. Hirsch, Free-
dom of Testation / Freedom of Contract, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2180, 2215–21 (2011) [here-
inafter Hirsch, Freedom]; Adam J. Hirsch, Trusts for Purposes: Policy, Ambiguity, and 
Anomaly in the Uniform Laws, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 913 (1999) [hereinafter Hirsch, 
Trust for Purposes]; Alexander A. Bove, Jr., The Purpose of Purpose Trusts, GPSOLO, 
Mar. 2005, at 18 [hereinafter Bove I, The Purpose of Purpose]; Alexander A. Bove, Jr., 
The Purpose of Purpose Trusts, PROB. & PROP., June 2004, at 34  [hereinafter Bove II, 
The Purpose of Purpose]. 
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law’s reliance on beneficiary rights as enforcement mechanisms.117  A histori-
cal outline is necessary to fully appreciate the forces aligned against the kind 
of dead hand control that our hypothetical client, Willa Cather, wants to 
achieve.  Today, purpose trusts are recognized, but typically in the “pet trust” 
form – a very different use than is proposed here.118  The basic principles of 
trusts, their origins, and their architecture will set the stage for an outline of the 
recognized varieties of purpose trusts.119  Following an examination of purpose 
trusts, certain recurring problems with purpose trusts will be noted.120  Next, 
this Section will chart current statutory frameworks for constructing purpose 
trusts.121  Finally, this Section will conclude with an exploration of purpose 
trusts as a means to vest artists with appropriate levels of postmortem control 
over their works and will consider how we might best achieve Willa Cather’s 
goals for her letters.122 
B. Origins and a Brief Introduction to Trust Architecture 
The original impetus for trusts derived primarily from a property problem 
in pre-sixteenth-century England: One could not devise land by a will.123  Land 
was inheritable but not devisable until 1540.124  If land were devisable, the 
feudal lord’s rights to revenue from reliefs, wardships, and marriages would 
have been jeopardized.125  A lord’s revenue could be equated with taxes of 
today.  Trusts arose to achieve control over property not otherwise available as 
a matter of law and also to minimize the lord’s ability to collect.126  The original 
 
 117. See Jennifer E. Levy, Comment, Idaho’s Noncharitable Purpose Trust Statute: 
Leaping over Age-Old Trust Laws in a Single Bound, 44 IDAHO L. REV. 801, 813–14 
(2008) (“The noncharitable purpose trust played tug-of-war for many years[,] . . . [and] 
[t]he continued hostility towards the noncharitable purpose trust presumably continued 
because of its appearance as an egotistic device employed primarily by the wealthy . . 
. .”). 
 118. “Most attorneys . . . associate noncharitable purpose trusts with pet trusts be-
cause ‘[t]he thrust in the United States to adopt purpose trust legislation appears to be 
largely related to and motivated by the public’s desire to be able to establish valid trusts 
for their pets.’”  Id. at 820 (alteration in original) (quoting Bove II, The Purpose of 
Purpose, supra note 116, at 35). 
 119. Infra Section II.B & C. 
 120. Infra Section II.D. 
 121. Infra Section II.E. 
 122. Infra Section II.F. 
 123. Kent D. Schenkel, Trust Law and the Title-Split: A Beneficial Perspective, 78 
UMKC L. REV. 181, 185 (2009). 
 124. Id. at 185 n.19 (“The first Statute of Wills was not promulgated until 1540.”). 
 125. Id. 
 126. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS ch. 1, introductory note, at 3 (AM. LAW. 
INST. 2001) (describing the evolution of the trust as “a device for flexible, long-term 
settlement of family property”).  “By employment of the ‘use,’ feudal landowners could 
devise property, avoid the feudal incidents of tenancy (e.g.[,] ward, marriage, relief, 
heriot, escheat, and aids), protect land from attachment by creditors, and create certain 
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creative impulses from which trusts sprang were thus private, donative goals 
coupled with some tax avoidance ambitions.127 
Trusts arose originally in English law as “uses” transplanted from early 
German law.128  In German law, the trustee’s duties were merely honorary (that 
is, unenforceable).129  With English law, the obligations of a trustee (that is, the 
“feoffee to uses”)130 became binding and enforceable in the courts of equity in 
order to secure the rights of the beneficiary (the cestui que use).131  The recog-
nition of binding trustee obligations was brought on by landowners “retaining 
for themselves land [that] they had received upon the faith of their dealing” 
when the common law gave no remedy.132  At early common law, the feoffee 
was the absolute owner.133  But the property had been conveyed with an under-
standing that the feoffee held the property for another’s benefit.134  The courts 
of law were unsympathetic in enforcing the feoffe’s obligations.135  Equity 
stepped into the breach and ordered these feoffees to hold land for the benefit 
of their cestui que use.136  Thus, the concept of a trust – a personal obligation 
of a trustee holding legal title to property for the benefit of another – was 
 
types of future interest.”  Payson R. Peabody, Comment, Taming CERCLA: A Proposal 
to Resolve the Trustee ‘Owner’ Liability Quandary, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 405, 432 
n.117 (1994). 
 127. See Kesling v. Kesling, 967 N.E.2d 66, 81 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS ch. 1, introductory note (AM. LAW. INST. 1959)) 
(“[T]he creation of a trust is a method of disposing of property”); Peabody, supra note 
126, at 432 (noting the adverse revenue effects on England’s treasury caused by trusts). 
 128. James Barr Ames, The Origin of Uses and Trusts, 21 HARV. L. REV. 261, 263 
(1908). 
 129. Id. at 265.  “[T]he transformation of the honorary obligation of the feoffee into 
a legal obligation was a purely English development.”  Id. 
 130. A “feoffee to uses” is a trustee.  Ashhurst v. Given, 5 Watts & Serg. 323, 327 
(Pa. 1843).  The trustee held legal title to trust property but “notwithstanding the legal 
estate was vested in the feoffee to uses, equity stepped in to the relief of the cestui que 
use, and furnished a protection to the latter . . . .”  Id. 
 131. Barr Ames, supra note 128, at 264–65. 
 132. Id. at 265. 
 133. Tyndall v. Tyndall, 119 S.E. 354, 355 (N.C. 1923).  “[T]he feoffee was origi-
nally regarded in law as the real owner . . . .”  Id. 
 134. See Claiborne v. Henderson, 13 Va. 322, 343 (1809). 
 135. See Thatcher v. Omans, 20 Mass. 521, 529–30 (1792). 
 136. Barr Ames, supra note 128, at 265. 
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born.137  The most basic understanding of a trust is a relationship between two 
people – trustee and beneficiary – in regards to property.138 
We can therefore view a trust as a personal relation relative to a res – a 
status of property.139  When the owner of property creates a trust by transferring 
property to a trustee, she accomplishes a bifurcation of the legal and equitable 
interests between trustee and beneficiary while imposing fiduciary duties upon 
the trustee to carry out the terms of the trust.140  While a trustee holds property, 
legally speaking, the beneficiary too holds a property interest to the same res, 
equitably speaking.141 Alternatively, a trust is very much like a third-party-
beneficiary contract, although in a donative context rather than a commercial 
 
 137. E.g., McCreary v. Gewinner, 29 S.E. 960, 963 (Ga. 1898) (“A trust is an equi-
table obligation, either express or implied resting upon a person by reason of a confi-
dence reposed in him, to apply or deal with property for the benefit of some other per-
son, or for the benefit of himself and another or others, according to such confidence.”).  
Defining a trust as a kind of confidence can be traced back to Sir Edward Coke.  See 1 
JAIRUS WARE PERRY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 13, at 10 
(3d ed. 1882) (quoting Coke, “[A] trust is a confidence reposed in some other, not is-
suing out of the land, but as a thing collateral, annexed in privity to the estate of the 
land, and to the person touching the land, for which cestui que trust has no remedy but 
by subpoena in chancery”). 
 138. Barr Ames, supra note 128, at 271 n.5 (emphasizing that a trust “necessarily 
implies a relation between two persons”).  “[T]he common law will not allow a right in 
personam, an obligation, to be created without two parties.”  John Chipman Gray, Gifts 
for A Non-Charitable Purpose, 15 HARV. L. REV. 509, 512 (1902) (alteration in origi-
nal).  “It will not recognize a promisor without a promisee, a contractor without a con-
tractee, or a trustee without a cestui que trust.”  Id. 
 139. 5 WILLIAM J. BOWE & DOUGLAS H. PARKER, PAGE ON WILLS § 40.2 (2005);  
see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS § 2 (AM. LAW. INST. 1935) (defining a trust 
as “a fiduciary relationship with respect to property”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TRUSTS § 2 (AM. LAW INST. 2003). 
 140. See In re Adkisson, 26 B.R. 879, 882 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1983) (“As a general 
rule, a separation of legal title and equitable ownership of the trust property is necessary 
to the formation of an express trust.”); GERRY W. BEYER, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 
§ 18.1.2 (3d ed. 2005) (identifying the property interest held by a beneficiary as repre-
sented by “equitable title” without control while the trustee holds “legal title”); PERRY, 
supra note 137, at 11 (“[I]f an equitable estate and a legal estate meet in the same per-
son, the trust or confidence is extinguished, for the equitable estate merges in the legal 
estate.”); Schenkel, supra note 123, at 195–96 (highlighting how the equitable/legal 
title-split idea of trusts allows the numerous clausus rule that would otherwise restrict 
property interests to a finite number of clearly-defined forms). 
 141. But see GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 
§ 1, Westlaw (database updated June 2018) (“Whether the beneficiary has a property 
right in the subject matter of the trust (a right in rem), or merely a personal right against 
the trustee (a right in personam), is a question much debated.”). 
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one.142  A trust is therefore an owner-trustee bargain intended to benefit a ben-
eficiary.143  The trust is more donative than contractual.144  A trust is a different 
form of a gift – it is an alternative to an outright gift.145  At the same time, 
contractual aspects cannot be denied.  Upon the creation of a trust, the trustee 
agrees with the settlor to hold property, administer it, and distribute it as in-
structed to benefit a third party – the beneficiary.146  One cannot say that a trust 
is strictly a third-party beneficiary contract since typically one party to the 
agreement – the settlor – lacks the power to enforce the agreement.147  At the 
same time, a trust is also an artificial legal person similar to a corporation or an 
estate.148  A trust is treated as a person for tax purposes.149  A trust can sue and 
be sued and hire and fire advisors.150  Three views compete for explaining a 
 
 142. John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE 
L.J. 625, 627 (1995) (calling the two “functionally indistinguishable”). 
 143. In re Estate of Bodger, 279 P.2d 61, 67 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955).  “In legal 
contemplation [sic] a declaration of trust is nothing other than a third party beneficiary 
contract.”  Id. 
 144. See Scanlon v. Scanlon, 993 N.E.2d 855, 866 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013) (“[B]alanc-
ing the rights and requirements at issue in a trust dispute should be resolved in favor of 
upholding the donor’s intent when creating the trust.”). 
 145. See BEYER, supra note 140, at 305 (“In general, a trust scenario arises when a 
property owner wants to bestow benefits on a worthy individual or charity but does not 
want to make an unrestricted outright gift.”). 
 146. E.g., In re E. Paving Co., 293 B.R. 704, 710 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2003) (“A 
provision contained in an indemnity agreement . . . purporting to create a trust, without 
any evidence of the intention of the settlor to create a trust or impose restrictions on the 
use of the funds by the purported trustee, is insufficient by itself to create an enforceable 
express trust.”).  Contra Lah v. Rogers, 707 N.E.2d 1208, 1211–12 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1998) (reasoning that no “meeting of the minds” between settlor and trustee is neces-
sary to create a trust). 
 147. See Alaska State Emps. Ass’n v. Alaska Pub. Emps. Ass’n, 825 P.2d 451, 458 
n.8 (Alaska 1991) (“[A] settlor has created a trust, the settlor has no rights or powers 
with regard to the trust unless the trust instrument provides otherwise.”); Amundson v. 
Kletzing-McLaughlin Mem’l Found. Coll., 73 N.W.2d 114, 117 (Iowa 1955) (listing a 
plethora of cases supporting the proposition that a settlor absent empowerment is not 
entitled to sue); BOGERT ET AL., supra note 141 § 42.  With regards to charitable trusts, 
the rule of no-settlor-standing is beginning to erode.  Id. § 415. 
 148. See, e.g., Angelique Devaux et al., The Trust as More Than a Common Law 
Creature, 41 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 91, 93 (2014) (“[A] trust is a legal entity to hold, man-
age, and transfer property.”); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential 
Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 416 (2000) (“While it is sometimes 
said that the common-law trust lacks legal personality, in our view it is, on the contrary, 
quite clearly a legal entity . . . .”). 
 149. I.R.C. § 641(b) (2012). 
 150. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 105 cmt. a (AM. LAW. INST. 2011) 
(“[C]laims against a trust may be asserted by proceeding against the trustee in a repre-
sentative capacity.”); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 811 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000) (“A trustee 
shall take reasonable steps to enforce claims of the trust and to defend claims against 
the trust.”). 
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trust: (1) the trust as property bifurcation;151 (2) the trust as contract;152 and (3) 
the trust as entity.153 
In creating a trust, the necessary elements are (1) intent, (2) a res, and (3) 
ascertainable beneficiaries.154  A writing is not even required in most cases.155  
Nor is a trustee absolutely essential to the creation of a trust because a court 
 
 151. See Taliaferro v. Taliaferro, 921 P.2d 803, 809 (Kan. 1996). 
 152. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS § 17 cmt. f (AM. LAW. INST. 1935) (“If 
a person makes an enforceable promise to . . . make a conveyance of property to another 
person as trustee, a trust may be created . . . .”).  The contractual theory of trusts is most 
applicable to business trusts and commercial trusts, such as Real Estate Investment 
Trusts (“REIT”) or mutual funds.  John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The 
Trust as an Instrument of Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 165, 167–172 (1997). 
 153. Anderson v. Wilson, 289 U.S. 20, 27 (1933); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TRUSTS § 2 cmt. a (AM. LAW. INST. 2001).  For income tax purposes, any non-grantor 
trust is treated as a separate entity.  See James A. Nitsche, Income Taxation of the Fam-
ily After the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 26 J. FAM. L. 715, 715 (1988) (“[T]he income 
generated by the property held in trust will generally be taxed to the trust or the bene-
ficiary, depending upon whether the trust accumulates or distributes the income pursu-
ant to the terms of the trust instrument.”). 
 154. See BOGERT ET AL., supra note 141, §§ 45, 111, 161 (reciting the elements of 
settlor intent, ascertainable beneficiaries, and a res).  Thus, the three basic requirements 
for creating a trust are 
 
(1) an expression of intent that property be held, at least in part, for the benefit 
of one other than the settlor; (2) at least one beneficiary for whom the property 
is to be administered by the trustee; and (3) an interest in property which is in 
existence or is ascertainable and is to be held for the benefit of the beneficiary. 
 
Id. § 1 (footnotes omitted).  The res requirement is often recited as essential.  E.g., 
Begier v. I.R.S., 496 U.S. 53, 70 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“A trust without a res 
can no more be created by legislative decree than can a pink rock-candy mountain.”).  
But see UNIF. TRUST CODE § 402(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000) (requiring five ele-
ments to a valid trust: intent, settlor capacity, ascertainable beneficiaries, active duties 
of the trustee, and that “the same person is not the sole trustee and sole beneficiary” – 
while omitting the res requirement). 
 155. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 20 (AM. LAW. INST. 2001) (“Except as 
required by a statute of frauds, a writing is not necessary to create an enforceable inter 
vivos trust, whether by declaration, by transfer to another as trustee, or by contract.”).  
“Most states have enacted statutory provisions like [s]ection 7 of the English Statute of 
Frauds, specifically requiring a writing for the inter vivos creation of enforceable trusts 
of interests in land.”  Id. cmt. a.  And testamentary trusts must satisfy the applicable 
Wills Act since they are contained within the text of a will.  Id.   
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can always appoint one.156  Usually, a trust will not fail for want of a trustee.157  
One or more beneficiaries who can be ascertained, with or without some diffi-
culty, however, are essential.158  Extrinsic evidence may be admissible to 
properly identify a beneficiary, but if a beneficiary cannot be identified, the 
trust becomes impossible to enforce.159  Without beneficiaries, there is no 
trust.160  The existence of a beneficiary is essential because without one, there 
 
 156. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 31. 
 
Even though a trustee is essential to a trust, a trust does not fail simply because 
no trustee is provided by the terms of the trust or because, before or when or 
after the trust is created, the designated trustee dies, is unable or unwilling to 
act, or is removed. 
 
Id. cmt. a.  But see BOWE & PARKER, supra note 139, at 174 (“[If a trust] can be carried 
into effect only by the exercise of the personal discretion of the named trustee, this trust 
will, ordinarily, be held not exercisable by any person other than the trustee” and will 
therefore fail). 
 157. Childs v. Waite, 67 A. 311, 312 (Me. 1907); In re Jordan’s Estate, 197 A. 150, 
150 (Pa. 1938). 
 158. See Levy v. Levy, 33 N.Y. 97, 107 (1865) (“If there is a single postulate of the 
common law established by an unbroken line of decision, it is that a trust without a 
certain beneficiary who can claim its enforcement, is void, whether good or bad, wise 
or unwise.”).  “It cannot be claimed that, at common law, there can be a valid devise or 
bequest to an indefinite object, or a valid use without an ascertained cestui que trust or 
beneficiary.”  Id. at 101 (alteration in original); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TRUSTS § 44 (stating the ascertainable beneficiary rule). 
 159. Weaver v. Kirby, 119 S.E. 564, 566 (N.C. 1923), superseded by Ch. 630, Pub-
lic Laws of 1947, G.S. 36-23.1, as recognized in Banner v. N.C. Nat’l Bank, 146 S.E.2d 
89.  “There must be somebody in whose favor the court can decree performance.”  Id.  
 160. See Levy, 33 N.Y. at 104–05 (“In a trust limitation without a beneficiary, there 
is no one to enforce the trust, and necessarily it results to the heir . . . .”); Longoria v. 
Lasater, 292 S.W.3d 156, 168 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009) (“When an express trust fails, a 
resulting trust is generally implied in law.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 8 cmt. 
a  (providing that where a transfer to an intended trustee fails, “title to the property 
remains (with no need of the resulting-trust device) either in the would-be transferor or 
in the personal representative or beneficiaries of the testator’s estate”). 
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can be no trustee duties.161  A trustee without duties is not a trustee.162  Without 
the threat of enforcement from ascertainable beneficiaries, the trust collapses – 
unless a different kind of threat can sustain it. 
C. Types of Trusts: A Proposed Taxonomy 
Typically, trusts are ranked into two major divisions: express trusts and 
implied – or constructive, remedial – trusts.163  Express trusts are themselves 
divided into two major groups: charitable trusts and noncharitable (private) 
trusts.164  This is a sensible approach since charitable trusts enjoy a host of 
treatments and exemptions that are unique to them, such as tax breaks, cy 
pres,165 and enforcement by the attorney general.166  Noncharitable trusts do 
not enjoy these benefits. 
Despite the justifications of dividing express trusts into charitable and pri-
vate categories, this Section submits a different taxonomy of express trusts.  It 
 
 161. See, e.g., Clark v. Campbell, 133 A. 166, 170–71 (N.H. 1926) (trust for 
“friends” fails for lack of ascertainable beneficiaries); Heiss v. Murphey, 40 Wis. 276, 
292 (1876) (trust for “orphans” fails for a lack of ascertainable beneficiaries); UNIF. 
TRUST CODE § 402(a)(3) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000) (providing that a trust, other than 
a charitable trust or a purpose trust must have “a definite beneficiary”).  The Clark 
decision – considering a trust for the decedent’s “friends” – noted: “It was the evident 
purpose of the testator to invest his trustees with the power after his death to make 
disposition of the enumerated articles among an undefined class with practically the 
same freedom and irresponsibility that he himself would have exercised if living . . . .”  
Clark, 133 A. at 171.  That, the court concluded, violated the formality requirements of 
the Wills Act and the definiteness requirement of a noncharitable trust.  See id.  But see 
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 402(c) (“A power in a trustee to select a beneficiary from an in-
definite class is valid.”). 
 162. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 6(3) cmt. b (“If the Statute of Uses or 
similar statute or doctrine applies to some or all of the property held in a passive trust, 
the trustee’s legal (or possibly other) title to the affected property is extinguished and 
the beneficiary or beneficiaries take title to that property . . . .”). 
 163. E.g., Smiley v. Yllander, 105 So. 3d 1171, 1175 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012).  But 
see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 1  (categorizing trusts into three types: express 
trusts, implied or resulting trusts, and charitable trusts).  There are, in turn, two subtypes 
of implied trusts: constructive trusts and resulting trusts.  McGhee v. Mergenthal, 735 
N.W.2d 867, 870 (N.D. 2007).  Express noncharitable trusts – or “donative trusts” – 
might be divided into “caretaker” and “dynastic” subcategories.  LAWRENCE M. 
FRIEDMAN, DEAD HANDS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WILLS, TRUSTS, AND INHERITANCE 
LAW 113 (2009).  Implied, resulting, and constructive trusts are beyond the scope of 
this Article.  See generally Grace Murphy Long, Commentary, The Sunset of Equity: 
Constructive Trusts and the Law-Equity Dichotomy, 57 ALA. L. REV. 875 (2006). 
 164. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. a. 
 165. See infra Section II.C.1. 
 166. See 13 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW Trusts § 326 West (data-
base updated June 2018) (noting five favorable characteristics of charitable trusts: relief 
from RAP, a liberal construction, cy pres, tax exemption, and attorney general super-
vision). 
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contends that express trusts are comprised of two subgroups: trusts for ascer-
tainable beneficiaries and purpose trusts.167  Purpose trusts, in turn, may be 
considered as comprised of two subtypes: charitable trusts and noncharitable 
trusts.168  Charitable purpose trusts can be distinguished – sometimes not easily 
– from noncharitable (or private) purpose trusts because they involve promot-
ing health, relieving poverty, advancing religion or education, or other pur-
poses that benefit a community.169  Noncharitable purpose trusts can be thought 
of as any private trust without ascertainable beneficiaries that fails to qualify 
as “charitable.” 
Thus: 
I. Constructive Trusts 
II. Express Trusts 
A. Trusts for Ascertainable Beneficiaries 
B. Purpose Trusts 
1. Charitable Trusts 
2. Noncharitable Purpose Trusts 
Admittedly, this taxonomy is clumsy.  Its clumsiness lies in the fact that 
although a great many charitable trusts are purpose trusts, some charitable 
trusts are also trusts for ascertainable, charitable beneficiaries.  For example, 
the trust instrument in the famed Ladysmith Rescue Squad case directed the 
trustee to distribute the remainder to two named charitable beneficiaries – a 
volunteer fire department and the Ladysmith Volunteer Rescue Squad.170  The 
charitable beneficiaries were not only ascertainable, but they were identified 
by name.171  A charitable trust may therefore include ascertainable, charitable 
beneficiaries.172  This is the primary clumsiness with categorizing charitable 
 
 167. Some charitable purpose trusts look very much like noncharitable purpose 
trusts.  See, e.g., In re Estate of du Pont, 663 A.2d 470, 471–72 (Del. Ch. 1994) (con-
sidering a realty in a charitable trust to be used as a convalescent hospital and monu-
ment); Kolb v. City of Storm Lake, 736 N.W.2d 546, 548 (Iowa 2007) (describing a 
charitable trust “to maintain a flower garden at a designated location in a city park for 
the enjoyment of the public in the memory of a family member”). 
 168. See Hirsch, Delaware Unifies, supra note 116, at 17–18 (noting that as purpose 
trust law evolves, “its noncharitable branch has, in one respect, surpassed its charitable 
branch”). 
 169. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 405(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000); Statute of Charitable 
Uses Act 1601, 43 Eliz. I, c. 4 (Eng.).  “However, gifts for more esoteric purposes, such 
as trusts to teach poodles to dance or to prove the world is flat, may be struck down as 
not sufficiently in the public interest.”  Mary Kay Lundwall, Inconsistency and Uncer-
tainty in the Charitable Purposes Doctrine, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 1341, 1348 (1995). 
 170. Ladysmith Rescue Squad, Inc. v. Newlin, 694 S.E.2d 604, 606 (Va. 2010). 
 171. Id.  The named charities were (1) the Upper Caroline Volunteer Fire Depart-
ment, and (2) the Ladysmith Volunteer Rescue Squad.  Id. 
 172. See BOGERT ET AL., supra note 141, § 363.  See also Evelyn Brody, Whose 
Public? Parochialism and Paternalism in State Charity Law Enforcement, 79 IND. L.J. 
937, 957 (2004) (“[I]f we view the charity itself as the beneficiary, the [charity] does 
not need the help of the attorney general to enforce the proper use of the charitable 
assets.”). 
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trusts as a type of purpose trust – some charitable trusts are pure purpose trusts 
(without ascertainable beneficiaries), some are quasi-purpose trusts (with some 
beneficiaries named and some unnamed), and some are simply trusts for ascer-
tainable charitable (and/or noncharitable) beneficiaries.173 
Still, there is also a certain clarity that follows from this proposed taxon-
omy.  Charitable and noncharitable purpose trusts share four important com-
monalities.  First, charitable trusts, like noncharitable purpose trusts, occasion-
ally lack ascertainable beneficiaries.  A wealth of jurisprudence from over 500 
years’ worth of charitable trust history illuminates noncharitable purpose trusts.  
What has worked and failed with charitable trusts must be included as part of 
any discussion of trusts for noncharitable purposes.  Second, charitable trusts 
share with noncharitable purpose trusts the inherent tendency to violate the 
Rule Against Perpetuities (“RAP”).174  Without a savings clause,175 a trust stat-
ing, “distribute for the maintenance of my headstone” violates the rule just as 
a trust stating, “distribute for the maintenance of orphans in London.”176  Third, 
we will see with purpose trusts generally, as well as charitable trusts particu-
larly, repeated displays of settlor eccentricities with which the courts must 
 
 173. Perhaps a more complete taxonomy which recognizes charitable trusts as a 
subtype of purpose trusts would look like this:   
I.  Constructive Trusts 
II. Express Trusts 
     A. Trusts for Ascertainable Beneficiaries 
          1. Trusts with Ascertainable Individual Beneficiaries 
          2. Trusts with Ascertainable Charitable Beneficiaries 
     B. Purpose Trusts 
          1. Charitable Trusts (i.e., without ascertainable beneficiaries) 
          2. Noncharitable Purpose Trusts (i.e., without ascertainable beneficiaries) 
     C. Hybrid Purpose Trusts 
          1. Charitable Hybrid Purpose Trusts (e.g., split interest trusts) 
          2. Noncharitable Hybrid Purpose Trusts 
Hybrid purpose trusts are discussed infra at Section II.C.2.f.   
 174. See BOGERT ET AL., supra note 141, § 214 (outlining the history and status of 
RAP). 
 175. See infra note 405 for a sample RAP savings clause; see also, e.g., Fitchie v. 
Brown, 211 U.S. 321, 328–31 (1908) (finding a RAP savings clause stating an intent 
that the testamentary trust for “as long a period as is legally possible” sufficient). 
 176. E.g., In re Palethorp’s Estate, 24 Pa. D. 215, 220–21 (Orphans’ Ct.) (holding 
a trust to “to show people where [the testator’s gravesite] is” void as creating a perpe-
tuity), affirmed, 94 A. 1060 (1915). 
33
Simmons: A Will for Willa Cather
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
674 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
wrestle.177  Both charitable and noncharitable purpose trusts often reveal am-
bitious, and sometimes puzzling, aims.178  Finally, both charitable and nonchar-
itable purpose trusts can involve a serious structural problem requiring an an-
tidote: the lack of ascertainable beneficiaries to enforce the trustee’s obliga-
tions.  This structural deficiency is mended with both types of purpose trusts in 
different ways. 
1. Charitable Purpose Trusts 
Private trusts require an ascertainable beneficiary with standing to enforce 
a trustee’s obligations.179  Charitable trusts are permitted to violate this funda-
mental trust rule – charitable trusts may lack an ascertainable beneficiary.180  
Indeed, some seem to claim that a charitable trust benefits an indefinite class 
of persons.181  This may be because of the frequency with which charitable 
 
 177. See GARETH JONES, HISTORY OF THE LAW OF CHARITY 1532–1827, at 27 
(1969) (describing a bequest for “bows and arrows for children between the age of 
seven and seventeen” that Francis Moore concluded satisfied the public benefit element 
of  a charitable gift statute despite legal obligation of parents to provide such items); 
see also Rosser v. Prem, 449 A.2d 461, 463, 471 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982) (describing 
a devise to publish a book about the testator’s daughter where the evidence showed was 
“ungodly bad,” but the devise was nonetheless deemed charitable and enforceable). 
 178. See, e.g., Detwiller v. Hartman, 37 N.J. Eq. 347, 354 (Ch. 1883) (invalidating 
a trust to establish a cornet band to perform a funeral march on the anniversary of the 
testator’s death).  “Gifts which are made out of mere sentiment and have no practical 
result except the satisfying of a whim of the donor are obviously lacking in the wide-
spread social effect necessary to a charity.”  BOGERT ET AL., supra note 141, § 379. 
 
Thus, a trust to establish a museum to exhibit what a testator regarded as objects 
of art but which testimony establishes to be of no artistic value, or a trust to 
publish and distribute a testator’s views that are irrational or other writings that 
are of no literary or educational value, is not charitable. 
 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. a(2).  See also, e.g., In re Hill’s Estate, 
204 P. 1055, 1056 (Wash. 1922) (holding a trust to promote faith healing void as harm-
ful to public health). 
 179. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 44 (AM. LAW. INST. 2001).  To be validly 
created, a trust must include “a beneficiary who is ascertainable at the time or who may 
later become ascertainable within the period and terms of [RAP].”  Id. 
 180. Id. cmt. a. 
 181. See Russell v. Allen, 107 U.S. 163, 167 (1883) (“[Charitable trusts] may, and 
indeed must, be for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons; for if all the benefi-
ciaries are personally designated, the trust lacks the essential element of indefiniteness 
. . . .”); Bedford v. Bedford’s Adm’r, 35 S.W. 926, 931 (Ky. 1896) (“Indefiniteness . . 
. characterizes all charitable trusts to a greater or less degree . . . .”); W. Allen, Anno-
tation, Charitable Gifts; Definiteness, 163 A.L.R. 784, West (database updated weekly) 
(originally published in 1946) (“Their identity rests in the vague future . . . .”).  These 
decisions reason that it is the vagueness of a charitable trust that fulfills the public as-
pect of a charitable gift. 
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trusts lack ascertainable beneficiaries.  Yet a charitable trust could certainly be 
created to benefit charitable organizations by name (for example, the Salvation 
Army) or benefit charitable organizations that are capable of ascertainment (for 
example, all of the volunteer fire stations in a given county).182  Charitable 
trusts may function as passive distributors of wealth to charitable organiza-
tions, and they may operate as charities themselves.  For example, a trust di-
recting the trustee to alleviate hunger in a community that lacks a soup kitchen 
or food bank may need to create those social services in order to fulfill the 
purpose of the trust.  The majority of charitable trusts, however, operate pas-
sively, similar to private foundations by supporting governmental and non-
profit entities, which advance the charitable objectives that the settlor has ar-
ticulated in the trust instrument.183 
Where a trustee is directed to distribute towards the relief of poverty, the 
beneficiaries are unascertainable.  So, for example, where a poor person de-
mands an accounting or a food bank demands a distribution, a court would 
likely determine that they each lack standing because it is uncertain whether 
either would ever personally benefit from the trust.  Therefore, they lack stand-
ing to make demands upon the trustee.  This creates a problem; if no one has 
standing to sue a trustee for violating the trustee’s duties, then there is no 
trust.184  Vesting the state’s attorney general with standing to enforce charitable 
 
 182. See, e.g., Robert Schalkenbach Found. v. Lincoln Found., Inc., 91 P.3d 1019, 
1027–28 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (reasoning that a charitable organization’s “position 
with regard to the trust is [not] more or less fixed so that it can be said to be certain to 
receive trust benefits”); In re Clement Tr., 679 N.W.2d 31, 40 (Iowa 2004) (holding 
that a nonprofit organization for which a trust had agreed to help fund citizen center 
had standing to challenge trust’s decision to revoke funding, although it lacked standing 
to challenge administration of trust); see also discussion of Ladysmith Rescue Squad, 
Inc. v. Newlin, 694 S.E.2d 604, 606 (Va. 2010) supra notes 171–72 and accompanying 
text. 
 183. See William A. Drennan, Surnamed Charitable Trusts: Immortality at Tax-
payer Expense, 61 ALA. L. REV. 225, 227–28 (2010) (“A family charitable trust typi-
cally conducts no charitable activities directly, but instead functions as an endowment 
which makes annual grants to operating charities.”). 
 184. Generally, a settlor cannot enforce her own charitable trust, although excep-
tions can be noted.  See Russell v. Yale Univ., 737 A.2d 941, 945–46 (Conn. App. Ct. 
1999) (finding neither settlor nor his heir has standing to enforce a charitable gift); see 
also Courtenay C. & Lucy Patten Davis Found. v. Colo. State Univ. Research Found., 
320 P.3d 1115, 1126 (Wyo. 2014).  But see Smithers v. St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hosp. 
Ctr., 723 N.Y.S.2d 426, 435–36 (App. Div. 2001) (reasoning that a deceased settlor’s 
widow as executor has coextensive standing to enforce the terms of a charitable gift); 
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 405(c) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000) (allowing settlor standing to 
“maintain a proceeding to enforce the trust”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 
94(2) (AM. LAW. INST. 2011) (allowing appropriate public officers, co-trustees, succes-
sor trustees, settlors, or other persons with “a special interest” to enforce the trust); 
Sullivan, supra note 12, at 116 (“A contract-based approach to restricted charitable gifts 
should specify that, by default, the donor retains a right of enforcement.”). 
35
Simmons: A Will for Willa Cather
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
676 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
trusts solves this problem.185  Although some states vest their attorney general 
with exclusive standing, there is little to recommend of this approach.186  
State’s attorneys general are often given poor marks for the vigor of their char-
itable trust enforcement efforts.187  Yet where a charitable trust lacks ascertain-
able beneficiaries, the standing of the attorney general neatly solves a charita-
ble trust’s architectural deficiency that would otherwise be present.188  Empow-
ering the attorney general also addresses the practical difficulty that many cash-
strapped charitable organizations would face in having to enforce a charitable 
trust out of their own revenues.189  Attorney general enforcement of charitable 
trusts can be seen as a special government benefit reserved for charitable trusts. 
Charitable trusts are often thought of in a class of their own, distinct from 
purpose trusts, but charitable trusts are, in fact, the most common variety of 
 
 185. See e.g., Zoeller v. E. Chi. Second Century, Inc., 904 N.E.2d 213, 218 (Ind. 
2009) (“The people’s interest in the rectitude of entities created in the name of public 
good, such as charities, has long led to regarding the Attorney General as an officer 
with authority to enforce those interests.”); see also JONES, supra note 177, at 7–8, 34–
37, 54–56 (first citing fifteenth-century examples cases where a church chaplain or 
wardens of its brotherhood petition for enforcement of a charitable trustee’s duties and 
then noting the later intervention of the attorney general).  The standing of the attorney 
general would have become more critical as charitable trusts expanded in the Refor-
mation from gifts to the church to broader purposes like relief of the poor.  Id. at 10 
(“[T]he objects of charity were to become more secular as the majority of Englishmen 
reflected less on the fate of their souls and become more concerned with the worldly 
needs of their fellow men.”). 
 186. BOGERT ET AL., supra note 141, § 411.  A better rule would be that the attorney 
general has exclusive standing only when the charitable beneficiaries are unascertain-
able or no one else has standing.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Champion v. Holden, 953 
S.W.2d 151, 155 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (finding a charitable trust “sufficiently ‘public’” 
to give attorney general standing).  Approaches here vary.  C.f., e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 214, § 3(10) (West 2018) (describing actions to enforce gifts to local govern-
ments in trust for specific purposes by ten taxpayers or the attorney general), with MD. 
CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 14-301(a) (West 2018) (extending standing to “any per-
son having an interest in enforcement of the trust”), and VA. CODE ANN. § 57-13 (West 
2018) (allowing suits by members of a congregation to sue a trustee of church property). 
 187. See BOGERT ET AL., supra note 141, § 411 (noting the “laxity in the enforce-
ment by the Attorney General”). 
 188. Compare Bascom v. Albertson, 34 N.Y. 584, 586, 592 (1866) (holding that a 
charitable trust “to found and establish an institution for the education of females” is 
void for lack of ascertainable beneficiaries), with First Camden Nat.’l Bank & Tr. Co. 
v. Collins, 168 A. 275, 275–76 (N.J. 1933) (holding that a trust “to help worthy people 
start in life by assisting them to secure homes on the partial payment plan” indicates a 
charity sufficiently definite).  New York’s Tilden Act of 1893 proclaimed that no char-
itable trust should be void for lack of ascertainable beneficiaries.  See J. Frederic Taylor, 
New Chapter in the New York Law of Charitable Corporations, 25 CORNELL L. Q. 382, 
384 (1940) (citing L. 1893, ch. 701, §§ 1, 2). 
 189. See JONES, supra note 177, at 20 (quoting the 1857 Victorian charity commis-
sioners) (noting the “peculiarity of Charitable Trusts” in “that the persons beneficially 
interested under them are seldom in a position to originate measures affecting their 
government”). 
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purpose trusts under my proposed taxonomy.190  Although a charitable trust 
need not have ascertainable beneficiaries, it must be “charitable” in its pur-
pose.191  Various statutes have lists of qualifying charitable purposes.192  So do 
the Restatements.193  Of course, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) has its 
own list that it applies in determining whether a tax deduction is available.194  
Determining whether a trust qualifies as charitable or not depends on the an-
swer to the following underlying question: whether the trust qualifies for a fed-
eral income tax deduction, a state property tax exemption, or other special treat-
ments reserved for charitable trusts, such as relief from RAP.195  Charitable 
trusts are also exempt from the Rule Against Accumulations (“RAA”).196  Ear-
lier English law would streamline charitable trust court proceedings and ex-
empt charitable trusts from the statute of limitations for enforcement actions.197  
The relief from these rules allowed greater settlor control over the scope and 
restrictions of a charitable trust.198  One may think of this greater range of free-
 
 190. See supra Section II.C. 
 191. Mapping the precise definition of a “charitable” purpose trust is difficult.  See 
Lundwall, supra note 169, at 1348–51. 
 192. E.g., Statute of Charitable Uses Act (1601), 43 Eliz. I, c. 4 (Eng.) (listing, inter 
alia, “[r]eleife of aged impotent and poore people, some for Maintenance of sicke and 
maymed Souldiers and Marriners, Schooles of Learninge, . . . some for Mariages of 
poore Maides, . . . and persons decayed . . . .”); I.R.C. § 501 (2012). 
 193. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 368 (AM. LAW. INST. 1957) 
(stating that “[c]haritable purposes include (a) the relief of poverty; (b) the advance-
ment of education; (c) the advancement of religion; (d) the promotion of health; (e) 
governmental or municipal purposes; [and] (f) other purposes the accomplishment of 
which is beneficial to the community”); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 405(a) (UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 2000) (“A charitable trust may be created for the relief of poverty, the ad-
vancement of education or religion, the promotion of health, governmental or munici-
pal purposes, or other purposes the achievement of which is beneficial to the commu-
nity.”). 
 194. See I.R.C. § 2055(a)(3) (2012) (allowing a charitable deduction against federal 
taxes for gifts to trusts “exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or edu-
cational purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals”); Estate of 
Engelman v. Comm’r, 121 T.C. 54, 71–73 (2003) (disallowing a charitable deduction 
for an unrestricted devise to the State of Israel). 
 195. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. d (AM. LAW. INST. 2003) 
(“Charitable trusts may be of unlimited duration”). 
 196. SIMES, supra note 22, at 110.  “[RAA] limits for a specified period of time a 
settlor’s ability to direct that the income from trust property be added to principal rather 
than used as income.  Like the [RAP], it limits the duration of a trust.”  BOGERT ET AL., 
supra note 141, § 215. 
 197. See JONES, supra note 177, at 18, 57.  A rule of construction also provided that 
when an estate’s creditors were numerous, private legacies were deemed to abate before 
charitable ones.  See id. at 17–18. 
 198. SIMES, supra note 22, at 111.  Charitable trusts permit “full scope to the control 
of the dead hand, far beyond that which is possible anywhere else in the law.”  Id. 
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dom as a bargained-for exchange: Benefits are extended to the settlor in ex-
change for the social good that we expect to flow from a charitable trust.199  
Certain “split interest” trusts can include both charitable and noncharitable ben-
eficiaries and yet still qualify for favorable tax treatment and charitable trust 
favoritism.200  “Split interest trusts” are a hybrid of both charitable and non-
charitable components.201 
While the standing of the attorney general solves the recurring charitable 
trust problem of unascertainable beneficiaries, the doctrine of cy pres allows 
charitable trusts to benefit from occasional judicial repairs and adjustments to 
keep their operational momentums optimum.  The Cy pres doctrine functions 
as follows: “[W]here a charitable trust failed because its objects were uncertain, 
impossible to achieve[,] or illegal, the court would apply the property to similar 
charitable uses, provided that this was in accordance with the settlor’s inten-
tion.”202  When the settlor’s exact intent cannot be carried out, cy pres permits 
judicial modification so that the intent “will be given effect ‘as nearly’ as may 
be.”203 
The origins of the cy pres doctrine are obscure, but Roman law knew of 
it.204  By the seventeenth century it was a mature doctrine.205  Originally, the 
doctrine seems to have been deployed most frequently to repair a charitable 
trust from various defects and imperfections at inception (for example, upon 
the death of the testator who created the trust).206  Today, it is more often ap-
plied to modernize a charitable purpose that threatens to stall on account of 
obsolescence.207  The longer a charitable trust has been administered, the more 
 
 199. Tait, supra note 14, at 1673–74 (discussing Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Wood-
ward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819)). 
 200. See I.R.C. § 664(d)(2) (2012). 
 201. E.g., Commonwealth v. Phoebe W. Haas Charitable Tr. ‘A’, 370 A.2d 406, 
409 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977) (describing the “hybrid nature of [split interest trusts] hav-
ing both charitable and noncharitable purposes and objectives”), aff’d, 409 A.2d 27 (Pa. 
1979). 
 202. JONES, supra note 177, at 73; accord UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413 (UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 2000) (allowing cy pres where “a particular charitable purpose becomes un-
lawful, impracticable, impossible to achieve, or wasteful”).  Cy pres means “as near as 
possible.”  Obermeyer v. Bank of Am., N.A., 140 S.W.3d 18, 23 (Mo. 2004) (quoting 
GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS 520 (6th ed. 1987)).  The full French phrase was cy pres 
com possible.  Id.  
 203. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 cmt. a (AM. LAW. INST. 2001). 
 204. See H. F. JOLOWICZ, ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN LAW 138–39 (1957). 
 205. JONES, supra note 177, at 74. 
 206. Id. at 60–70. 
 207. E.g., Dunbar v. Bd. of Trs. of George W. Clayton Coll., 461 P.2d 28, 32 (Colo. 
1969) (en banc). 
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likely that cy pres will be applied, especially where the original purpose is rel-
atively narrow.208  Adhesiveness to donor intent may wane with the passage of 
time.209 
2. Noncharitable Purpose Trusts 
The second broad category of purpose trusts are the noncharitable purpose 
trusts, which are distinguishable from charitable purpose trusts because they 
fall short of articulating a sufficiently charitable purpose.210  A noncharitable 
purpose trust is typically ineligible for the benefits reserved for charitable 
trusts.211  Generally, noncharitable purpose trusts do not enjoy exemption from 
RAP or other favorable exemptions.212  The scholarship of Professor Ray 
Madoff of Boston College Law School has focused on philanthropy as well as 
the rights of decedents to control their bodies and property.213  She notes that 
noncharitable purpose trusts have been “at best tolerated in limited circum-
stances, but just as often . . . disallowed” – at least until fairly recently.214  We 
can subdivide noncharitable purpose trusts into three categories: (1) trusts for 
masses, gravesites, and memorials; (2) trust for pets; and (3) other types of 
noncharitable purpose trusts.215  Each is considered below.  Although nonchar-
itable purpose trusts may be thought of as a relatively recent innovation, their 
history is nearly as ancient as charitable trusts. 
 
 208. Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Limiting Dead Hand Control of Charitable Trusts: Ex-
panding the Use of the Cy Pres Doctrine, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 353, 370–74 (1999). 
 209. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 
§ 440 (AM. LAW. INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009) (recognizing that with “the passage 
of a significant period of time following the creation of a charitable trust . . . the policy 
of adhering to the terms in the trust lessen”). 
 210. See proposed taxonomy supra Section II.C.  See also Hirsch, Delaware Uni-
fies, supra note 116, at 14 (describing noncharitable purpose trust as being “sandwiched 
in between” charitable trusts and trusts which are void for purposes against public pol-
icy). 
 211. See, e.g., Wilber v. Asbury Park Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co., 59 A.2d 570, 572, 584 
(N.J. Ch. 1948) (finding a trust to be charitable and therefore eligible for cy pres cor-
rection despite the fact that “the testator was eccentric, egotistical, pompous, and had 
an exaggerated idea of his own importance” in wishing to publish a manuscript titled 
“Random Scientific Notes Seeking the Essentials in Place and Space”), aff’d sub nom. 
Wilber v. Owens, 65 A.2d 843 (N.J. 1949). 
 212. See Hirsch, Delaware Unifies, supra note 116, at 14–15 (noting that nonchar-
itable purpose trusts traditionally do not enjoy cy pres relief, attorney general enforce-
ment, nor exemption from RAP). 
 213. Faculty Directory: Ray D. Madoff, B.C. L. SCH., https://www.bc.edu/bc-
web/schools/law/academics-faculty/faculty-directory/ray-madoff.html (last visited 
Sept. 1, 2018). 
 214. MADOFF, supra note 52, at 113. 
 215. But see In re Endacott [1959] 3 All ER 562.  Lord Evershed, in the Endacott 
case, listed five varieties of noncharitable purpose trusts as “anomalous” exceptions to 
the general rule of English non-recognition of such trusts: 
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a. Trusts for Masses, Gravesites, etc. 
Trusts or bequests for the saying of prayers for the testator after death are 
often intermixed with charitable inclinations in support of a church.216  King 
Henry VIII’s will was executed just days before his death.217  Following a tes-
tamentary prayer, burial instructions for the King’s body, and funeral details 
that he wished carried out, he made a bequest of lands equal to the yearly net 
value of 600 pounds to the Chapel of Saint George, subject to the following 
covenant: 
 
Deane and Cannons and thyr 
Successors for ever shall fynd two priestes 
to say masses at the said Aulter to be made . . . 
And also after our decease kepe yerely 
Foure solempne obites218 for us . . . 
And also at 
every of the sayd obites to give to poore people 
in almez tenne poundes[;] And also to gyve for every yerly 
to thirteen poor men which shalbe called poore 
knightes to every of them twelf pens every daye[,] and 
ones in the yere yerely for ever a long gowne of white 
cloth, with the garter upon the brest embrodered 
with a shelde and crosse of Saint George . . . .219 
 
Henry VIII’s will also made an outright bequest to needy persons, adding, 
parenthetically, that “commyn beggars as moch as may be avoided.”220  This 
outright bequest should be contrasted with the gift to the Dean of the Chapter 
 
(1) trusts for the erection or maintenance of monuments or graves; (2) trusts for 
the saying of masses, in jurisdictions where such trusts are not regarded as char-
itable; (3) trusts for the maintenance of particular animals; (4) trusts for the 
benefit of unincorporated associations (though this group is more doubtful); 
[and] (5) miscellaneous cases. 
 
Id. at 567 (quoting J. H. C. MORRIS & W. BARTON LEACH, THE RULE AGAINST 
PERPETUITIES 298 (2d ed. 1962)).  Under the category of “miscellaneous,” we will find 
trusts to promote fox hunting.  Thompson v. Loyd [1934] All ER 805 (valid).  Or a trust 
to dispose of property to the “best spiritual advantage” of the testator.  Gibbons v. Gib-
bons [1917] 1 IR 448 (valid).  But see Re Gassiot v. Vintners’ Co. (1901) 70 LJ Ch 242 
(Ch.) (voiding a trust to keep a portrait in repair). 
 216. See Gray, supra note 138, at 518 (observing that testamentary gifts “for the 
saying of masses for the soul of the testator or of others” are held to be valid charitable 
trusts in America). 
 217. SUZANNAH LIPSCOMB, THE KING IS DEAD: THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT 
OF HENRY VIII xii (2016). 
 218. An obit – obite in Henry VIII’s spelling – is a requiem mass to pray for the 
soul of a deceased individual. 
 219. LIPSCOMB, supra note 217, at 116–17. 
 220. Id. at 115. 
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of St. George’s Chapel at Windsor Castle to endow the support of the “poore 
knightes.”221  The former is simply a testamentary gift to a class of individuals 
selected by the executor.  The latter is a perpetual trust with the church (or its 
Dean) as trustee thereof.222  The poor knights were in fact supported and, alt-
hough re-attired and renamed the “Military Knights of Windsor” in 1833 by 
William IV, still reside in Windsor Castle today.223 
It can often be difficult to distinguish between a purpose trust and burial 
instructions.  The more elaborate and expensive the burial instructions, the 
more likely they are to be both challenged by heirs who will suffer the costs 
and voided as capricious or unreasonable by the courts.224  The settlor’s milieu 
is highly relevant in questions of this kind.225  Burial instructions that direct the 
erection of an enormous stone pyramid might be seen as grossly wasteful in 
our time but appropriate in another.226  Waste may take forms other than a bla-
tant instruction to destroy property.227  Extravagant directions may be lim-
ited.228 
 
 221. Id. at 117. 
 222. Henry VIII required that sermons be made at Windsor “every Sonday in the 
yere for ever.”  Id. at 117. 
 223. E-mail from Dr. Clare Rider, Archivist & Chapter Librarian, St. George’s 
Chapel Archives & Chapel Library, Windsor Castle (Aug. 18, 2017, 06:18 CST) (on 
file with author). 
 224. See Gray, supra note 138, at 515 (“An executor or an administrator can pay 
the funeral expenses of the deceased; and although no one can compel him to carry out 
the directions of the will as to the testator’s burial, yet, if he does carry them out, the 
courts will protect him from claims on the part of heirs, next of kin, or residuary lega-
tees.”). 
 225. E.g., Wright v. Menefee, 145 So. 315, 317 (Ala. 1932) (reasoning that despite 
respect for the feelings of a father in giving a burial in accordance with the position of 
the family, the reduction of funeral expense was correct given the condition of the es-
tate); In re Kiernan, 77 N.Y.S. 924, 399 (Sur. Ct. 1902) (trimming funeral bill where 
the deceased was a child who did not have a large circle of acquaintances or large in-
heritance). 
 226. Cf., e.g., Aitken’s Trustees v. Aitken, [1927] SC 374, 383 (Scot.) (invalidating 
a devise to construct a massive bronze statue of the testator as “irrational, futile, and 
self-destructive”), with John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the 
Future of Trust Investing, 81 IOWA L. REV. 641, 663 (1996) (noting that a “trust to 
endow Iowa with bronze, equestrian Langbeins” would be unenforceable). 
 227. E.g., Pinkham v. Cent. Farmers’ Tr. Co., 159 So. 289, 291 (Fla. 1935) (finding 
casket cost “grossly excessive”). 
 228. See, e.g., In re Kiefer’s Estate, 19 P.a. D. 608, 609 (Orphans’ Ct. 1909) (“Ex-
travagance in funeral expenses is regarded as ‘a species of waste,’ and the courts will 
not countenance a silly exhibition by ordering bills for it to be paid.”).  But see Gray, 
supra note 138, at 515 (reasoning that expensive gravesite monuments, like expensive 
funerals, will be allowed “if the rights of creditors are not interfered with” even where 
“they be of the most extravagant character”). 
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Few cases discuss bequests or trusts to fund the performance of Christian 
masses.229  Perhaps because the bequests tend to be relatively insignificant in 
terms of monetary amounts, there is little motivation for heirs to challenge 
them.  A bequest to say masses may escape judicial notice because of moral 
reservations of the residual devisees in setting aside sums intended to protect a 
departed one’s soul.230  Some masses bequests might be easily construed as 
precatory – a wish or desire but not a mandate.  Others might be construed as 
individual bequests rather than purpose trusts.  For example in Sherman v. 
Baker, the testator devised $100 to a priest “to say masses for me.”231  The 
court held that the instruction was valid as a gift to the priest.232  Alternatively, 
a gift for the purpose of saying masses may be upheld as sufficiently charitable 
in purpose to be sustained; although, it might be argued that its intent is to 
spiritually benefit the donor only.233  Occasionally, a devise to say masses is 
coupled with a bequest to maintain a gravesite, and the two purposes are min-
gled together in a single gift.234 
Unlike bequests for the purpose of saying masses, bequests that are tied 
to requests to erect monuments or preserve gravesites are commonly liti-
gated.235  For example, In re Byrne’s Estate concerned a will that provided 
 
 229. Ausness, supra note 116, at 355; see also John W. Curran, Trusts for Masses, 
7 NOTRE DAME LAW. 42, 54-55 (1931) (collecting thirty masses trust cases from Amer-
ican jurisdictions); Gray, supra note 138, at 518–20 (collecting cases).  “In England a 
trust for [m]asses was originally held valid, subsequently invalid, and again valid in 
1919.”  Curran, supra, at 42. 
 230. Compare In re Beck’s Estate, 225 N.Y.S. 187, 188–89 (Sur. Ct. 1927) (rea-
soning that a bequest of half the residue for the perpetual care of a burial lot and saying 
masses violated the state’s mortmain statute), and Festorazzi v. St. Joseph’s Catholic 
Church, 18 So. 394, 396 (Ala. 1894) (concluding that a bequest to say masses was 
unenforceable for the lack of an ascertainable beneficiary to enforce the church’s obli-
gation), with Bourne v. Keane [1918-19] All ER 167 (upholding a trust for the saying 
of masses). 
 231. 40 A. 11, 11 (R.I. 1898). 
 232. Id. at 12; accord Estate of Beckley, 405 N.Y.S.2d 861, 862, 864 (App. Div. 
1978) (“The words ‘with the request that High Masses be said’ were precatory and 
created no trust.”). 
 233. Obrecht v. Pujos, 268 S.W. 564, 565–66 (Ky. 1925); In re Smallman’s Will, 
247 N.Y.S. 593, 602 (Sur. Ct. 1931). 
 234. E.g., Webster v. Sughrow, 45 A. 139, 139–40 (N.H. 1898) (quoting from a 
residual bequest to a trust “to pay the expense of keeping my burial lot in a proper and 
respectable condition, and for having anniversary mass said annually”).  Webster up-
held the trust as a charitable one, reasoning that mass is a religious ceremony “just the 
same in kind whether it be designated to promote the spiritual welfare of one or many.”  
Id. at 141.  The burial lot maintenance aspect of the trust was upheld on account of 
statutory authority for the same.  Id. 
 235. Ausness, supra note 116, at 352–53; see also James T. Brennan, Bequests for 
the Erection, Care, and Maintenance of Graves, Monuments, and Mausoleums, 9 
WASHBURN L.J. 23, 25–31 (1969) (collecting cases).  “There are no cases in the United 
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$100 for the saying of masses and devised the $19,000 residue “to Thomas 
Doherty, . . . in trust, to be expended by him for the erection of a tomb on my 
family lot in St. Joseph’s Cemetery, in said Manchester, of such material and 
architecture as to him may seem proper.”236  Without ascertainable beneficiar-
ies, the trust could only be sustained if it were deemed charitable because New 
Hampshire law rejected the idea of noncharitable purpose trusts.237  The court 
noted that ordinarily, a trust to maintain a gravestone or memorial would be 
deemed charitable because “[t]he public interest in the sightly [sic] appearance 
of cemeteries is served” while a trust to erect a gravestone or tomb would 
not.238  Mr. Byrne’s wishes, however, were thwarted when the cemetery deter-
mined that an above-ground tomb was unsuitable for the cemetery lot in ques-
tion.239  The court reasoned that the use of funds for the purpose designated 
was therefore “impossible,” and the remaining estate was instead directed to 
be distribute to intestate heirs.240 
b. Trusts for Pets 
A second variety of noncharitable purpose trusts are pet trusts.  Trusts for 
pets have generated quite a volume of American scholarship.241  The love of a 
 
States where trusts for monuments to private persons, such monuments having no con-
nection with the interment of the testator, have been allowed.”  Gray, supra note 138, 
at 516. 
 236. 100 A.2d 157, 158 (N.H. 1953). 
 237. Id. at 159.  Today, New Hampshire recognizes noncharitable purpose trusts. 
See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:4-408 (West 2018) (pet trusts); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 564-B:4-409 (West 2018) (other noncharitable purpose trusts). 
 238. Byrne’s Estate, 100 A.2d at 159.  However, the Supreme Court of New Hamp-
shire noted, a trust to erect a memorial may qualify as charitable where “it would if it 
became a part of the fabric of a church or commemorated some notable person.”  Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at 160.  The court noted that the executor had the inherent authority to 
arrange for another burial memorial (e.g., a headstone) instead.  Id; accord, e.g., State 
ex rel Woodlands Cemetery Co., v. Lodge, 16 A.2d 250, 251 (Del. Super. Ct. 1940) 
(upholding a direction to an executor to pay a cemetery company a sum adequate to 
generate sufficient income to pay for the perpetual care of a family burial lot). 
 241. It is the rare pet trust title that does not utilize puns or playfulness.  See gener-
ally Susan R. Abert, Pet Trusts: The Uniform Trust Codes Gives Enforceability a New 
Bite, 46 N.H. B.J. 18 (2006); Katharine Coxwell & Wanda D. Devereaux, Paws Laws 
or How Nigel and Miss Muffy Came to Be Rich, 67 ALA. LAW. 433 (2006); Christina 
M. Eastman, Chapter 168: For the Love of Dog: California Fully Enforces Trusts for 
Pet Animals, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 543 (2009); Margaret R. Hoyt & Sarah S. AuMil-
ler, Can You Trust Your Pet? A Primer on Florida Pet Trusts, FLA. B.J., Nov. 2014, at 
12; Michael A. Ogline et al., Trusts for the Care of Animals: Estate Planning Goes to 
the Dogs, 18 OHIO PROB. L.J. 9 (2007); Jennifer R. Taylor, A “Pet” Project for State 
Legislatures: The Movement Toward Enforceable Pet Trusts in the Twenty-First Cen-
tury, 13 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 419 (1999); Jonathan P. Wilkerson, Comment, A 
“Purr”fect Amendment: Why Congress Should Amend the Internal Revenue Code to 
Apply the Charitable Remainder Exception to Pet Trusts, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 587 
43
Simmons: A Will for Willa Cather
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
684 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
pet motivates around a quarter of today’s testators to include their pets in their 
wills.242  Because humans have affections for their pets and because pets ex-
hibit consciousness and autonomy, we may be tempted to treat a pet trust for a 
particular animal as similar to a trust for ascertainable beneficiaries.  Despite 
the legal inability of pets to sue a nonperforming trustee, pets may certainly 
vocalize their mistreatment to a much higher degree than other chattels.  For 
example, a toaster or the copyright to Beyoncé Knowles’s newest hit can nei-
ther yowl nor yip.  But the law still largely treats animals like any other per-
sonal property.243  Until a guardian ad litem can be appointed for a chimpanzee, 
a trust for a chimpanzee will be legally considered in the same category as any 
other noncharitable purpose trust, such as a trust for a Beyoncé tune. 244  A trust 
for a puppy is more akin to a trust for a toaster than a trust for an infant.245 
Pet trusts do not enjoy quite the same lengthy history as trusts for masses 
or burial arrangements.  The first English case recognizing a testamentary gift 
for the maintenance of a testator’s horses was reported in 1848.246  Perhaps the 
 
(2009); Christine Cave, Comment, Trusts: Monkeying Around with Our Pets’ Futures: 
Why Oklahoma Should Adopt a Pet-Trust Statute, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 627 (2002). 
 242. See GERRY W. BEYER, TEACHING MATERIALS ON ESTATE PLANNING 816 (4th 
ed. 2013) (citing surveys which show “that between 12% and 27% of pet owners in-
clude their pets in their wills”).  This is not to say that a quarter of wills include bequest 
for pets – or perhaps of pets – since only about a third of Americans own a dog or a cat.  
See Ogline et al., supra note 241, at 9 (“According to the American Veterinary Medical 
Association 36.1% of American households own dogs, and 31.6% own cats.”). 
 243. E.g., State v. Smith, 83 N.E.3d 302, 311 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017) (considering 
and rejecting a 5th Amendment taking of property without due process claim to seizure 
of forty-seven puppies); Smith v. City of Detroit, No. 16-11882, 2017 WL 3279170, at 
*1, *6–7 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 2, 2017) (granting defendants summary judgment to a 4th 
Amendment unlawful seizure claim where police shot three dogs – Debo, Smoke, and 
Mama –  because they were unlicensed and thus considered contraband).  In Smith v. 
City of Detroit, Judge Steeh wrote that “while pet owners consider their pets to be fam-
ily members, the law considers pets to be property.”  Detroit, 2017 WL 3279170, at *7. 
 244. E.g., Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Stanley, 16 N.Y.S.3d 898, 917–18 
(Sup. Ct. 2015) (reasoning that two allegedly unlawfully detained chimpanzees could 
not claim habeas relief); but see Travis v. Murray, 977 N.Y.S.2d 621, 630–631 (Sup. 
Ct. 2013) (taking account of the dog’s interests in a dispute over the dog in a divorce 
proceeding, declining to apply a strict property analysis). 
 245. See MADOFF, supra note 52, at 113 (“A dog cannot enforce a trust for its own 
benefit, and the attorney general has no obligation to enforce trusts that do not serve 
the public benefit.”).  Although wild animals are typically publicly owned or owned by 
no one, once captured or tamed, animals become property subject to ownership rights. 
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 656 (West 2018) (“Animals wild by nature are the subjects of 
ownership, while living, only when on the land of the person claiming them, or when 
tamed, or taken and held in possession, or disabled and immediately pursued.”). 
 246. R. E. La G., Annotation, Validity of Bequest or Trust for Care of Specified 
Animal, 31 A.L.R. 430, West (database updated weekly) (citing Mitford v. Reynolds 
[1848] 60 Eng. Rep. 812)).  The residual bequest in Mitford read: 
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emotional attachments to pets, common now, were less known prior to the 
nineteenth century.  A sampling of pet affection in a testamentary context can 
be viewed in Thelma Russell’s bequest to her dog, Roxy.247 
Thelma Russell’s holographic will on a small card read, in relevant part: 
 
I leave everything 
I own Real & 
Personal to Chester H. Quinn & Roxy Russell248 
 
Chester H. Quinn was a close human friend, but Roxy Russell was an 
Airedale Terrier.249  The trial court construed the will as a devise of Roxy to 
Chester.250  The will’s text, however, clearly contemplated a devise to Roxy 
and Chester.  Alternatively, the trial court reasoned, the inclusion of Roxy was 
simply a precatory indication that the testator hoped Chester would care for 
Roxy.251  The Supreme Court of California reversed.252  The text of the instru-
ment was plain: One-half of the residue was devised to a pooch.253  One cannot 
 
I will, devise, give and bequeath the remainder of my property, of whatsoever 
kind and description, and that may arise from the sale of my effects, after de-
ducting the annual amount that will be requisite to defray the keep of my horses 
(which I will and direct be preserved as pensioners, and are never, under any 
plea or pretense, to be used, rode or driven, or applied to labour) to the govern-
ment of Bengal, for the express purpose of that government applying the 
amount to charitable, beneficial and public works at and in the city of Dacca in 
Bengal . . . . 
 
Mitford v. Reynolds [1848] 60 Eng. Rep. 812, 813 (alteration in original).  The bequest 
was thus a mixed charitable/pet devise.  See id.; cf. Willet v. Willet, 247 S.W. 739, 741 
(Ky. 1923) (discussed as the first American “pet trust” case infra text accompanying 
notes 251–257); Note, Validity of Trusts in Favor of Animals, 42 YALE L.J. 1290, 1291–
92 (1933) [hereinafter Favor of Animals] (discussing problems with pet trusts). 
 247. In re Estate of Russell, 444 P.2d 353 (Cal. 1968); see generally Page Dowda-
kin, Note, Revisiting Roxy Russell: How Current Companion Animal Trust and Custody 
Laws Affect Elderly Pet “Guardians” in the Event of Death of Incapacity, 20 ELDER 
L.J. 411 (2013). 
 248. Russell, 444 P.2d at 355.  The reverse side of the card read: 
 
My ($10.) Ten dollar gold 
Piece & diamonds I leave 
To Georgia Nan Russell. 
Alverata, Geogia [sic] 
 
Id.  The will was dated more than eight years prior to her death in 1965.  Id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. at 356. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. at 364. 
 253. Actually, the facts were more complicated than this, but it didn’t affect the 
court’s reasoning.  In fact, the Roxy Russell Airedale living at the time that its owner 
made her will “died after having had a fox tail removed from its nose” and was buried 
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give property to other property.254  And so, because the devise was void under 
then-governing California statutes, one-half of the residue passed by intestacy 
to a niece.255  Testator intent was quite obviously frustrated, but such intent 
might have been achieved had the option of a noncharitable purpose trust been 
considered. 
The earliest pet trust decision in America was Willett v. Willett.256  The 
devise in question reserved $1000 for a dog named Dick and the remainder to 
a church.257  The court reasoned that the trust could be sustained because the 
 
in a pet cemetery prior to Thelma Russell’s death.  Id. at 355 n.2.  Roxy I was then 
replaced by another dog of unspecified breed – but also named Roxy – that survived 
her owner.  Id. at 355, 355 n.2.  Professors Dukeminier and Sitkoff ask playfully: “Since 
the will was executed when the first Roxy was alive, isn’t the second Roxy a pretermit-
ted Airedale?”  JESSE DUKEMINIER AND ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND 
ESTATES 353 n.26 (10th ed. 2017). 
 254. The petitioner in Russell argued that the probate code “enumerates those enti-
tled to take by will; that ‘[d]ogs are not included among those listed … [n]ot even Aire-
dale dogs.”  Russell, 444 P.2d at 355.  Apart from probate code particulars, there are 
two primary reasons why an inter vivos gift cannot be made to a dog.  One is that a 
chattel lacks the capacity to accept a gift; another is that a chattel lacks the power of 
ownership.  See Snowden v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 80 A. 510, 512 (Md. Ct. App. 
1911) (considering “whether an unincorporated association has any capability whatever 
for the reception or retention of a gift inter vivos”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: 
WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.1 cmt. i (2001) (“Acceptance by the donee 
is required for a gift to become complete.”). 
 255. Russell, 444 P.2d at 363–64. 
 256. 247 S.W. 739 (Ky. 1923); R.E. La G., supra note 246, at 430 (stating that 
Willett then was “apparently the only American case passing on the validity of a bequest 
or trust for the care of a specified animal”). 
 257. Willett, 247 S.W. at 739.  The will seemingly devised the testator’s entire es-
tate in trust for her sister Minnie Willet, remainder to the Hopewell Church with the 
exception of: 
 
$1[000], which is to be used for the support of our dog ‘Dick,’ if the interest is 
not sufficient for him to be kept in comfort, that is being well fed, have a bed in 
the house by a fire and treated well every day, that the principal be used to such 
a sum so it will last his lifetime. 
 
I also give Mrs. Belilah Stevens $100 for being kind to me when I needed it. 
Dicky must have three meals daily. 
 
Id.  The court felt that the wills meaning would be more easily ascertained if some of 
its parts be transposed so that it reads: 
 
I write this as my last will. I give to my sister Mrs. Minnie Willett, everything 
I have at my death, except $1[000], which is to be used for the support of my 
dog ‘Dick,’ to be used by her for life; at her death it is to go to the Hopewell 
Church . . . . If the interest from the $1[000], which is set aside for the support 
of my dog ‘Dick,’ be not sufficient to keep him in comfort, that is, be well fed, 
have a bed in the house by a fire and treated well every day, the principal (may) 
be used so it will last his lifetime. 
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purposes were humane, even partially charitable, especially in view of the re-
mainder interest to the church.258  The court explained: “This is not a devise to 
the dog Dick, but a trust created for his use and benefit.”259  Although the court 
did not consider RAP, the trust would qualify as exempt from RAP only if 
deemed charitable.  Technically, the trust for Dick was construed as being “hu-
mane” and not “charitable.”260  While acknowledging that typically a trust for 
a particular animal could not be construed as charitable, the court upheld the 
trust as “humane” under a Kentucky statute validating such gifts.261  Further, 
the court was untroubled by the testator’s failure to name a trustee, citing the 
old trust rule that no trust shall fail for want of a trustee; the courts may appoint 
one.262 
c. Trusts for Other Noncharitable Purposes 
We now come to the third category of noncharitable purpose trusts.  Sev-
eral varieties within this final “catch-all” category can be sketched.  Perhaps 
the most common noncharitable purpose, aside from the maintenance of a pet 
or a grave, is the publication of personal papers.263  Theodore Schroeder was a 
lawyer who, after retiring, devoted himself to writing and self-published a book 
in 1911 titled Obscene Literature and Constitutional Law.264  Other self-pub-
lished pamphlets followed with titles like Divinity in Semen.265  Many of his 
writings criticized the Mormon faith.266  In 1953, he died with a will drafted in 
his own hand on a standard legal form of some kind.267  The will nominated an 
executor, devised his entire estate to Ethel Clyde and Leslie Kuhn “to be ex-
pended in the collection . . . [,] arrangement, and publication of my writing” 
and further directed that Clyde and Kuhn “be allowed to serve without 
bond.”268  The net sum of his estate amounted to about $36,000.269 
 
Id. at 740.  The remainder of the estate, the court reasoned, was devised as a life estate 
to Minnie, remainder to the Hopewell Church.  Id. 
 258. Id. at 740–41. 
 259. Id. at 740. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id.  The court acknowledged that while a trust to erect a fountain for the benefit 
of thirsty animals or a gift to a society that prevents cruelty to animals would qualify 
as charitable, a gift to favor the donor’s own horses would not.  Id. at 740–41. 
 262. Id. at 740. 
 263. MADOFF, supra note 52, at 112. 
 264. Fid. Title & Tr. Co. v. Clyde, 121 A.2d 625, 627 (Conn. 1956). 
 265. Id.  Other titles included “Phallic Worship to Secularized Sex” and “Why 
Priests Don’t Marry.”  Id. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. at 626. 
 268. Id. at 627 n.1.  Typically, an executor or “personal representative need not 
obtain a bond when excused from doing so, either by the decedent’s will or by waiver 
of all interested parties.”  In re Estate of Dickson, 736 A.2d 1007, 1009 (D.C. Ct. App. 
1999) (citing D.C. Code § 20–502(a) (1997)). 
 269. Clyde, 121 A.2d at 626–27. 
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The court had little difficulty in construing the bequest as a trust despite 
the lack of the words “trust” or “trustee.”270  Schroeder had, however, “ne-
glected to designate beneficiaries who would be definitely ascertainable either 
at the time of his death or within the period of [RAP].”271  The trustees con-
tended that the trust was charitable because of its educational aims.272  The 
court acknowledged that “a trust to promote the dissemination of knowledge 
or of beliefs through the distribution of books or pamphlets may, in the absence 
of any profit element, qualify as a valid charity.”273  The court also acknowl-
edged “the liberal construction we give to our statute of charitable uses.”274  
But, the court gave one further hurdle to the trust’s validity – a public policy 
concern.  Before a charity will “be upheld, it must be consistent with public 
policy.”275  The court had read at least one of Schroeder’s pamphlets and found 
it “a truly nauseating experience.”276  Where the object of the trust “is to dis-
tribute articles which reek of the sewer,” a finding of invalidity must follow.277  
As a result, Schroeder’s estate was distributed to his first cousins, with whom 
“[h]e had no interest.”278 
Another well-known example of a purpose trust, which does not fit within 
the two afore-described categories (trusts for masses and gravestones or pets), 
was in the will of George Bernard Shaw.279  As a boy growing up in Dublin, 
 
 270. Id. at 628–29. 
 271. Id. at 629. 
 272. Id.  A charitable categorization would have solved the unascertainable benefi-
ciary defect since attorney general enforcement would have been supplied.  See 
RONALD CHESTER, GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS 
AND TRUSTEES § 411, West (database updated June 2018). 
 273. Clyde, 121 A.2d at 629 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 370, cmt. 
a (1959)); see R. F. Martin, Annotation, Validity, as for a Charitable Purpose, of Trust 
for Dissemination or Preservation of Material of Historical or Other Educational In-
terest or Value, 12 A.L.R.2d 849 § 6[e], West (database updated weekly) (originally 
published 1950); see also Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, Validity, as for a Chari-
table Purpose, or Trust for Publication or Distribution of Particular Books or Writings, 
34 A.L.R.4th 419 §§ 2[a], 3[a], 3[b], West (database updated weekly)  (originally pub-
lished 1984) (“‘[M]erit’ is not for the courts to consider, so long as the books or writings 
in questions do not manifestly tend to encourage violation of law or the corruption of 
morals or religion, and an intent to benefit the public is manifested . . . .”). 
 274. Clyde, 121 A.2d at 629. 
 275. Id. (citing CARL ZOLLMANN, AMERICAN LAW OF CHARITIES § 210 (1924)). 
 276. Id. at 629.  The title, which the court read and characterized as “nauseating,” 
was “Prenatal Psychisms and Mystical Pantheism.”  Id. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. at 627, 630.  The court noted that “honorary” trusts had never been recog-
nized in the jurisdiction and declined to consider whether Schroeder’s trust could qual-
ify as an honorary trust because the same public policy violation would invalidate a 
noncharitable honorary trust.  Id. at 630. 
 279. See Bove & Mattson, supra note 59, at 26–27 (describing Shaw’s alphabet 
trust as a failed purpose trust).  “In Shaw’s case, the trust failed in part because a court 
cannot enforce a trust if its purpose cannot be accomplished with certainty.”  Id. 
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Shaw developed an interest in reforming the English alphabet.280  Through life, 
this remained one of his chief interests.281  The will he left at his death in 1950 
made bequests of substantial annuities to his servants and gifts to a few of his 
older relatives who survived him.282  He devised the rest of his estate, one of 
the largest ever left by a writer, for the purpose of creating a new alphabet – 
simplified and phonetic, with forty letters, each of which having its own, single, 
pronunciation.283  This idea of an “alphabet trust” was met with “derision 
among the large body of persons who know better than we do how our money 
should be spent.”284  The trust was challenged.285 
The text of Shaw’s will characterized the trust as charitable.  But despite 
the arguments that a new, more sensible alphabet would prove educational and 
beneficial to the public, the court concluded that the trust was noncharitable.286  
 
 280. ST. JOHN ERVINE, BERNARD SHAW: HIS LIFE, WORK AND FRIENDS 3, 596 
(1956). 
 281. Id. at 596. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Re Shaw [1957] 1 All ER 745, 749.  The will was dated June 12, 1950, when 
Shaw was ninety-four; he died in November of that year.  Id. at 747, 748.  The court 
described the instrument as “long and complicated” and offered “that it is rather youth-
ful exuberance than the circumspection of old age that mars its symmetry.”  Id.  The 
will devised the residue in trust, instructing the trustee, 
 
(1) To institute and finance a series of inquiries to ascertain or estimate as far 
as possible the following statistics (a) the number of extant persons who speak 
the English language and write it by the established and official alphabet of 
twenty-six letters (hereinafter called Dr. Johnson’s alphabet); (b) how much 
time could be saved per individual scribe by the substitution for the said alpha-
bet of an alphabet containing at least forty letters (hereinafter called the pro-
posed British alphabet) enabling the said language to be written without indi-
cating single sounds by groups of letters or by diacritical marks, instead of by 
one symbol for each sound; (c) how many of these persons are engaged in writ-
ing or printing English at any and every moment in the world; (d) on these fac-
tors to estimate the time and labour wasted by our lack of at least fourteen une-
quivocal single symbols; (e) to add where possible to the estimates of time lost 
or saved by the difference between Dr. Johnson’s alphabet and the Proposed 
British alphabet estimates of the loss of income in British and American cur-
rency. 
 
Id. at 733 (quoting will, cl. 35).  The trustee was also directed to arrange for the trans-
literation of Shaw’s Androcles and the Lion into the proposed British alphabet.  Id. at 
734. 
 284. ERVINE, supra note 280, at 596.  Ervine asks rhetorically, “Why should a man 
not endow his hobby if that be his pleasure?”  Id. 
 285. Re Shaw [1957] 1 W.L.R. 729, 736.  As the litigation opened, Justice Harman 
playfully queried the assembled solicitors, “And who appears for the poor alphabet?”  
GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, SHAW: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 1898–1950, THE PLAYWRIGHT 
YEARS 293 (Stanley Weintraub ed. 1970) [hereinafter Weintraub].  Came the reply: 
“The Attorney-General, my Lord.”  Id. 
 286. Re Shaw [1957] 1 All ER 745, 758. 
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The conclusion was a fatal one because English law does not recognize non-
charitable purpose trusts.287  The court rejected the trustee’s assertion that pure 
research – without any teaching – might be characterized as educational.288  
The court further rejected the claim that the aim of Shaw’s trust represented a 
purpose beneficial to the community.289  The court reasoned that since the re-
search and promotion of a new alphabet might not benefit the general public, 
it could not be characterized as charitable on account of community benefits.290  
English law would not recognize a “trust, other than a charitable trust, for the 
benefit, not of individuals, but of objects,” and the trust failed.291  The court 
recognized that a different outcome might result under American law.292  Under 
American law, noncharitable purpose trusts are generally permitted.293  The 
 
 287. Id. at 759. 
 288. Id. at 755–56. 
 289. Id. at 756. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. at 758. 
 292. Id. at 759 (quoting J. H. C. MORRIS & W. BARTON LEACH, THE RULE AGAINST 
PERPETUITIES 308 (1956) (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS § 124 (1935)).  
Under American law, “the transferee has only a power and not a duty to apply the 
property . . .  [so] it is more accurate to state that the trustee has a power than it is to 
state that he holds upon trust . . . .”  RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS § 124 cmt. c 
(1935).  See also discussion of honorary trusts infra Section II.E.1.  Despite the court’s 
decision, the litigation continued and eventually a settlement was reached where £8,300 
was allocated to the alphabet project.  Weintraub, supra note 285, at 294.  “A competi-
tion, with prize money derived from the £8,300, was held to develop a new alphabet 
according to Shavian standards, and the result was the Androcles and the Lion edition 
Shaw wanted.”  Id. (alteration in original); see generally George Bernard Shaw, Andro-
cles and the Lion, in SAINT JOAN, MAJOR BARBARA, ANDROCLES AND THE LION 325 
(1956). 
 293. The Restatement (Third) of Trusts contains an illustration modeled on Shaw’s 
alphabet trust litigation: 
 
George Bernard Shawnessy, a playwright and critic of the English language, 
left his entire estate to T “in trust to use one-third of the income for thirty years, 
or until the trust sooner terminates, to support (a) the study of the advantages of 
a phonetic alphabet and (b) the publication and free distribution of my play, 
‘Andrew and the Leopard,’ written in this alphabet.”  The trust is otherwise for 
the primary benefit of Shawnessy’s sole survivors, a daughter and the two chil-
dren of his predeceased son; the trust is to terminate at the death of the last of 
these three life beneficiaries, with remainder to Shawnessy’s then living issue.  
If the state will not uphold the “purpose” provision as one for a charitable pur-
pose . . .  T cannot be compelled to expend the intended share of the income as 
directed, but she has power as trustee of an adapted trust to do so for 21 years 
(not for the specified 30 years), subject also to the specified lives-in-being du-
ration of the trust.  To the extent T does not so expend the full income share and 
no successor trustee is appointed . . .  T is to pay the rest of the income to the 
individual beneficiaries. 
 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 47 cmt. d(1), illus. 7 (2001). 
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next sections explore the attorney general equivalent in noncharitable purpose 
trusts and two variations of such trusts: res purpose trusts and hybrid purpose 
trusts. 
d. The Purpose Enforcer as Proxy for an Ascertainable Beneficiary 
Noncharitable purpose trusts – like charitable purpose trusts – must con-
front their inherent flaw that beneficiaries are not ascertainable if the law is to 
allow them.  Beneficiaries secure the trustee’s duties.294  An obligation “[that] 
nobody can enforce” is, Justice Roxburgh once wrote, “difficult to visual-
ize.”295  The lack of an ascertainable beneficiary has historically been fatal to 
the creation of a private trust.296  A beneficiary – whether presently ascertain-
able or who will become ascertainable – is required.297  The problem of a trust 
with unascertainable beneficiaries is solved for charitable trusts by placing the 
attorney general at the helm of enforcement.298  For noncharitable purpose 
trusts, the attorney general’s role could, in theory, be expanded, but because 
noncharitable purpose trusts may lack a clear public benefit, this seems a poor 
policy choice.  No states have adopted this approach.  Instead, some form of 
private enforcement is preferred. 
A noncharitable purpose trust needs its own enforcer or invigilate if it is 
to function as a trust.299  The office and appointment of an “enforcer” might be 
grafted into the trust agreement.  This enforcer acts much like an attorney gen-
eral; she has standing to sue, just as a beneficiary would, to review, and to 
 
 294. See BOGERT ET AL., supra note 141, §161 (emphasizing that in creating a trust 
“[t]he settlor must select and identify the person or persons who are to be the benefi-
ciaries”).  “The law does not acknowledge a trust over the exercise of which it will not, 
through its tribunals, assume control to avert its destruction, perversion, or abuse.”  
Mannix v. Purcell, 19 N.E. 572, 586 (Ohio 1888). 
 295. In re Astor’s Settlement Tr., (1952) 1 All ER 1067, 1071. 
 296. Ausness, supra note 116, at 330; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 43 
cmt. a.  
 297. See Note, The Beneficiary of a Non-Charitable Trust, 42 HARV. L. REV. 813, 
813 (1929) (“[C]ourts have upheld present trusts for unascertained persons, provided 
sufficient information is given to enable the intended beneficiaries to be ascertained in 
the future.”).  Trust beneficiaries must become ascertainable within the perpetuities pe-
riod.  Reach v. Kelley, 10 Cal. App. 3d 1082, 1092 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970). 
 298. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS § 391 (1935). 
 299. See In re Astor’s Settlement Tr., 1 Eng. Rep. at 1071 (explaining that the ben-
eficiary principle reflects that because a person cannot complain to the court, a court 
cannot enforce a noncharitable purpose trust lacking ascertainable beneficiaries).  In 
that case, a private trust for the benefit of independent newspapers was deemed void 
for want of any ascertainable beneficiaries who could enforce it.  Cf. Alexander A. 
Bove, Jr., The Use of Purpose Trusts in the United States, TRS. & TRS., July 2004, 6 
[hereinafter Bove, Use of Purpose Trusts] (theorizing that a charitable trust actually has 
ascertainable beneficiaries who could enforce it – “members of the public, but it would 
be cumbersome, confusing, and unworkable to allow any and every person to enforce 
the trust”). 
51
Simmons: A Will for Willa Cather
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
692 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
enforce the trustee’s fiduciary obligations.300  Indeed, the office of the enforcer 
is akin to a private attorney general.301  One might question the efficacy of a 
purpose trust enforcer, as many have questioned the efficacy of the attorneys 
general in the context of charitable trust enforcement.302  Will a noncharitable 
purpose trust enforcer vigorously advocate for the trust’s purpose?  The conse-
quences of a lazy attorney general may be political because the attorney general 
is an elected office.  The consequences of a representative of a party (for ex-
ample, a guardian ad litem303) who is less than zealous are often in the form of 
liability to the represented party due to the fiduciary relationship between 
them.304  With a lax purpose trust representative, however, unless there is a 
consequence for failed diligence, how can proper advocacy be assured? 
Imagine a trust where the trustee is directed to maintain, preserve, and 
supervise the proper care of the settlor’s poodle.  The trustee ignores her re-
sponsibilities, and the poodle is maltreated, abused, and eventually dies.  The 
architecture of a purpose trust relies on the enforcer asserting claims of fiduci-
ary malfeasance against the trustee.  But, if the enforcer ignores her responsi-
bilities as well, who has a claim against the enforcer?  Certainly not the poodle 
nor the deceased poodle’s “estate” (indeed, there is no such thing).305  If there 
is no real consequence for a lax enforcer, then is there, by extension, no real 
consequence for a lax trustee?  And if, as Justice Roxburgh emphasized, there 
is no real obligation of a trustee, then there is (and was) no trust to begin 
 
 300. See Christopher M. Reimer, International Trust Domestication: Migrating an 
Offshore Trust to a U.S. Jurisdiction, 25 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 170, 202–03 (2012) 
(explaining how the Cayman Islands’ 1997 Special Trust – Alternative Regime or 
STAR – trusts appoint an “enforcer” with “standing to enforce the terms” of nonchari-
table purpose trusts). 
 301. See Bove II, The Purpose of Purpose, supra note 116, at 34–56. 
 302. E.g., Mary Grace Blasko et al., Standing to Sue in the Charitable Sector, 28 
U.S.F.L. Rev. 37, 39 (1993) (“[T]he effectiveness of attorney general enforcement is 
likely to be sporadic, at best.”); Brody, supra note 172, at 939 (“[F]ew state attorneys 
general have the funding and inclination to engage in aggressive charity enforce-
ment.”). 
 303. A guardian ad litem for a minor “is ‘appointed as a representative of the court 
to act for the minor in the cause, with authority to engage counsel, file suit, and to 
prosecute, control and direct the litigation.’”  Noe v. True, 507 F.2d 9, 12 (6th Cir. 
1974).  Typically, an ad litem is a fiduciary.  Collins v. Tabet, 806 P.2d 40, 49–50 
(N.M. 1991). 
 304. E.g., de Montigny v. de Montigny, 233 N.W.2d 463, 468–69 (Wis. 1975) 
(“The guardian ad litem is more than an adjunct to the court.  He is an attorney for the 
children and their interest.  He must perform his duties in accordance with the standards 
of professional responsibility adopted by this court.  Nominal representation that fails 
to assure that children are treated as parties to the action is insufficient and constitutes 
a breach of the duties of professional responsibility.”), superseded by WIS. STAT. 
767.045 (1992), renumbered and amended by Act 443, S.B. 123, 2005 Leg. (Wis. 2005) 
(current version at WIS. STAT. 767.407 (2018), as recognized in Hollister v. Hollister, 
496 N.W.2d 642 (Wis. 1992)). 
 305. See Hunt v. McLaren [2006] EWHC 2386 ¶ 89 (Ch) (“[T]rusts for purposes 
or objects are invalid, for a purpose or object cannot sue . . . .”). 
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with.306  Imposing some level of accountability on enforcers of noncharitable 
purpose trusts is key. 
e. The Res Purpose Trust 
There is no particular reason why a purpose trust, the purpose of which is 
to preserve or maintain certain property, cannot own that property as a part of 
the trust estate (or trust res).307  The res of a pet trust, for example, might in-
clude the pet.308  Such a “res purpose trust” might, in fact, be recommended.309  
The trustee will, after all, be better able to discharge her responsibilities in en-
suring the proper care of a pet if the trustee owns the pet and can retake pos-
session of the animal if it is mistreated.  If ownership rights have vested in a 
third party, the trustee will have difficulty insisting upon finding the animal a 
new home if a neglectful owner resists.  The trustee will also be better postured 
to insist upon periodically assessing the animal’s health and welfare if the trus-
tee retains ownership of it.  Even discharging the trustee’s obligation to confirm 
that the animal is still living (and that distributions should continue) would be 
simplified if the trustee retained ownership, if not necessarily possession, of 
the animal. 
These advantages can be seen with a trust formed for the purposes of pre-
serving and maintaining real property or even intellectual property.  Consider 
a trust to maintain a particular tree.  While a trustee directed to prune and main-
tain a majestic oak might be able to achieve the trust’s aims even though the 
oak is located on property owned by a third party, the trustee’s ability to satisfy 
the settlor’s objectives will be improved if the trust res includes the tree and 
the underlying realty.  Supervision and maintenance tasks are more achievable 
on property one owns.  Attempts to trim someone else’s tree will encounter 
challenges if the owner is uncooperative.  It is much easier to preserve one’s 
own oak than someone else’s. 
When the trustee holds legal title to a res, which is connected to the pur-
pose of a noncharitable purpose trust, the trustee will typically still enjoy the 
 
 306. In re Astor’s Settlement Tr., (1952) 1 All ER 1067, 1071. 
 307. See, e.g., Craig J. Krogstad & Matthew P. Bock, Modern Trust Governance, 
31 S.D. L. REV. 370, 377 (2016) (recommending a purpose trust designed to own inter-
ests in a special purpose entity which can act as a trust protector which is in turn created 
for the governance of a separate dynasty trust). 
 308. See SELTZER & BEYER, supra note 78, at 75 (discussing “what other property 
(in addition to your pet) to transfer to your trust”); Darin I. Zenov & Barbara Ruiz-
Gonzalez, Trusts for Pets, 79 FLA. B.J. 22, 26 (2005) (“In order to ensure that someone 
is responsible for the pet at all times, the client should bequeath the animal to the trus-
tee, in trust, with instructions to deliver the pet to the beneficiary or caretaker.”). 
 309. Some noncharitable purpose trusts will be directed towards aims unmoored 
from any particular res.  See Ausness, supra note 116, at 364–65.  In these instances, a 
res purpose trust will be an unavailable option.  Id. at 365. 
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power (as legal owner) to encumber or transfer the property.310  There may be 
circumstances when the trustee’s duties to beneficiaries suggest that the trustee 
should sell or exchange the res that the trustee is directed to maintain.  For 
example, if the trustee receives an offer to purchase the res for a sum greatly 
exceeding its fair market value, the trustee would be cautious about rejecting 
the offer despite the greater difficulties the trustee would encounter in contin-
uing to maintain that res.  But the advantages typically inherent in a res purpose 
trust will give the trustee pause in considering any possible sale of the res to 
which the purpose of the trust is directed.  The offer would have to be so at-
tractive that it overshadows the difficulties in continuing to maintain the prop-
erty once it leaves the trustee’s ownership.  This observation – that there is a 
built-in incentive for a trustee to retain unencumbered title to the maintained 
or preserved property– illustrates something else as well.  A directive to a trus-
tee to never sell or encumber trust property is typically an unenforceable re-
straint on alienation, but designing trust architecture to discourage alienation 
or hypothecation can largely achieve a trustee asset retention objective without 
running afoul of the alienation doctrine.  The trustee of a res purpose trust re-
tains full powers of alienation over trust property but is encouraged to retain 
unencumbered title to best achieve the noncharitable purposes of the trust.311  
The trustee is thereby discouraged – but not prohibited – from losing title to 
the res of a res purpose trust. 
f. The Hybrid Purpose Trust 
A second variety of noncharitable purpose trusts is the hybrid purpose 
trust.312  A “hybrid purpose trust” is a trust for a noncharitable purpose with 
one or more concurrent, ascertainable beneficiaries.313  Most noncharitable 
purpose trusts will have a successive ascertainable beneficiary – that is, the 
 
 310. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 815(a)(2)(A) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000) (providing 
that a trustee has “all powers over the trust property which an unmarried competent 
owner has over individually owned property”); id. §§ 816(2), (3), (5) (providing that a 
trustee has the power to “sell” or “exchange” and “mortgage or pledge” trust property). 
 311. Charitable purpose trusts may be exempt from the rule banning unreasonable 
restraints on alienation, just as they are exempt from RAP.  See Phillips v. Chambers, 
51 P.2d 303, 306–07 (Okla. 1935).  The reasoning is that the rule against unreasonable 
restraints on alienation is a part of RAP.  Id.   Noncharitable purpose trusts, however, 
are not exempt.  See infra Section II.D.2.  In fact, however, the two rules are really 
quite distinct.  See 61 AM. JUR. 2D Perpetuities & Restraints on Alienation § 2, West 
(database updated Aug. 2018).  “Unlike [RAP], which is measured exclusively by the 
passage of time, the common law rule against unreasonable restraints on alienation 
evaluates the reasonableness of a restraint based on its duration, purpose, and the des-
ignated method for fixing the purchase price.”  Id. 
 312. Leslie Kiefer Amann, Discretionary Distributions: Old Rules, New Perspec-
tives, 6 EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 181, 185 (2014).  A hybrid trust is a mix 
of a support trust and a discretionary trust.  Id. 
 313. See generally 76 AM. JUR. 2D Trusts § 113, West (database updated Aug. 
2018). 
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taker or takers upon the accomplishment of the purpose in question.  With a 
hybrid purpose trust, the trustee is directed to expend trust funds towards ac-
complishing a noncharitable purpose while also aiding particular beneficiar-
ies.314  There is no real objection to also including an ascertainable beneficiary 
concurrent with distributions to accomplish a particular noncharitable purpose, 
but they seem less common.315  Hybrid charitable purpose trusts have been 
recognized as well.316 
A hybrid noncharitable purpose trust is especially useful in the most com-
mon type of American drafted trusts – those for young children.317  Consider 
two spouses with three children and a loyal dog whom we will call Clifford.  A 
typical estate plan would include a contingent trust to manage wealth for the 
children until they reach a suitable age in the event that both parents pass away 
before the children are grown.318  During the term of the trust, the trustee is 
vested with authority to make distributions that advance the children’s health, 
education, maintenance, and support.319  Imagine that the trustee receives a 
distribution request from the orphaned children’s guardian to pay for Clifford’s 
veterinary and grooming bills.  The trustee might conclude that paying for 
Clifford’s reasonable expenses advances the children’s support if Clifford is 
living in the same household given the emotional attachments they certainly 
have for the pet.  Yet a trust that specifically authorizes the trustee, in addition 
to distributing for the children’s benefit, to also make distributions for a pur-
pose – maintaining Clifford’s health and well-being – might better fulfill the 
parents’ preferences.  They probably view Clifford almost as much as a part of 
their family as their children.320  In jurisdictions that permit it, a hybrid pet trust 
 
 314. See id. 
 315. E.g., In re Howells’ Estate, 260 N.Y.S. 598 (Sur. 1932), modified, 261 N.Y.S. 
859 (Sur. 1933) (considering a trust for five pets and one human being). 
 316. See, e.g., Dingwell v. Seymour, 267 P. 327, 333–34 (Cal. Ct. App. 1928) 
(holding that provisions benefitting nieces and nephews did not destroy the otherwise 
charitable character of a trust).  For purposes of qualifying as a charitable trust for tax 
purposes, split-interest trusts are permissible.  26 U.S.C. § 664 (2012). 
 317. E.g., 16A N.J. PRAC. Legal Forms § 58:8 (4th ed. 2017) (“Some of the more 
common types of trusts are the insurance trust, educational trust, charitable trust, trust 
for the benefit of minor children and family income trust.”). 
 318. E.g., In re Goldfaden’s Estate, 81 A.2d 758, 759 (N.J. 1951) (discussing a trust 
which terminated upon the youngest child’s 21st birthday or marriage, whichever oc-
curred first).  The sort of “contingent minor’s trust” could take the form of testamentary 
trusts funded in the event that one or more of the children are not yet ready for an 
outright inheritance – say, age twenty-five or thirty – or within the provisions of revo-
cable trusts for each spouse. 
 319. E.g., Xiaojun Zhang Revocable Tr. v. Weijun Ling, No. 2004–L–114, 2005 
WL 2211108, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (describing a trust for a decedent’s child until 
the age of thirty with distributions prior to trust termination for the child’s “health, 
maintenance, support and education”). 
 320. A trust for this type of scenario might include language to address the possi-
bility that upon both parents’ deaths it is not feasible to keep Clifford and the children 
– or some of them – in the same household.  The author would caution against “all-or-
55
Simmons: A Will for Willa Cather
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
696 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
ought to be considered where a household includes minor children and one or 
more domesticated animals like Clifford.321 
A second scenario for hybrid purpose trusts can also be considered 
briefly.  Our client is a divorced farmer with three adult children who are not 
farmers.  She wishes to provide for her children and preserve her farm for gen-
erations to come.  The children are mature and self-sufficient, but there is al-
ways the risk of an unforeseen financial catastrophe (a divorce, especially), and 
so the asset-protection features of spendthrift trusts managed by a reputable 
corporate fiduciary are attractive, as is the ability to preserve the farm intact.  
A typical estate plan to achieve these kinds of objectives might be dynastic322 
in jurisdictions that allow perpetual trusts,323 even if the client and her children 
are not currently of sufficient means to trigger federal estate tax concerns.324  
 
nothing” language in this regard since Clifford may be placed with a family friend or 
relative and still provide the children with emotional connections when they visit the 
dog.  But distributions for the purpose of Clifford might be terminated if the trustee 
concludes that the dog is receiving appropriate care and is no longer providing any 
benefit to the children. 
 321. See, e.g., H.B. 1072, 2018 Leg., 93rd Sess. (S.D. 2018) (“Any property may 
form a part or all of the trust estate, including some, all or an interest in some or all of 
the property that is the subject or purpose of a purpose trust.”).  Compare UNIF. TRUST 
CODE § 408 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000) (allowing pet trusts), with id. § 409 (allowing 
noncharitable purpose trusts).  Both of the Uniform Trust Code sections also provide: 
“Property of a trust authorized by this section may be applied only to its intended use, 
except to the extent the court determines that the value of the trust property exceeds the 
amount required for the intended use.”  Id. §§ 408(c), 409(3) (emphasis added).  And: 
“Except as otherwise provided in the terms of the trust, property not required for the 
intended use must be distributed to the settlor, if then living, otherwise to the settlor’s 
successors in interest.”  Id.  These sections are concerned with “the problem of excess 
funds” – such as a multi-million-dollar trust for a goldfish.  Id. § 408.  The overfunded 
goldfish example is the author’s not the Uniform Trust Code’s.  While the Uniform 
Trust Code contemplates de-funding a purpose trust with excess funds, it could also be 
construed as disallowing res purpose trusts where the res is not income-producing.  See 
id.  Moreover, the admonition that “[p]roperty of a trust authorized by this section may 
be applied only to its intended use” might be interpreted as prohibiting hybrid purpose 
trusts.  Id. §§ 408(c), 409(3). 
 322. Although a “dynasty trust” is essentially interchangeable with “perpetual 
trust,” the former can refer more generally to a trust “set up primarily to perpetuate the 
trust estate for as long a period as possible.”  Lawrence M. Friedman, The Dynastic 
Trust, 73 YALE L.J. 547, 547–548 (1964) (comparing dynasty trusts and caretaker 
trusts).  The motivations for dynasty trusts are typically tax-related.  See Joshua C. Tate, 
Perpetual Trusts and the Settlor’s Intent, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 595, 613 (2005) (“Virtu-
ally every website or article promoting dynasty trusts gives prominent attention to the 
tax benefits they offer . . . .”). 
 323. See generally, Stewart E. Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition to Abolish the Rule 
Against Perpetuities: R.I.P. for the R.A.P., 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2097 (2003). 
 324. See J. Ronald Skipper, Should You be Recommending Generation-Skipping 
Trusts to Your Clients?, FLA. B.J.  Nov. 1996, at 61.  Skipper explains: 
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Dynasty trusts manage wealth over successive generations of descendants.325  
Adding a hybrid purpose provision could help ensure the farm’s retention and 
preservation without running afoul of the unreasonable restraints against alien-
ation doctrine that would jettison any trust provision that simply prohibited the 
trustee from ever selling or encumbering the farm.  The provision might be as 
straightforward as this: 
In addition to the foregoing provisions for the benefit of my descend-
ants, the trustee shall maintain and preserve the Farm (defined below) 
so long as practical and feasible.  I discourage (but do not prohibit) the 
trustee from transferring, encumbering, or distributing the Farm or any 
part thereof in order to best accomplish the foregoing purpose.  To those 
ends, this trust is also a “purpose trust” pursuant to state law provision 
§ XYZ. 
The aim of “never selling the farm” is not an uncommon one for farm-
ers.326  But, the aim is a difficult one to achieve.  A dynastic res hybrid purpose 
trust cannot guarantee that a farm is never sold, but it may be the best vehicle 
for attempting to do so. 
g. Artistic Limitations, Virtue, and Vision: Drafting Hints 
We are now ready to identify some preliminary considerations with an 
artistic vision trust, such as the one to be drafted for Willa Cather.  One of the 
more important decisions to be made in drafting a purpose trust is whether to 
 
The nontax advantages of these “dynasty” trusts were often of equal importance 
to the people who created them.  The assets in the trust were not subject to the 
claims of the children’s or grandchildren’s creditors; thus, the trust assets could 
not be reached in bulk if a trust beneficiary divorced or suffered a serious finan-
cial setback.  Additionally, the trust beneficiaries could not affect the disposi-
tion of the trust assets at their deaths: The trust assets were not subject to the 
terms of the beneficiaries’ wills.  Thus, the family patriarch or matriarch who 
created the trust could be sure that the trust assets would only be enjoyed by his 
or her descendants. 
 
Id. at 61–62.  As of 2018, the estate and generation skipping transfer tax credits were 
$11.18 million.  Howard M. Zaritsky, Using the Newly Increased GST Exemption, EST. 
PLAN., May 2018, at 46 n.2 (discussing the effects of Pub. Law. No. 115–97, 131 Stat. 
2054 (2017)). 
 325. See Mary D. Cascino, Dynasty Trusts for Everyone, ILL. B.J., Aug. 2012, at 
441, 441 (“To create a dynasty trust, the grantor establishes a trust for the benefit of his 
descendants (and optionally, his spouse) and funds the trust with assets that will pre-
sumably increase in value over time . . . [then] apply his gift and GST exclusion to the 
gift by filing a gift tax return . . . .”). 
 326. E.g., Clark v. Howe, No. CA 98–1226, 1999 WL 782561, at *2 (Ark. Ct. App. 
1999) (“Ms. Brown had always told them to never sell the farm.”); Slater v. Slater, 167 
N.W. 201, 203 (Iowa 1918) (quoting a letter: “I will never sell the farm as long as I live 
. . . .”). 
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include the specific underlying motivations of the settlor’s gift.327  Including 
recitals of the underlying motivations in the trust instrument may better posture 
the trust in the event of a petition to deviate or reform the substantive provisions 
of the trust.328  For example, in James’ Estate, the court stripped away a direc-
tion to accumulate portions of income in a charitable trust.329  The trust was to 
last for 400 years.330  The instrument instructed the trustee to accumulate in-
come for the first twenty years of the trust and then distribute half of it after 
twenty years.331  By the 220th year, the trustee was directed to increase income 
distributions to seventy-five percent of the income and to distribute all accu-
mulated income and principal after 400 years, at which point the trust would 
terminate.332  The charitable beneficiary petitioned the court to deviate the 
terms of the trust, asserting the income accumulations were “unreasonable and 
illegal,” and the Attorney General joined the petition.333  In ruling that the in-
come accumulation directions were unreasonable, the court noted the absence 
of any indication of the settlor’s aims in wishing to accumulate income: 
The will of Frank James supplies no indication of purpose for the 400[-
]year accumulation provision, nor does it, either by express language or 
by implication, reveal any particular plan or need for retaining accumu-
lations over such an extended period of time.  We are satisfied, how-
ever, that the settlor intended to benefit the charity rather than to demon-
strate by the device of a lengthy charitable accumulation the effect of 
accumulation of income and the compound interest tables.  In reality, 
were we to sustain the accumulation of wealth in the amount and man-
ner contemplated, we would demonstrate the latter effect rather than 
implement the settlor’s primary charitable intention.  We are reluctant 
to ascribe to testator the paramount desire merely to turn an approxi-
mately $50,000 trust fund into a final gift of almost $15,000,000, at the 
expense of immediate social needs.334 
A directive to accumulate income can run afoul of the RAA.335  Pennsyl-
vania law specifically exempted charitable trusts like the ones in James’ Estate 
 
 327. See Ausness, supra note 116, at 372 (emphasis added) (“[Purpose trust] set-
tlors should be able to prevent courts from reducing the amount allocated to the achieve-
ment of specified trust objectives . . . .”). 
 328. Cf. Eyerman v. Mercantile Tr. Co., 524 S.W.2d 210, 214 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) 
(invalidating a testamentary directive to raze the testator’s home where “[n]o reason, 
good or bad, is suggested by the will or record for the eccentric condition”).  Left with-
out a motive, the court concluded that the directive “stemm[ed] from apparent whim 
and caprice . . . .”  Id. 
 329. In re James’ Estate, 199 A.2d 275, 280 (Pa. 1964). 
 330. Id. at 276. 
 331. Id. 
 332. Id. 
 333. Id. 
 334. Id. at 279. 
 335. See infra Section II.D.1.b. 
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from the RAA, but the court still voided the income accumulation provisions 
as unreasonable.336  In doing so, the court took note of the fact that the settlor 
had failed to supply any particular reason for wishing to accumulate income.337  
He had not, for example, pointed to capital improvements or other needs that 
could not be met by drawing on current income.338  This silence, the court’s 
reasoning suggests, was what enabled deviation from his expressed inten-
tions.339  Perhaps if Mr. James had recited his motivations, the trust might have 
avoided judicial rewriting.  The court, in fact, justified its deletion of text from 
James’ trust as getting closer to his actual intent; its rewrite better achieved 
James’ intent than James’ text.340  Had James articulated his motivations, per-
haps his trust would have better weathered the unnecessary attempts to change 
it. 
On the other hand, including a recitation of particular motivations can 
also provide leverage for proposals to deviate from the trust’s textual provi-
sions.  A recited reason of malice or senselessness for a particular instruction 
would be more likely to result in a court’s deviation from the instruction.  Jo-
seph Pulitzer’s will created a trust for descendants.341  He withheld from his 
trustee the power to sell shares of stock in a corporation that published the 
World newspapers, but the trustee successfully petitioned the court for ap-
proval to sell the shares after years of large and escalating losses.342  Pulitzer’s 
trust was silent as to his motivations in directing retention of the World news-
paper stock.343  One could speculate that if Pulitzer had instructed his trustee 
to retain shares in his beloved newspaper empire based on a desire to harm the 
trust’s beneficiaries, the directive would have proved void from inception.344  
 
 336. See James’ Estate, 199 A.2d at 277 (“[T]he statutory provisions under which 
accumulations of income are declared void shall not apply to accumulations of income 
for charitable purposes.”); see also 20 PA. CONS. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6106 
(West 2018). 
 337. James’ Estate, 199 A.2d at 279. 
 338. Id. at 279–80. 
 339. Id. at 279. 
 340. Id. (“We conclude . . . that the testator’s primary charitable intention is best 
attained by making available to the beneficiary the income of the trust on a current 
basis.”). 
 341. In re Pulitzer’s Estate, 249 N.Y.S. 87, 91 (Sur. 1931). 
 342. Id. at 91–92, 98. 
 343. Id. at 93. 
 344. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 404 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000) (“A trust and its 
terms must be for the benefit of its beneficiaries.”).  This provision may not be drafted 
around; it is a mandatory rule under the Uniform Trust Code.  UNIF. TRUST CODE § 
105(b)(3); see also Lee-Ford Tritt, The History, Impact, and Future of the Benefit-of-
the-Beneficiary Rule, EST. TAX & PERS. FIN. PLAN. (Dec. 2014) (describing the contro-
versy surrounding the codification of the benefit-of-the-beneficiary rule).  Lee-Ford 
asserts that “the Benefit-of-the-Beneficiary Rule” is far broader in scope and deeper in 
significance than the Rule Against Capricious Purposes was ever meant to be.”  Id.; see 
also infra Section II.D.1.d (regarding rules against capriciousness); c.f. S.D. CODIFIED 
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But if the instruction was based on anticipated appreciation of the shares and a 
desire to increase the wealth of the trust, it seems likely that the instruction 
would be honored, at least until the aim plainly turned out to be misguided.345  
There is also a firmer basis for deviation from the instruction when share values 
plummet because a court could reason that deviation is necessary in order to 
achieve the grantor’s stated investment-growth objective.  Including the set-
tlor’s motives can thus cut two or more ways depending on the circum-
stances.346  Perhaps, at a minimum, the adroit drafter could confirm that the 
settlor’s intent is not based on caprice, avarice, or whim. 
In addition to recitations of settlor motivation, the purpose trust drafter 
should consider the dynamics of the successive interests in the trust.  Whether 
by design or default, a remainderman typically claims an interest in the trust 
once the noncharitable purpose has been accomplished.347  For example, upon 
the death of a pet, a pet trust trustee may be instructed to distribute any remain-
ing funds to a named beneficiary.  If the trust is silent, the remainderman may 
be deemed to be the settlor’s estate or heirs.348  This necessarily incentivizes 
the remainder beneficiaries to challenge what they view as excessive expendi-
tures for the trust’s purpose.  The remaindermen could also consider a petition 
to bring the purpose administration to a close when facts would support the 
assertion that the purpose has been achieved.  If the settlor prioritizes the non-
charitable purpose over the remaindermen, one option is to grant the trustee or 
 
LAWS § 55–1–5.1 (2018) (“The terms of an express trust need not be for the exclusive 
benefit of its beneficiaries, whether or not the beneficiaries are ascertainable.”). 
 345. But see Pulitzer, 249 N.Y.S. at 94–95 (reasoning that Joseph Pulitzer’s domi-
nant purpose had been to benefit his beneficiaries, not to require the retention of shares 
out of “mere vanity”).  Query whether Pulitzer’s investment retention directive would 
have been enforceable had Pulitzer indicated that his motivations were traceable to sen-
timental attachments to his newspaper business rather than wealth preservation aims 
for beneficiaries’ benefit. 
 346. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 27 cmt. b (2001). 
 347. E.g., Shidon Aflatooni, The Statutory Pet Trust: Recommendations for a New 
Uniform Law Based on the Past Twenty-One Years, 18 ANIMAL L. 1, 50 (2011) 
(“[R]emainder beneficiaries or successors in interest may contest the validity of an am-
biguous statement leaving money for the care of the pet owner’s animal.”); Frances H. 
Foster, Trust Privacy, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 555, 579 (2008) (quoting Siobhan Morris-
sey, Wills Go to the Dogs, A.B.A. J., May 2003, at 24, 25) (cautioning pet trust drafters 
against naming a pet’s caregiver as the remainder beneficiary out of concerns that it 
“‘tempt[s] the caretaker to shorten the pet’s life in order to keep the money’”). 
 348. E.g., UNIF. TRUST CODE § 408(c) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000) (“[P]roperty not 
required for its intended use must be distributed to the settlor, if then living, otherwise 
to the settlor’s successors in interest.”); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907(b) (providing 
that a pet “trust terminates when no living animal is covered by the trust”); id. §§ 2-
907(c)(2)(A), (B) (providing that upon termination of a testamentary noncharitable pur-
pose trust, the remainder passes according to the will’s residuary clause unless other-
wise provided in the will’s text). 
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another individual a special power of appointment over the remainder in order 
to diminish the standing of persons who disagree with the settlor’s aims.349 
3. A Tricky Income Tax Matter 
Although noncharitable purpose trusts have been recognized, in fits and 
starts, for over a hundred years, authority on their treatment for purposes of the 
federal income tax is sparse.350  The taxation of purpose trusts has been de-
scribed as “complex and not clearly defined.”351  Purpose trusts involve “some 
tricky if not odd, tax considerations.”352  Many trusts suffer under steeply com-
pressed trust income tax rates, which reach the current maximum of 39.6% at 
a mere $12,500 in income.353  A trust may claim a deduction for its distribu-
tions.354  Corresponding tax code sections provide that a beneficiary receiving 
distributions must report the distributions in her gross income.355  Distribution 
of all net trust income is oftentimes preferred for this reason.  And with purpose 
trusts, this is where things get particularly interesting – for how is its trustee to 
“distribute” income to a purpose? 356 
Revenue Ruling 76-486, published in 1976, provides a partial answer.357  
The ruling continues to be the primary authority for the income tax rules for 
 
 349. See JEFFREY N. PENNELL & ALAN NEWMAN, ESTATE AND TRUST PLANNING 
281 (2005) (“[T]he powerholder may impress on the class of permissible appointees 
the need to pay attention to the powerholder lest they be divested of their expectancy 
by effective exercise of the power in favor of others.”).  “The provision creating a power 
should indicate when and how the power is exercisable, whether the property may be 
appointed on a further trust, in whose favor it may be exercised, and whether the prop-
erty may be appointed unequally or to the complete exclusion of some permissible ap-
pointees.”  JOHN R. PRICE & SAMUEL A. DONALDSON, PRICE ON CONTEMPORARY 
ESTATE PLANNING § 10.23 (2014 ed.). 
 350. Gerry W. Beyer & Jonathan P. Wilkerson, Max’s Taxes: A Tax-Based Analysis 
of Pet Trusts, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 1219, 1220–21 (2009). 
 351. Wendy S. Goffe, An Introduction to Lesser-Known but Useful Trusts – Part 2, 
37 EST. PLAN., Aug. 2010, at 1, 3. 
 352. Bove II, The Purpose of Purpose, supra note 116, at 37. 
 353. 26 U.S.C. § 1(e) (2012); Rev. Proc. 2016-55, Table 5, 2016-45 I.R.B. 707. 
 354. 26 U.S.C. §§ 641, 651 (2012). 
 355. Id. §§ 642, 652. 
 356. Bove II, The Purpose of Purpose, supra note 116, at 37.  Bove explains: 
 
[W]hat happens to these rules in the case of a purpose trust that distributes in-
come for the upkeep of an automobile or the care of a cat?  Obviously neither 
the car nor the cat will be filing a tax return, and it wouldn’t seem fair . . . that 
the trust should simply be denied the distribution deduction and taxed at the 
higher trust tax rates, because it is not accumulating the income.  On the other 
hand, to allow a deduction for trust distributions that are not taxed to anyone 
just will not fly under our tax laws. 
 
Id. 
 357. See Rev. Rul. 76-486, 1976-2 C.B. 192, 1976 WL 36269. 
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purpose trusts.358  The IRS reasoned that pet trust distributions to a non-person 
could not be deductible as distributions because no one would be taxed on 
them.359  However, the IRS further reasoned that the trust should not be taxed 
at the higher trust tax rates because the trustee did not accumulate the income 
but instead distributed it for pet care costs.360  The IRS concluded that the trust 
should instead be taxed at the rate of a married individual filing separately.361  
The reliability of the last portion of this reasoning was weakened when Con-
gress enacted section 1(e) of the tax code, which added a new rate of tax for 
both trusts and estates.362  Today, most commentators agree, a purpose trust 
would be taxed on its distributions to non-persons at the compressed trust in-
come tax rates.363  The trust would be taxed as if it had not made any distribu-
tions.364  Trust income would suffer under the compressed trust tax brackets 
even if the trustee had “distributed” all income to the “pet-beneficiary.” 
Things get even stickier with a hybrid purpose trust.365  Consider two sim-
ilar trusts: The first is a typical trust for a testator’s two surviving children, 
which continues until the youngest reaches her thirtieth birthday.  The children 
are both in their early twenties and reside rent-free in a home situated on their 
deceased parent’s farmland, which is now an asset of their trust.  The trustee 
maintains and insures the farmland and leases it to a neighbor.  Each month, 
the trustee distributes the net rental income to the beneficiaries. 
The second trust in this hypothetical is a hybrid purpose trust.  As in the 
previous example, the beneficiaries of the trust are the testator’s two surviving 
children.  The noncharitable purpose of the trust is to maintain and preserve the 
testator’s farmland, which is an asset of the trust.  The trust is also a “res pur-
pose trust.”366  The primary aim of the trust is to support the children, but a 
secondary purpose is to maintain the farm.  The trustee applies income from 
trust investments to maintain and insure the farm, which is leased to a neighbor.  
The trustee distributes the net income to the two children. 
With both trusts, the income distributed to the children is deductible at 
the trust level and taxable to the children as income.367  With the first trust, as 
the trustee incurs ordinary expenses associated with maintaining and insuring 
 
 358. See Beyer & Wilkerson, supra note 350, at 1226. 
 359. See Rev. Rul. 76-486, 1976-2 C.B. 192, 1976 WL 36269, at *3. 
 360. Id. 
 361. Id. (citing I.R.C. §1(d) (2012) (amended 2017)). 
 362. I.R.C. § 1(e) (West 2018). 
 363. Beyer & Wilkerson, supra note 350, at 1227–28; Bove II, The Purpose of Pur-
pose, supra note 116, at 37; but see DONALD H. KELLEY ET AL., Specialty Trusts, in 
ESTATE PLANNING FOR FARMERS AND RANCHERS § 5:1.50, West (database updated 
Sept. 2018) (“Distributions would be deductible at the trust level only if made to the 
caretaker [of an animal] as an individual beneficiary of the trust;” but this creates an-
other problem: “how to require the individual to actually provide care for the animal.”). 
 364. Zenov and Ruiz-Gonzalez, supra note 308, at 25. 
 365. See explanation of hybrid purpose trusts supra Section II.C.2.f. 
 366. See description of res purpose trusts supra Section II.C.2.e. 
 367. I.R.C. § 662(a) (2012); see also, generally, BOGERT ET AL., supra note 141, § 
268.25 (2017) (summarizing trust income tax rules). 
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the agricultural property owned by the trust, the trustee may deduct them from 
otherwise taxable trust income.368  Should not the second trust – identical to 
the first except with regards to the additional noncharitable purpose of preserv-
ing the farm ground – receive the same treatment?369 
Revenue Ruling 76-486 did not consider whether a pet trust could deduct 
any expenses.370  It certainly seems the IRS contemplated that in calculating its 
taxable income, a pet trust could deduct the investment losses, the trustee’s 
fees, the investment manager’s fees, and the accountant’s charge for preparing 
the trust’s tax return.371  It seems, therefore, that the IRS retained for nonchar-
itable purpose trusts the distinction between distributions and deductible ex-
penses.  Typically, a distribution can be distinguished from an expense because 
an expense represents a value retained within the trust (for example, in repair-
ing fence on trust property, the trustee is preserving and maintaining trust prop-
erty), or an expenditure outside the trust that represents taxable income to its 
recipient (for example, paying the trust’s income tax preparer for her services), 
or both.372  An outer limit on the reasonableness of an expense would permit 
the deduction of ordinary dogfood but not steak and lobster dinners with a pet 
trust benefitting a dog.373  These uncertainties concerning the income tax treat-
ment of noncharitable purpose trusts unfortunately bedevil the kind of planning 
that Willa Cather might hypothetically pursue. 
 
 368. I.R.C. § 643(b) (2012). 
 369. Congress has imposed the federal income tax on trusts’ net income, resting an 
allowance for deductions of reasonable expenses as “determined under the terms of the 
governing instrument and applicable local law.”  Id.  Whether a given expense should 
be charged to income or principal depends on the nature of the expense in question, the 
terms of the trust, and the particular local accounting principles governing fiduciaries. 
M. CARR FERGUSON ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF ESTATES, TRUSTS, & 
BENEFICIARIES §7.02 (Supp. 2004).  Thus, setting aside a portion of income to account 
for the depreciation of a wasting asset can be appropriate, depending on the trust terms 
and local law.  Levin v. Comm’r, 355 F.2d 987, 988 (5th Cir. 1966); Estate of Little v. 
Comm’r, 274 F.2d 718, 723–24 (9th Cir. 1960).  Generally, “repairs to, taxes on, and 
other expenses directly attributable to the maintenance of rental property or the collec-
tion of rental income are allocated to rental income.”  26 C.F.R. § 1.652(b)–3(a) (2017). 
 370. See Rev. Rul. 76-486, 1976-2 C.B. 192, 1976 WL 36269. 
 371. But see Knight v. Comm’r, 552 U.S. 181, 187 (2008) (holding that typically 
investment advisory fees are deductible only to extent that they exceeded two percent 
of trust’s adjusted gross income). 
 372. See generally BOGERT ET AL., supra note 141, § 801. 
 373. Extending this rationale, some commentators have suggested that pet trusts 
could mitigate their unfavorable income tax treatment by naming the pet’s caretaker as 
a beneficiary (e.g., a hybrid purpose trust).  E.g., Veronica Cerruti, Unleash Creative 
Planning Ideas for Clients with Pets, 42 EST. PLAN. 10, 16 (2015) (explaining that if a 
pet trust names a pet and human beneficiary/caregiver, “then the human beneficiary 
would report the trust income distributed out of the trust as personal income, and the 
trust would be entitled to a distribution deduction for those amounts”); see also Chris-
tian N. Weiler, Louisiana Pet Trusts and How to Avoid Some Hairy Situations, LA. B.J., 
Feb./Mar. 2017, at 344, 345 (“If a Pet Trust names a caregiver, is that caregiver not also 
a beneficiary of the Pet Trust since he/she receives funding needed for the day-to-today 
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D. Stumbling Blocks 
As has been already noted, purpose trusts encounter several adversarial 
doctrines and rules that challenge their existence.374  The law exempts charita-
ble trusts from the most formidable of these adversaries: RAP and the benefi-
ciary principle.375  Because of the relief available to charitable purpose trusts, 
a recurring strategy is to argue that the trust in question qualifies as charitable, 
thereby escaping the voiding blows of RAP.  The sections that follow outline 
stumbling blocks for charitable purpose trusts and then for noncharitable pur-
pose trusts.  Before doing so, brief mention should be made of two historically 
noteworthy stumbling blocks to realizing settlor intent with regards to charita-
ble trusts.  These two old stumbling blocks were exclusive to charitable trusts 
– the Mortmain statutes and the superstitious uses doctrine.  Mortmain (mean-
ing “dead hand”) laws were designed to protect individual heirs from being 
disinherited in favor of a charity.376  The superstitious uses doctrine functioned 
to set aside bequests for unorthodox religious purposes.377  Both are antiquated, 
in part, perhaps as a reflection of the twentieth century’s gradually warming 
 
maintenance and care of the pet?”).  Another option is restricting trustee investments 
to tax-free municipal bonds.  GERRY W. BEYER, ESTATE PLANNING FOR NON-HUMAN 
FAMILY MEMBERS 18, http://www.professorbeyer.com/Articles/Pet_Trusts_06-02-
2014.pdf (last revised June 2014).  Alternatively, could not the trustee of a pet trust 
without any concurrent ascertainable beneficiaries hire a caregiver for Rover and de-
duct those caregiver costs as trust expenses?  But see Barbara Graham and Diane Gary, 
Attention Lawyers: Sit, Stay, Plan, MD. B.J., Mar./Apr. 2010, at 12, 17 (concluding, 
without authority, that “[e]xpenses incurred for the care of the pet like Pet Caregiver 
fees, veterinarian care, and pet sitting fees are not deductible”).  One pair of commen-
tators asserts: “A caretaker of the animal could not be charged with the tax liability 
because the caretaker serves only as an agent of the animal . . . .”  Zenov & Ruiz-
Gonzalez, supra note 308, at 24.  It is unclear to me how a pet could engage in an agent-
principal relationship. 
 374. Indeed, Professor Austin Wakeman Scott – of “Scott on Trusts” fame – once 
asserted that noncharitable purpose trusts should not be permitted at all on grounds of 
public policy.  See Hirsch, Freedom, supra note 116, at 2216  (citing AUSTIN W. SCOTT 
& WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 124 (4th ed. 1987) (“It is submitted 
that it is not in accordance with public policy that a decedent should be permitted to 
control the disposition of his property to this extent.”).  Professor Mark Ascher, the 
current editor of the treatise, has stricken this passage.  Id. (citing 2 AUSTIN WAKEMAN 
SCOTT ET AL., SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 12.11 (5th ed. 2006)). 
 375. BOGERT ET AL., supra note 141, § 351. 
 376. MARY F. RADFORD, Charitable Trusts, in GEORGIA TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 
5:1, West (database updated Dec. 2017).  Mortmain statutes in the United States might 
limit the portion of an estate that may be devised to charities or impose restrictions on 
the timing of a will such as invalidating charitable bequests in deathbed wills.  W.D. 
ROLLISON, THE LAW OF WILLS 313–14 (1939). 
 377. JONES, supra note 177, at 11, 83–85. 
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affections towards charitable bequests or perhaps simply as a recognition that 
the statutes were ineffective in achieving their aims.378 
1. Contemporary Stumbling Blocks for Purpose Trusts 
The primary stumbling blocks exclusive to noncharitable purpose trusts 
are those from which charitable trusts are typically exempt, namely RAP, the 
beneficiary principle, and the largely forgotten RAA.379  These stumbling 
blocks will merit close scrutiny in the drafting of a noncharitable purpose trust, 
as they represent an array of potential objections and traps.  The beneficiary 
principle is resolved with the injection of an “enforcer” who assumes the role 
of a kind of private attorney general, but RAP and RAA must be considered 
carefully.  After probing these rules, this Section will turn to two additional 
potential objections to purpose trusts (both charitable and noncharitable alike), 
namely the rule against unreasonable restraints on alienation and the more 
amorphous rules against capriciousness.380 
a. The Rule Against Perpetuities (RAP) 
RAP aims to free up the alienability of property otherwise undermined by 
future interests with unacceptable longevity.381  Future interests themselves 
create property market distortions and ought to be contained.  Stated another 
way, “It is socially desirable that the wealth of the world be controlled by its 
living members and not by the dead.”382  The rule thus frowns on property that 
remains unmarketable for unreasonable periods of time but does so by stamp-
ing out settlor intent while harnessing such complex abstractions that even the 
 
 378. See Holland v. Alcock, 16 N.E. 305, 329 (N.Y. 1888) (reasoning that obser-
vances such as trusts for the benefit of priests or charities “cannot be condemned by 
any court, as a matter of law, as superstitious, and the English statutes against supersti-
tious uses can have no effect here”); Shirley Norwood Jones, The Demise of Mortmain 
in the United States, 12 MISS. C. L. REV. 407, 458 (1992) (“It certainly makes no sense 
in modern times that families should be protected against charitable organizations and 
not against anyone else.”). 
 379. See infra Section II.D.1.  See generally Note, Accumulations in Charitable 
Trusts, 41 HARV. L. REV. 514 (1928) (discussing “statutory provisions concerning ac-
cumulations for charitable purposes”).  “It is usually said that [RAP] does not apply to 
charitable trusts.  But a charitable trust which may not vest within the limits of the rule 
against remoteness is void.”  Id. at 515 n.5 (citing Inst. for Sav. v. Roxbury Home, 139 
N.E. 301 (Mass. 1923); Easton v. Hall, 154 N.E. 216 (Ill. 1926)).  But see Robert H. 
Sitkoff, The Lurking Rule Against Accumulations of Income, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 501, 
506 n.31 (2006) [hereinafter Sitkoff, Lurking] (emphasis added) (“Charitable trusts are 
exempt from [RAP] and the [RAA].”). 
 380. See infra Section II.D.1.c & d. 
 381. See Trecker v. Langel, 298 N.W.2d 289, 291 (Iowa 1980) (explaining RAP 
has the “objective of keeping property freely alienable”). 
 382. SIMES, supra note 22, at 59. 
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most stolid law student may be driven to madness in trying to master them.383  
The rule is simple enough to state: “No interest is good unless it must vest, if 
at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of 
the interest.”384  RAP thus “prevents the creation of any future interest in prop-
erty which does not vest within twenty-one years after some life or lives pres-
ently in being plus the period of gestation if gestation is in fact taking place.”385  
The common law judges who mapped RAP in the Duke of Norfolk’s Case 
thought that a donor ought to be able to “provide for all of those in his family 
whom he personally knew and the first generation after them upon attaining 
majority” but no more.386  In application, RAP often conjures “remorseless 
construction” and frequently results in an “infectious invalidity” of settlor in-
tent.387 
Two examples will suffice.  The first is taken from Renner’s Estate, where 
the testator devised the residue of her estate as follows: 
All the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, real and personal, of 
whatsoever kind and wheresoever situate, I give, devise and bequeath 
unto my executrix, hereinafter named, IN TRUST, however, for the 
maintenance of my pets, which I leave to her kind care and judgment, 
and for their interment upon their respective deaths in the Francisvale 
Cemetery.  Upon the death and interment of the last of my pets to sur-
vive, I give, devise and bequeath my entire residue estate so held in trust 
unto the said Mary Faiss Riesing, absolutely and in fee.388 
The trust was challenged by the remainderman as violating RAP, but the 
court explained that the remainder interest in Mary Faiss Riesing was a vested 
 
 383. In re Estate of Freeman, 404 P.2d 222, 227–28 (Kan. 1965) (citation omitted). 
 384. GRAY, supra note 1, at 191. 
 385. Estate of Freeman, 404 P.2d at 227.  See generally W. Barton Leach, Perpe-
tuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule’s Reign of Terror, 65 HARV. L. REV. 721 (1952) 
[hereinafter, Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective]; W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities: Stay-
ing the Slaughter of the Innocents, 68 L.Q. REV. 35 (1952) [hereinafter Leach, Perpe-
tuities].  Professor Leach eloquently ranted, 
 
If there should be among our rules one which is so abstruse that it is misunder-
stood by a substantial percentage of those who advise the public, so unrealistic 
that its “conclusive presumptions” are laughable nonsense to any sane man, so 
capricious that it strikes down in the name of public order gifts which offer no 
offense except that they are couched in the wrong words, so misapplied that it 
sometimes directly defeats the end it was designed to further – then in perfor-
mance of our corporate responsibility we should take corrective action. 
 
Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective, supra, at 721–22. 
 386. 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.16 (A. James Casner et al. eds., 1952); 
accord Duke of Norfolk’s Case [1682] 22 Eng. Rep. 931. 
 387. Estate of Freeman, 404 P.2d at 231–31. 
 388. 59 Pa. D. & C. 102 (Orphans’ Ct 1946) (quoting will). 
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interest upon creation of the trust.389  It is true that the remainderman’s interest 
may not become possessory until after a period in excess of the RAP period 
has elapsed, but RAP is not concerned with the moment an interest becomes 
possessory.390  RAP focuses on the moment an interest must vest.391  Presum-
ably, even if Mary Faiss Riesing had predeceased the testator’s pets, remainder 
distributions would have been made to her estate.  This instability suggests that, 
as applied to noncharitable purpose trusts, a secondary rule may be operating 
alongside RAP that requires trust termination rather than vesting within the 
perpetuities period.392  If a second, more shadowy, twin to RAP operates on 
purpose trusts, its possible application to remote trust termination possibilities 
cannot be overlooked either.393 
A second example – this one involving RAP’s interactions with nonchar-
itable purpose trusts – can be seen in Searight’s Estate.394  George Searight 
died in 1948 with a will providing: 
I give and bequeath my dog, Trixie, to Florence Hand of Wooster, Ohio, 
and I direct my executor to deposit in the Peoples Federal Savings and 
 
 389. Id. at 105–06. 
 390. See W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REV. 638, 639–
40 (1938) [hereinafter Leach, Nutshell] (“[RAP] is not a rule invalidating interests 
which last too long . . . .”) (alterations in original).  “The metaphysical common-law 
notion that a future estate can vest in interest before it vests in possession is incorpo-
rated into [RAP].”  Id. at 647. 
 391. See Hubscher & Son, Inc. v. Storey, 578 N.W.2d 701, 703 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1998) (“The rule applies only to nonvested property interests.”); Williams v. Watt, 668 
P.2d 620, 635 (Wyo. 1983) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citation omitted) (“[T]here is a 
dual meaning ascribed to the term ‘vested.’ . . . [T]he secondary meaning of the term 
‘vested’ is transmissible, but . . . [RAP] does not concern itself with this secondary 
meaning but instead deals only with notions of remoteness of possession.”).  In some 
instances, whether an interest “vests” or “becomes possessory” is the same thing.  See 
Earle v. Int’l Paper Co., 429 So. 2d 989, 992 (Ala. 1983) (“[E]xecutory interests are by 
definition not vested until they become possessory . . . .”). 
 392. Hirsch, Trusts for Purposes, supra note 116, at 931.  “Courts unanimously 
require trusts for definite noncharitable purposes to terminate (rather than vest) within 
some life in being and twenty-one years.”  Id.  Professor Hirsch describes this as “the 
parallel rule requiring that trusts for noncharitable purposes terminate within the per-
petuities period . . . .”  Id.  This important observation explains the reasoning underpin-
ning the dual-RAP repeal language found in some states’ purpose trust legislation.  See, 
e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-1-20 (West 2018) (“Neither the common law [RAP], . 
. .  nor any common law limiting the duration of noncharitable purpose trusts is in force 
in this state.”). 
 393. See Hirsch, Trusts for Purposes, supra note 116, at 931–32 (noting that nu-
merous scholars have “deduced that noncharitable purpose trusts are subject to a sec-
ond, (unnamed) rule, shadowing [RAP], though not identical to it”); Thomas E. Sim-
mons, A Trust for Ted’s Head, 87 MISS. L.J. SUPRA (2018) (forthcoming 2018) (de-
scribing RAP’s “sly and shadowy twin” – that is, “the Purpose Trust Rule against Per-
petuities (or, to coin an acronym, ‘P-TRAP’).”). 
 394. In re Searight’s Estate, 95 N.E.2d 779 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950). 
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Loan Association, Wooster, Ohio, the sum of $1000.00 to be used by 
him to pay Florence Hand at the rate of 75 cents per day for the keep 
and care of my dog as long as it shall live.  If my dog shall die before 
the said $1000.00 and the interest accruing therefrom shall have been 
used up, I give and bequeath whatever remains of said $1000.00 to be 
divided equally among those of the following persons who are living at 
that time, to wit: Bessie Immler, Florence Hand, Reed Searight, Fern 
Olson and Willis Horn.395 
The executor acted as trustee, retaining the $1000 fund, and Florence 
Hand accepted the bequest of Trixie –  a dog, incidentally, valued at five dol-
lars.396  The state inheritance tax authorities challenged the bequest as a means 
to overturn the estate’s inheritance tax calculations.397  The probate court con-
cluded, however, that although the five-dollar dog was taxable as a succession 
to Ms. Hand, only the remainder interests could be taxed to the five remainder-
men – subject to tax refunds to the extent funds were not consumed for Trixie’s 
care.398  The Ohio inheritance tax rules subjected bequests to individuals, insti-
tutions, and corporations, but no others, to taxes, and the probate court reasoned 
that Ohio statutes did not levy any tax “upon the succession to any property 
passing to an animal[.]”399  The department of taxation appealed the decision, 
but the appellate court affirmed.400 
On appeal, the department of taxation asserted that the bequest for 
Trixie’s care was invalid.401  It advanced two principal arguments: that the be-
quest was invalid as an “honorary trust” and that it violated RAP.402  The ap-
pellate court dismissed the first argument because Ms. Hand was willing to 
administer the bequest.403  Nor, the court reasoned, did the bequest amount to 
a power of appointment.404  Turning to the RAP argument, the court calculated 
that since it would take less than five years to consume seventy-five cents each 
day even if the $1000 was invested at six percent interest, it was “very appar-
ent” that “such time limit is much less than the maximum period allowed under 
 
 395. Id. 
 396. Id. at 781. 
 397. Id. at 780. 
 398. Id. at 780. 
 399. Id. at 780, 784. 
 400. Id. at 781, 784. 
 401. See id. at 781. 
 402. Id. 
 403. Id. at 782 (quoting Harry W. Vanneman, 40 OHIO JURIS. § 68) (“[T]he trust 
does not fail if the trustee is willing to carry it out . . . provided the trust will not continue 
for a period longer than the [RAP].”).  The idea of honorary trusts is unpacked infra at 
Section II.E.1. 
 404. Id. at 784 (citing RESTATEMENT OF PROP.: FUTURE INTERESTS § 318(2) (1944)) 
(providing that a power of appointment does not include honorary trusts). 
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[RAP].”405  Therefore, Trixie’s trust was valid and, to the extent funds were 
expended on Trixie, the bequest was nontaxable.406 
Searight’s Estate’s RAP analysis is neat but wrong (although it remains 
respectable authority in Ohio).407  The analysis is wrong because RAP requires 
that a future interest be absolutely certain of vesting within the RAP period and 
not probably certain.408  Alternatively, if a remote trust termination is being 
considered, then the same certainty would be required.409  If the remaindermen 
must survive the termination of the trust before their interests vest, then it will 
not be known whether those interests vest until the death of Trixie.410  As a 
respected treatise articulates, “In applying [RAP] to contingent future interests, 
the question is not: Will the future interest probably vest within the period?  
Rather it is this: Must it necessarily vest within the period, if it vests at all?”411  
A dog is not a measuring life, so the question is whether the dog’s life, as a 
matter of law, will come to an end within twenty-one years.412  It may not.  For 
example, in Wood, it did not matter that as a practical matter the trust would 
almost certainly terminate within four years.413  The aims of RAP in operation 
are certainty and predictability.414  Theoretically, even a testamentary bequest 
to vest “when my debts are paid” would violate RAP.415  A treatise explains, 
“It is of the essence of [RAP] that we must be certain whether an interest is 
valid or void.”416  Indeed, if we are to have RAP, then “a social policy involved 
in determining the validity of an interest at an early date” should also be 
acknowledged.417  Therefore, Searight’s Estate misconstrued the law in order 
 
 405. Id. at 783. 
 406. Id. at 784. 
 407. See Vinson v. First Tr. & Sav. Bank, 339 N.E.2d 670, 672 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1974) 
(discussing Searight’s Estate). 
 408. See Hirsch, Trusts for Purposes, supra note 116, at 935 (“[C]ourts have usu-
ally held invalid trusts to provide support for the lives of pet animals because they might 
continue too long, unless expressly limited to some human life or lives and/or twenty-
one years.”) (alteration in original); Leach, Nutshell, supra note 390, at 642 (“A future 
interest is invalid unless it is absolutely certain that it must vest within the period of 
perpetuities.”). 
 409. See supra notes 430–31. 
 410. See supra note 394 and accompanying text. 
 411. 3 SIMES AND SMITH THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 1228, West (database 
updated Jan. 2018) (emphasis added). 
 412. See Favor of Animals, supra note 246, at 1292 (“Although the ingenuity of the 
commentator could, no doubt, be depended upon to devise a technique for distinguish-
ing crocodiles and crows from dogs, the decision that dogs don’t live for purposes of 
[RAP] may be justified as furthering the simplicity of the rule.”). 
 413. In re Wood (1894) 3 Ch. 381, 383.  Professor Leach called this the “magic 
gravel pit” case.  Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective, supra note 385, at 731–32. 
 414. SIMES, supra note 22, at 73.  Simes explains that “certainty and predictability” 
are “at the very heart of [RAP].”  Id. 
 415. Id. at 64. 
 416. Id. at 66. 
 417. Id. 
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to accommodate the settlor’s intent (and defeat a tax).418  In states with a “wait-
and-see” approach to RAP, George Searight’s bequest would also be sustained.  
But in traditional RAP states, even a pet trust for a mayfly would violate the 
rule.419 
Adroit drafters typically include a RAP “savings clause” in instruments 
that may be subject to the rule, but the savings clause does terminate the trust 
at a relatively early date.420  A savings clause may allow a trust subject to RAP 
to last around ninety years, but this may be inadequate for a pet trust for a parrot 
(that may live 100 years) or a tortoise (that may live beyond 250 years).421  It 
may also be inadequate to accomplish any number of other noncharitable pur-
poses.  As dynastic trust drafters have long known, the best solution is to es-
tablish a noncharitable trust in a jurisdiction without RAP.422 
 
 418. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 253, at 425.  See id. at 428 (emphasis 
added) (“The assumption of a [six] percent interest rate in Searight’s Estate is incon-
sistent with the common law [RAP], which considers what might happen rather than 
what is likely to happen.”). 
 419. See, e.g., In re Estate of McNeil, 41 Cal. Rptr. 139, 141–42 (Ct. App. 1964) 
(reasoning that a trust to pay $50/week for two dogs violates RAP).  The Supreme Court 
of Virginia has explained the wait-and-see approach to RAP: 
 
Under [the ‘wait-and-see’] doctrine, [RAP] is determined to have been violated 
or not by taking into consideration events which occur after the period fixed by 
the rule has commenced. If, upon a later look, the event upon which an interest 
was made contingent is found to have occurred and the interest has vested or 
has become certain to vest within the period fixed by the rule, the rule is held 
not to have been violated. 
 
Lake of the Woods Assoc., Inc. v. McHugh, 380 S.E.2d 872, 875 n.2 (Va. 1989) (alter-
ation in original).  Compare W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities Legislation: Hail, Pennsyl-
vania!, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1124 (1960) (hailing the wait-and-see approach), with Law-
rence W. Waggoner, Perpetuity Reform, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1718 (1983) (criticizing the 
wait-and-see approach). 
 420. The following is an example of a simple perpetuities savings clause: “This 
trust shall terminate not later than 21 years after the death of the survivor of my issue 
living on my death . . . .” PRICE & DONALDSON, supra note 349, § 10.47.  The early 
termination of the trust pursuant to the savings clause may leave the tortoise without 
financial support from the trust.  Consider this RAP and RAA savings period from 
George Bernard Shaw’s will incorporating a lengthier – but still valid – term by refer-
encing a wider class of measuring lives: “a period ending at the expiration of twenty 
years from the day of the death of the last survivor of all the lineal descendants of His 
late Majesty King George the Fifth who shall be living at the time of my death (here-
inafter called ‘the special period’).”  Re Shaw [1957] 1 All ER 745. 
 421. See In re Searight’s Estate, 95 N.E.2d 779, 783 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950) (fretting 
that absent RAP, pet trusts might be “established for animals of great longevity, such 
as crocodiles, elephants and sea turtles.”). 
 422. See Brian Layman, Comment, Perpetual Dynasty Trusts: One of the Most 
Powerful Tools in the Estate Planner’s Arsenal, 32 AKRON L. REV. 747, 761–62 (1999); 
see also Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for 
Trust Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 
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b. The Rule Against Accumulations (RAA) 
RAA is mostly ignored and unknown today.  For these reasons alone, it 
is potentially nettlesome.423  It seems that charitable trusts are generally con-
sidered exempt from the rule’s application, but this conclusion is less than as-
sured in all jurisdictions.424  The rule derives from the will of Englishman Peter 
Thellusson who died wealthy in 1797.425  Thellusson devised the residue of 
more than six hundred thousand pounds in trust to accumulate for the joint lives 
of his three sons and his then-living grandchildren before distributing it all to 
his three oldest surviving descendants.426  The accumulation, one projection 
calculated, might reach £140 million over the seventy-five-year estimated life 
of the trust.427  The House of Lords applied a RAP analysis to the trust contest-
ants’ claims and determined that because the trust would accumulate no longer 
 
373–74 (2005) (noting that “state perpetuities law became a highly salient margin of 
differentiation” on account of the implementation of the generation skipping transfer 
tax).  “[I]t was only a matter of time until jurisdictional competition sparked a race to 
abolish [RAP].”  Id. at 374. 
 423. See Note, Use of Corporate Device to Effect Accumulation of Estate Income, 
47 YALE L. J. 1026, 1027–28 (1938) (noting that both mandatory trust provisions as 
well as a trustee’s discretionary election to accumulate income can run afoul of RAA).  
See generally BOGERT ET AL., supra note 141, § 352 (discussing RAA). 
 424. Sitkoff, Lurking, supra note 379, at 506 n.31 (2006) (“Charitable trusts are 
exempt from . . . [RAA].”).  But see Tumlin v. Troy Bank & Tr. Co., 61 So. 2d 817, 
824 (Ala. 1950) (alterations in original) (quoting Reasoner v. Herman, 134 N.E. 276, 
280 (Ind. 1922)) (“Where a charitable gift vests, a direction for accumulation, being for 
the management of the fund and not of the essence of the gift, will not, even if invalid, 
affect the validity of the gift . . . .”); Brown v. Saake, 190 So. 2d 56, 59–60 (Fla. Ct. 
App. 1966) (noting that unreasonable accumulations by charitable trusts may be subject 
to judicial corrective action); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS § 2.2(2) (1981) (emphasis added) (“An accumulation of trust income under 
a charitable trust created in a donative transfer is valid to the extent the accumulation 
is reasonable . . . .”).  See generally Accumulations in Charitable Trusts, supra note 
379; Note, Accumulations of Income at Common Law, 54 HARV. L. REV. 839 (1941). 
 425. SIMES, supra note 22, at 83.  Professor Simes’ lecture emphasizes that the pol-
icy against accumulations derives directly from Thellusson’s will, asserting that to dis-
cuss the policy and omit the Thellusson will “would be as unthinkable as omitting the 
part of Hamlet from the play which bears his name.”  Id. 
 426. Id. at 84.  See also PATRICK POLDEN, PETER THELLUSSON’S WILL OF 1797 AND 
ITS CONSEQUENCES ON CHANCERY LAW, 134–41 (2002) (describing the will’s provi-
sions).  Polden notes: “One of the strangest parts in the tale of Peter’s will is the story 
that his fortune was founded largely on the money of guillotined Frenchmen and that 
the will was his attempt to do right by the heirs of these headless ghosts.”  Id. at 89. 
“Posthumous ambition, not posthumous avarice, is the likeliest key to the will.”  Id. at 
146. 
 427. SIMES, supra note 22, at 84.  The projections never came to pass.  Thellusson’s 
trust terminated in less than fifty-nine years with – due to trustee missteps and litigation 
costs – only a modest res.  Id. 
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than the lives in being plus twenty-one years, it was valid.428  But the British 
public was displeased, and legislation followed that further restrained a set-
tlor’s power to accumulate wealth in trust.429  The law restricted the accumu-
lation of income to any of the following: 
 
(1) the life or lives of the settlor or settlors; or 
(2) twenty-one years from the death of the settlor or testator; or 
(3) the minority of any person living or en ventre sa mère at the 
death of the settlor or testator; or 
(4) the minority of any person who under the terms of the deed or 
will directing such accumulations, would, for the time being, if of 
full age, be entitled to the income as directed to be accumulated.430 
 
The legislation remained a part of English law until 2009 when it was 
repealed.431  Various forms of the English legislation were adopted by the state 
legislatures of more than a dozen American jurisdictions in the nineteenth and 
early-twentieth centuries.432  Then the tide began to turn.  Beginning in the 
1920s, the laws were repealed.  By the 1950s, nine states still statutorily re-
stricted the duration of accumulations to a period less than the RAP period.433  
Today, some states simply restrict accumulations of income for periods equal 
to the RAP period.434  A few others have repealed RAA outright.435  The com-
pressed income tax brackets of non-grantor trusts generally function to deter 
income accumulations for contemporary estate planners, even where RAA has 
 
 428. Thellusson v. Woodward (1805) 32 E.R. 1030 at 1035–36. 
 429. Karen J. Sneddon, Comment, The Sleeper Has Awakened: The Rule Against 
Accumulations and Perpetual Trusts, 76 TUL. L. REV. 189, 199–200 (2001). 
 430. SIMES, supra note 22, at 86. 
 431. Perpetuities and Accumulations Act of 2009, c. 18, §§ 5, 7 (Eng. & Wales); 
see also Sitkoff, Lurking, supra note 379, at 511 n.24 (noting the English Law Com-
mission suggested repealing RAA in 1998 but as of 2006, Parliament had ignored the 
recommendation). 
 432. SIMES, supra note 22, at 86, 87 nn.12–19. “The posthumous vanity of Peter 
Thellusson shocked American lawyers as it had the English.”  Id. at 86–87; see also 
Gertman v. Burdick, 123 F.2d 924, 932 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (“[The argument for RAA] 
argued that the amount involved in this accumulation ties up too much wealth, and that 
it lowers the country’s purchasing power which is already too small.”); Hillyard v. Mil-
ler, 10 Pa. 326, 336 (1849) (worrying that a mandatory accumulation trust could “draw 
into its vortex all the property”). 
 433. SIMES, supra note 22, at 88. 
 434. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 724(a) (West 2018); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS §9-
2.1(b) (McKinney 2018). 
 435. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 506 (West 2018) (“No provision directing or 
authorizing accumulation of trust income shall be invalid.”); 765 Ill. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
315/1 (West 2018) (repealing RAA as to dynastic trusts); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-6-
7 (2018) (“No provision directing or authorizing accumulation of trust income is inva-
lid.  This section is effective and applies to trust instruments whenever created or exe-
cuted.”). 
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been repealed.436  Still, the rule of Thellusson – measuring impermissible ac-
cumulations by the RAP clock – remains in force in some American states.437 
Today, RAA is mostly ignored.438  It might be safe to assume that, in the 
absence of a legislative pronouncement adopting the rule, RAA does not form 
a part of the underlying common law fabric in American jurisdictions.  Some 
authorities, however, characterize the rule as common law in origin.439  They 
reason that RAA applies even in the absence of a statute.440  Their reasoning is 
that although RAA was not announced until after American independence, it 
was just unearthed in 1805.441  In other words, the rule (in its unearthed state) 
existed prior to American independence and therefore formed a part of Amer-
ican common law before America’s break with England.442  The Thellusson 
decision labeled RAA “a pure question of equity” suggesting, perhaps, that it 
existed before it was announced.443 
Although RAA is frequently measured by the same clock as RAP 
(twenty-one years plus lives in being) and overlaps to some degree, it is an 
independent barrier to settlor intent when income accumulation is desired.444  
 
 436. See I.R.C. § 1(e) (West 2018) (imposing trust income tax brackets); id. §§ 
665–68 (2012) (describing the “throwback rules” which further deplete the tax benefits 
of accumulating income in trust); Harry S. Colburn, Jr., Accumulation Trusts: Recent 
Developments Restrict but Do Not Eliminate Their Benefits, EST. PLAN., Jan./Feb. 
1986, at 8, 9–13 (discussing income and transfer tax elements to accumulation trusts). 
 437. Sneddon, supra note 379, at 208–09; cf. Accumulations of Income at Common 
Law, supra note 424, at 843 (explaining the uncertainty of “whether the permissible 
period for accumulation or postponement will be measured from the time of the gift or 
from the inception of the actual accumulation or postponement.”). 
 438. Some scholarship continues to consider RAA.  E.g., DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, 
supra note 253, at 924–28 (introducing the topic); Sitkoff, Lurking, supra note 379, at 
516 (concluding that the concerns underlying the rule have been rendered “obsolete”); 
Sneddon, supra note 429, at 210 (“[C]ourts could surprise drafters and settlors by in-
voking [RAA] to void trusts.”). 
 439. Gertman v. Burdick, 123 F.2d 924, 930–31 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (proclaiming that 
RAA with a clock equal to that of RAP’s “has been the common law of this country.”); 
In re Freeman’s Estate, 404 P.2d 222, 233 (Kan. 1965) (“Kansas must follow the com-
mon law rule [against accumulations] since we have no statute.”). 
 440. Freeman’s Estate, 404 P.2d at 233.  
 441. E.g., Tumlin v. Troy Bank & Tr. Co., 61 So. 2d 817, 824 (Ala. 1950) (consid-
ering both statutory and common law bases for RAA). 
 442. E.g., Kimball v. Crocker, 53 Me. 263, 271 (1865) (following English author-
ity); Sneddon, supra note 429, at 201 (“[I]t became settled law that there was indeed a 
common law [RAA] in America . . . .”). 
 443. See Thellusson v. Woodward (1803-13) All ER 30. 
 444. See Sitkoff, Lurking, supra note 379, at 506–07 (“[RAA] was therefore recog-
nized as a doctrine independent from [RAP], though the accumulations rule’s dura-
tional limit was that of the applicable perpetuities period.”). 
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While RAP is concerned with remote vesting (or termination), RAA is con-
cerned with remote enjoyment.445  For example, a trust that directs the trustee 
to accumulate all income for the life of a pet duck, then distribute the remainder 
to Donald Trump or his issue per stirpes if he is not then living, violates both 
rules.  Both vesting and accumulation suspension could last longer than a life 
in being plus twenty-one years.  Remember, an animal’s life, like the duck here, 
is not a measuring life.  Alternatively, a trust to distribute income to Ivanka 
Trump for a term equal to the life of a duck and the remainder to Donald Trump 
or his issue violates RAP but not RAA.  And a trust to accumulate income for 
a term equal to the life of a duck and remainder to Donald Trump or his estate 
violates RAA but not RAP.  There is a lurking problem on account of RAA 
when it comes to noncharitable purpose trusts – purpose trusts may call for 
trust distributions to advance a goal or preserve certain property.446  These may 
not technically qualify as “distributions” in the traditional sense of the word – 
or at least in the sense of RAA.447  If a purpose trust’s expenditures for its 
noncharitable purpose are not distributions, then it would seem to follow that 
the trustee could be characterized as accumulating income – perhaps unreason-
ably – thereby triggering RAA. 
c. Unreasonable Restraints on Alienation 
Unreasonable restraints on alienation are repugnant.448  Much of the 
early-twentieth-century case law considering unreasonable restraints arose 
from pre-Shelley v. Kraemer racial covenants banning – if not ownership – 
non-white occupation of realty.449  Although Professor Gray is best known for 
 
 445. See id. at 503, 505, 506 n.31 (unpacking the secondary RAP rule applicable to 
noncharitable purpose trusts which is concerned not with remote vesting, but remote 
trust termination). 
 446. See, e.g., 6A MO. PRAC. SERIES Legal Forms § 20:305 (3d ed. 2017) (alteration 
in original) (directing the trustee, in the context of a pet duck trust form, “pay first from 
income and then from principal, if required, up to ONE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED 
DOLLARS ($1,500.00) per month for the upkeep and maintenance of my pets . . . [and] 
all expenses incident to constructing a pond for said pets and a dog-proof pen”).  Pro-
fessor Sitkoff must be credited with linking the apropos adjective “lurking” to RAA.  
Sitkoff, Lurking, supra note 379. 
 447. See discussion of difficult distinction between “distributions” and “expendi-
tures” with purpose trusts in the context of income taxes supra Section II.C.3. 
 448. CAL. CIV. CODE § 711 (West 2018); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-1-405 (West 
2018); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-02-26 (West 2017).  For scholarship on the rule against 
unreasonable restraints or suspension of the power of alienation see Ralph E. Kharas, 
Trusts and Suspension of the Power of Alienation in New York, 13 N.Y.U. LAW. Q. 
REV. 191 (1936); Oliver S. Rundell, Suspension of the Absolute Power of Alienation, 
19 MICH. L. REV. 235 (1921); Horace E. Whiteside, Suspension of the Power of Alien-
ation in New York, 13 CORNELL LAW. Q. 31 (1927). 
 449. See generally 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Garrett Power, Meade v. Dennistone: The 
NAACP’s Test Case to “. . . Sue Jim Crow Out of Maryland with the Fourteenth Amend-
ment”, 63 MD. L. REV. 773 (2004). 
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his treatise on RAP, he also authored one on restraints on alienation.450  Since 
Gray’s treatise and Shelley, the doctrine has been largely forgotten except in 
the context of covenants and due-on-sale clauses.451  Its potential undermining 
tendencies with trust planning, however, still remain, especially if the settlor’s 
aim is to direct the trustee to permanently retain title to the settlor’s creative 
works.452  Perpetual suspension of alienability powers over property held in 
trust is just the sort of repugnancy targeted by the rule.453 
Recall that the architecture of a trust grants legal title to the trustee, re-
serving equitable or beneficial rights in the beneficiary.454  As the legal owner, 
the trustee is typically vested with the full and unqualified right to sell, convey, 
exchange, encumber, and transfer property held in trust subject only to exer-
cising those powers consistent with the trustee’s fiduciary obligations.455  Con-
straints on a beneficiary’s rights to distributions or the imposition of spendthrift 
protections – banning the beneficiary’s alienation of her beneficial interest – do 
not run afoul of the rule against unreasonable restraints on alienation.456  Equi-
table title, by its nature, may be restrained.457  If, however, the settlor attempts 
 
 450. GRAY, supra note 1; see generally Richard E. Manning, The Development of 
Restraints on Alienation Since Gray, 48 HARV. L. REV. 373 (1935). 
 451. See, e.g., Dawn Inv. Co. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 639 P.2d 
974, 978 (Cal. 1982) (holding that a due-on-sale clause in a deed of trust and promissory 
note constitutes unreasonable restraint on alienation unless the lender can demonstrate 
that enforcement is reasonably necessary to protect against impairment of its security); 
Streams Sports Club, Ltd. v. Richmond, 457 N.E.2d 1226, 1231 (Ill. 1983) (holding 
that a covenant requiring condominium owners to become dues-paying members of a 
sports club was not an unreasonable restraint on alienation); Crowell v. Shelton, 948 
P.2d 313, 317 (Okla. 1997) (reversing and remanding a summary judgment determina-
tion that a deed restriction required by a decedent trustor which prohibited all residential 
and commercial development was reasonable). 
 452. See, e.g., Laska v. Barr, 907 N.W.2d 47, 52 (S.D. 2018) (holding that an in-
definite option to purchase constitutes an unreasonable restraint on alienation); Wilden-
stein & Co. v. Wallis, 756 F. Supp. 158, 163–64 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that a set-
tlement agreement’s “combined exclusive consignment right and right of first refusal” 
constituted an unreasonable restraint on alienation), rev’d, 983 F.2d 1047 (2d Cir. 
1992);  see also In re Byrd, No. 13–03674–8–SWH, 2015 WL 5918754, at *2, *4 
(Bankr. E.D. N.C. 2015) (concluding that a right of first refusal violated RAP). 
 453. E.g., Alexander v. House, 54 A.2d 510, 512 (Conn. 1947) (holding that testa-
trix’s aim to “have her home maintained in perpetuity as a depository for the ashes of 
herself and her daughter” was invalid as a restraint on alienation). 
 454. See supra Section II.B. 
 455. UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 815, 816 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000). 
 456. Bennett v. Bennett, 75 N.E. 339, 341 (Ill. 1905).  “[A] ‘spendthrift trust’ [is] 
created for the purpose of providing for the maintenance of [a beneficiary], and at the 
same time securing it against his improvidence and incapacity for self-protection.”  Id. 
at 341.  “It is usual in such trusts to find a provision against alienation of the trust fund 
by the voluntary act of the beneficiary, or in invitum by his creditors.”  Id. 
 457. But in England, spendthrift trusts – trusts which impose a restraint on the al-
ienation of the beneficiary’s interest – are invalid.  Petty v. Moores Brook Sanitarium, 
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to restrain the trustee’s alienation powers to the trustee’s legal title, then the 
rule can operate to defeat those attempts. 
In some cases, the courts will avoid the issue by construing language de-
terring a sale or encumbrance as merely precatory.458  Where the language can-
not be construed as precatory, an attempt to restrain alienation is void.459  In 
either case, of course, the effect is to nullify the attempt.  For example, in Cau-
dle v. Smither, the trust provided that the trustee could sell (or lease) the trust’s 
property only if the trustee, one George McDonald, also sold (or leased) his 
individual fractional interests in the same property.460  Because there was “a 
distinct possibility that McDonald will not lease or sell his individual interest,” 
the court concluded that “such a shackle will prevent the property from being 
leased or sold.”461  Accordingly, the attempted restraint was invalid.462  One 
judge dissented, emphasizing that the settlor had obviously “reposed great con-
fidence in the integrity and judgment of McDonald” and that there ought not 
to be anything “unreasonable in expressing that confidence in his trust instru-
ment.”463  The majority, however, was unmoved. 
d. Rules Against Capriciousness 
The final purpose trust stumbling block for consideration are the rules 
against capriciousness.  The rules against capriciousness remain the most for-
midable foes to achieving the intent of a settlor, such as Willa Cather.  Capri-
ciousness is a rather free-floating concept, and one person’s integrity-grounded 
 
67 S.E. 335, 356 (Va. 1910), superseded by statute, VA. CODE ANN. § 55–19 as recog-
nized in In re O’Brien, 50 B.R. 67 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985), repealed by Act of 2005, 
ch. 935 (2005). 
 458. See, e.g., Romme v. Ostheimer, 20 A.2d 406 (Conn. 1941) (finding that a de-
vise of a farm “with the understanding” that the farm “not be sold till the sum of fifteen 
thousand dollars can be realized” was merely precatory); Sandberg v. Heirs, 40 N.W.2d 
411, 413 (Neb. 1950) (holding that a will directing that no mortgage, lien, or other 
encumbrance be placed upon this land or that it be sold was nonbinding as merely prec-
atory instructions). 
 459. E.g., Garner v. Becton, 212 S.W.2d 890, 891 (Tenn. 1948); Loehr v. Kincan-
non, 834 S.W.2d 445, 446–47 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992). But see Shriners Hosps. for Chil-
dren v. First Nat’l Bank of Wyo., 373 P.3d 392, 406, 420 (Wyo. 2016) (upholding a 
directive in trust for charity and also for the settlors’ children that the trustee holds a 
valuable ranch for the lengthy trust term “with the land remaining open and its use 
devoted to agriculture and/or preservation” unless economic conditions required the 
ranch’s sale). 
 460. 427 S.W.2d 227, 228 (Ky. 1968). 
 461. Id. at 230. 
 462. Id.; accord, e.g., In re Walkerly’s Estate, 41 P. 772, 779–80 (Cal. 1895) (in-
validating an attempt to convey property in trust for a surviving spouse with no sale of 
the trust property to occur during her life). 
 463. Caudle, 427 S.W.2d at 231 (Hill, J., dissenting). 
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vision might easily be another’s cantankerous whimsy.464  Capriciousness in-
cludes public policy concerns.465  Some public policy trust offenses are both 
sensible and clearly mapped.466  Others are less so.  Although all trusts are 
 
 464. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS § 124 (1935) (requiring the purpose of 
a noncharitable purpose transfer to not be capricious); In re Bailey’s Will, 253 N.Y.S. 
275, 282 (Surr. Ct. 1931) (holding that conditioning trust distributions upon the family 
moving to one of two cities within five years void for “uncertainty”); see also 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS § 417 (“Where property is devised or bequeathed 
upon an intended trust for indefinite or general purposes, not limited to charitable pur-
poses, and there is no definite or definitely ascertainable beneficiary designated, the 
devisee or legatee holds the property upon a resulting trust for the estate of the testator 
. . . .”); id. § 60 (“An intended trust or a provision in the terms of a trust is invalid if 
illegal.”).   Illegal trusts include 
 
(1) the performance of the intended trust or of the provision involves the com-
mission of a criminal or tortious act by the trustee; (2) the enforcement of the 
intended trust or provision would be against public policy, even though its per-
formance does not involve the commission of a criminal or tortious act by the 
trustee; (3) the purpose of the settlor in creating the trust is to defraud creditors 
or other third persons; (4) the consideration for the creation of the trust is illegal. 
 
Id. § 60 cmt. a. 
 465. See, e.g., In re Estate of James, 199 A.2d 275, 277, 279–280 (Pa. 1964) (find-
ing fault with a 400-year income accumulation mandate in a charitable trust on account 
of it being “absurd,” “unreasonable,” “unnecessary, charitably purposeless, and con-
trary to public policy”). 
 466. Professors Pennell and Newman explain the clear instances of trusts which 
violate public policy: 
 
[A] trust may not interfere with familial relations, such as by (1) denying cus-
tody of a child (e.g., S creates a trust that will benefit P only after P agrees to 
grand custody of their child to S), (2) encouraging abandonment of child sup-
port . . . or (3) encouraging divorce. And a trust may not call for destruction or 
waste of trust corpus . . . . 
 
Unreasonable restraints on marriage are also invalid trust purposes. The key is 
“unreasonable restraints. The breadth and duration cannot be excessive, but 
some restriction is permissible . . . . 
 
Encouraging marriage or discouraging divorce almost certainly is copacetic, 
although a marriage might be abusive and the trust constitutes a financial hand-
cuff preventing the beneficiary from breaking free . . . .  
 
Finally, a trust conditioning enjoyment on a beneficiary changing a religious 
affiliation likely would be an invalid restraint on religious freedom. 
 
PENNELL & NEWMAN, supra note 349, at 227. 
77
Simmons: A Will for Willa Cather
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
718 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
subject to disqualification on grounds of illegality or public policy,467 the courts 
seem to be appreciably less deferential when noncharitable purpose trusts are 
reviewed.468  In this context, the underlying motives and purposes of the indi-
vidual donor are key, as are the practicalities of achieving the settlor’s aims.  
The very power of testamentary freedom is granted by the state so that an in-
dividual “may use it for the benefit of other men who survive him; and to this 
end only can it be validly exercised.”469  This assortment of rules are as pater-
nalistic in their approach as they are unpredictable in their outcomes.470  A 
purpose that is, in the court’s view, wasteful or useless will not be honored.471  
An aim that is too vague or too indefinite will be ignored.472  And nearly any 
purpose, it sometimes seems, might be challenged on public policy grounds.473  
The settlor’s plan faces second-guessing by the courts at every turn under the 
rules against capriciousness.474  Here, the dead hand is at its most vulnerable 
and unprotected. 
Because the majority of scholarship and jurisprudence on noncharitable 
purpose trusts in the United States has focused on pet trusts, most of the capri-
ciousness concerns have seen expression in this context.  And in the context of 
pet trusts, capriciousness usually means overfunding.475  Leona Helmsley’s pet 
trust is the most famous of these examples.  She created a testamentary trust 
for her dog, Trouble, and devised six million dollars to it.476  The probate court 
 
 467. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 404 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000) (“A trust may be 
created only to the extent its purposes are lawful, not contrary to public policy, and 
possible to achieve.”). 
 468. See, e.g., In re Swayze’s Estate, 191 P.2d 322, 324–25 (Mont. 1948) (invali-
dating a testamentary directive to erect, operate, and maintain a hotel as a memorial to 
the testatrix as invalid for lack of certainty and violating RAP). 
 469. JOHN W. SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 424 (2d ed. 1907). 
 470. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. m (2003)  (citations omitted) 
(“It is against public policy to enforce a trust provision that would divert distributions 
or administration from the interests of the beneficiaries to other purposes that are ca-
pricious or frivolous . . . [or] detrimental to the community . . . .”). 
 471. Bove II, The Purpose for Purpose, supra note 116, at 36. 
 472. See id. at 34. 
 473. Kelly v. Nichols, 21 A. 906, 907, 908 (R.I. 1891) (invalidating a trust to keep 
a clock in repair); In re Gassiot (1901) 70 L.J. Ch. 242 (Eng.) (invalidating a trust to 
preserve a portrait); Kennedy v. Kennedy (1914) A.C. 215 PC (Can.) (invalidating a 
trust to maintain the testator’s residence).  All these instances are grouped as invalida-
tions of noncharitable purpose trusts on account of their capricious motives by Scott 
and Ascher.  MARK L. ASCHER ET AL., 2 SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 12.11.7 (5th 
ed. 2006). 
 474. But see Magee v. O’Neill, 19 S.C. 170, 189 (1883) (“The power to give in-
cludes the right to withhold or to fix the terms of gift, no matter how whimsical or 
capricious they may be, only provided they do not in any way violate the law.”). 
 475. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 124 cmt. g (1935). 
 476. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 253, at 427. 
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reduced the bequest to two million dollars.477  Legislation authorizing pet trusts 
typically invites the court to consider partial defunding of pet trusts.478 
Legislation of noncharitable purpose trusts in overseas jurisdictions has 
generally been much less narrowly focused on pet trusts.  As a result, the rules 
against capriciousness tend to be more oriented towards trusts for noncharita-
ble purposes other than pets.  Bermuda, for example, recognized noncharitable 
purpose trusts in 1989.479  It requires the purpose of a noncharitable purpose 
trust to be “specific, reasonable and possible” and not for any unlawful or im-
moral purpose.480  To require that a purpose trust articulate a purpose that is 
“possible” suggests that courts should consider not overfunding concerns but 
underfunding.  A Bermuda purpose trust for “the promotion of democratic val-
ues” may be too vague.481  A Bermuda trust for “good works” might be too 
uncertain.482  A trust to board up a home for too long might be unreasonable.483  
Trusts created to set up schools for prostitutes might be void for illegality.484  
Courts may, at times, seem almost eager to set aside noncharitable purpose 
trusts, finding them “useless” and therefore void as a matter of public policy.485  
Trusts have been voided where the court determined that its purpose would 
amount to “a sheer waste of money.”486  Notably, trusts that provide funds for 
ascertainable beneficiaries or charitable purposes never seem to suffer such 
scrutiny. 
2. The Noncharitable Equivalent to Cy Pres 
Cy pres can be seen as either a solution or a problem depending upon the 
judge who wields it.  The original bases for reforming a charitable trust under 
 
 477. Id.  “In limiting the trust to $2 million, the court relied on evidence of Trou-
ble’s yearly expenses, including $100,000 for security and $8[000] for grooming, and 
on the dog’s life expectancy.”  Id.  Despite the reduction, “[p]roponents of pet trusts 
were delighted.”  Id. 
 478. E.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS § 7-8.1(d) (McKinney 2018). 
 479. Trusts (Special Provisions) Act of 1989, §§ 12–16 (Bermuda 1989), 
http://www.bermudalaws.bm/laws/Consolidated%20Laws/Trusts%20(Spe-
cial%20Provisions)%20Act%201989.pdf.  Such trusts are “commonly used in relation 
to asset-financing transactions as a vehicle to hold shares in a company or to purchase 
and sell or lease a specific asset.”  JOHN GLASSON, THE INTERNATIONAL TRUST, at A5-
17 (2006). 
 480. Trusts (Special Provisions) Act of 1989, § 13(1).  
 481. GLASSON, supra note 479, at BF-19. 
 482. Id. (citing In re How [1930] 1 Ch 66.). 
 483. Id. (citing Brown v. Burdett (1882) 21 Ch D 667.). 
 484. Id. (citing In re Pinion [1965] Ch 85 at 105). 
 485. Brown v. Burdett (1882) 21 Ch D 667, 668. 
 486. M’Caig v. University of Glasgow (1907) SC 231 (Scot.).  This Scottish case 
voided a trust to provide memorials to family members.  Id. 
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cy pres were impossibility, illegality, and impracticality.487  In a 1617 decision 
by Sir Francis Bacon, for example, a testator had bequeathed funds to generate 
income and support six scholars and two fellows at Emmanuel College.488  The 
amount of the bequest was, Emmanuel College complained, inadequate for 
those purposes.489  Lord Bacon obligingly varied the terms of the bequest to 
reallocate the income from fellowships to scholarships.490  He found that the 
revisions were necessary “in respect of impossibility and inconvenience” so 
that the “will and meaning of the testator” might be achieved.491  At the same 
time, cy pres can jettison settlor intent needlessly, as in the case of Dr. Albert 
Barnes discussed below.492 
Doctrine also developed to deal with the situation where the testator had 
left not too little to accomplish an intended charitable purpose but too much 
(“surplus” cases).493  More contemporary applications of the cy pres impossi-
bility rule might involve a trust to care for freed American slaves or to help 
find a cure for polio.494  Charitable bequests to the Catholic Church in seven-
teenth-century England would face modification on the basis of illegality.495  A 
twentieth century court would declare a charitable trust for a park for whites 
only as illegal.496  And as for uncertainty, as a prerequisite to cy pres, the doc-
trine could be applied to narrow an overly broad bequest to, for example, “the 
good of the poor” to support for particular parishes.497  Certainty with charita-
ble trusts is a relatively low threshold; the bequest need only be sufficiently 
certain that a court may enforce it.498 
 
 487. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1935) (“If property is given in trust 
to be applied to a particular charitable purpose, and it is or becomes impossible imprac-
ticable or illegal to carry out . . . the court will direct the application of the property to 
some charitable purpose which falls within the general charitable intention of the set-
tlor.”). 
 488. JONES, supra note 177, at 74 (citing Emmanuel Coll., Cambridge v. Eng. 
(1617)). 
 489. Id. 
 490. Id. 
 491. Id. 
 492. See infra notes 544–45 and the accompanying text. 
 493. JONES, supra note 177, at 90–93.  These “surplus” rules of construction gen-
erally favored charities.  Id. at 92. 
 494. See, e.g., In re Estate of Bowne, 173 N.Y.S.2d 723, 728 (Surr. Ct. 1958) (ap-
plying cy pres where a “hospital has closed its doors because of the mastery achieved 
by medicine over the once dread disease of tuberculosis”). 
 495. JONES, supra note 177, at 80–82.  See also, e.g., Da Costa v. De Pas, (1754) 
27 Eng. Rep. 150 (Ch.) (varying a then-illegal bequest to form an assembly for the 
teaching of Jewish faith to a bequest to instruct Christian foundlings instead). 
 496. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 311–12 (1966) (White, J., concurring); see 
also Home for Incurables v. Uni. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 797 A.2d 746, 756 (Ct. App. 
Md. 2002) (refusing to enforce illegal racially discriminatory condition of charitable 
bequest). 
 497. JONES, supra note 177, at 88. 
 498. BOWE & PARKER, supra note 139, § 41.8. 
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Today, cy pres has undergone a moderate expansion to encompass chari-
table trusts that have become not quite impossible but merely wasteful.499  A 
case of wastefulness is essentially a modern “surplus” case.  The classic case 
for considering wastefulness as a ground for the application of cy pres was the 
Buck Trust, which was devoted to the needy of Marin County, California.500  
When the trust corpus grew unexpectedly from nine million dollars to over 300 
million dollars, it motivated a petition for cy pres.501  In a surplus case, a court 
may modify a charitable trust when the allocated funds “far exceed what is 
needed.”502  Yet the idea of cy pres is to preserve the donor’s original intent 
insofar as possible.503  In a sense, cy pres might be viewed as necessary to 
preserve donor intent.  As Judge Posner muses, 
[S]ince no one can foresee the future, a rational donor knows that his 
intentions might eventually be thwarted by unpredictable circumstances 
and may therefore be presumed to accept implicitly a rule permitting 
 
 499. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413(a).  Contemporary jurisprudence is also doing away 
with the silly common law bifurcation exercise which asks whether the donor had a 
“general” or a “specific” charitable intent as a prerequisite to cy pres.  See Vanessa 
Laird, Note, Phantom Selves: The Search for a General Charitable Intent in the Appli-
cation of the Cy Pres Doctrine, 40 STAN. L. REV. 973 (1988). 
 500. See John G. Simon, American Philanthropy and the Buck Trust, 21 U.S.F. L. 
REV. 641, 659–61 (1987) (unpublished decision reported therein); Tait, supra note 14, 
at 1689–94 (discussing the Buck Trust litigation). 
 501. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 253, at 773.  When Mrs. Buck died, the 
largest share of her estate was comprised of stock in a privately held oil company.  Id.  
“[I]n 1979, Shell Oil won a bidding war and bought the stock in the Buck Trust for 
$260 million.”  Id.  “By 1984, the corpus increased to well over $300 million . . . .”  Id. 
 502. David M. English, The Uniform Trust Code (2000): Significant Provisions and 
Policy Issues, 67 MO. L. REV. 143, 179 n.164 (2002).  A related doctrine – that of de-
viation – may also permit modification to a charitable trust.  While cy pres is intended 
to modify a donor’s ends, deviation is primarily aimed at altering the means – the ad-
ministrative provisions of a charitable trust.  PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT 
ORGANIZATIONS § 460 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009). 
 
The traditional difference between cy pres and equitable deviation is that cy 
pres presents a more narrowly invoked, but more sweeping, power to alter the 
actual charitable purpose of a gift (traditionally described as a “substantive” 
deviation). In contrast, equitable deviation provides a more liberally applied, 
but narrower, power to deviate not from the charitable purpose itself, but from 
particular donor directions relating to carrying out that charitable purpose (tra-
ditionally described as a departure from an “administrative” term). 
 
John K. Eason, The Restricted Gift Life Cycle, or What Comes Around Goes Around, 
76 FORDHAM L. REV. 693, 729 n.153 (2007) (italics added). 
 503. E.g., In re Shoemaker, 115 A.3d 347, 355 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015) (quoting In Re 
Estate of Elkin, 32 A.3d 768, 778 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011)) (“[A]pplication of the doctrine 
of cy pres is imprecise but the endeavor is to find the institution that ‘will most nearly 
approximate the intention of the donor.’”). 
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modification of the terms of the bequest in the event that an unforeseen 
change frustrates his original intention.504 
Arguably, cy pres is another element of the bargain between the donor 
and society by which perpetual charitable trusts with unascertainable benefi-
ciaries are permitted.  In this sense, cy pres represents additional consideration 
in the exchange between the community and the settlor in establishing a char-
itable trust – greater flexibility and accommodations from society in exchange 
for a public benefit bestowed by the settlor.  Cy pres arises from the equitable 
concern with preserving charitable bequests.505  The aim of cy pres is to “to 
permit the main purpose of the donor of a charitable trust to be carried out as 
nearly as possible where it cannot be done to the letter.”506 
As noted above, the longer the term of a trust, the more likely it will be-
come outdated and need a freshening up – textually speaking.507  With charita-
ble institutions and for-profit organizations, such as corporations, amendments 
to the governing documents are straightforward: Articles and bylaws can be 
amended by the constituents (typically by a majority vote of the board of di-
rectors).508  With irrevocable trusts, amendments are rarely authorized.509  Cy 
pres is the most common way a court can amend a charitable purpose trust.  
Other amendment options (for example, deviation) may be available to both 
charitable and noncharitable trusts.510  The availability of cy pres – or some 
form of it – to noncharitable purpose trusts can prove beneficial for both fresh-
ening up amendments as well as potentially addressing some more critical 
flaws, such as a violation of RAP or a finding that the purpose is too uncer-
tain.511 
The three historical bases for cy pres (impossibility, illegality, and im-
practicality) along with its newcomer (wastefulness) map those charitable trust 
 
 504. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 712 (9th ed. 2014).  
On the other hand, “Some rational donors, mistrustful of judges’ ability to alter the 
terms of a bequest intelligently in light of changed conditions, might prefer to assume 
the risks involved in rigid adherence to the original terms.”  Id. 
 505. Obermeyer v. Bank of America, N.A., 140 S.W.3d 18, 22 (Mo. 2004) (en 
banc). 
 506. Thatcher v. Lewis, 76 S.W.2d 677, 682 (Mo. 1934). 
 507. See supra Section II.C.1. 
 508. But see Banner Health Sys. v. Long, 663 N.W.2d 242, 250 (S.D. 2003) (rec-
ognizing that an implied charitable trust theory regarding donor contributions may im-
pair the ability of a nonprofit corporation’s articles of incorporation to be amended). 
 509. But see UNIF. DIRECTED TRUST ACT § 6 cmt. (2017) (explaining that a trust 
director can be given the power to amend a trust). 
 510. See Alberto B. Lopez, A Revaluation of Cy Pres Redux, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 
1307, 1308 (2010) (italics added) (“[C]y pres has proven difficult to distinguish from 
its fraternal twin –equitable deviation.”).  
 511. But see Miller v. Teachout, 24 Ohio St. 525, 529 (1874) (“Where a charitable 
or other trust is so vague, indefinite, and uncertain as to be incapable of being carried 
out, as made by the donor, our courts will not, nor have they the power to, devise a 
scheme and establish the trust cy pres the testator’s intention.”). 
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problems best repaired by means of cy pres, especially – but not exclusively – 
when brought on by obsolescence and changed circumstances.512  The usual 
understanding of cy pres is that its application is exclusively reserved to char-
itable trusts.513  Other possibly less helpful doctrines, such as deviation, are 
supposed to fill the gaps.514  In those jurisdictions where deviation is relatively 
liberal, it may supply the want.  But cy pres can be particularly helpful for 
dynastic noncharitable purpose trusts.  After all, in their conception, they are 
similar to charitable trusts: long-term trusts not for a class of individuals but 
for an aim.515 
The historical, noncharitable means of trust alteration are reformation and 
modification, which are two independent doctrines (although the terms are of-
ten used interchangeably).516  Reformation corrects trust terms.517  If a trust is 
imperfectly expressed due to mistake or ambiguity, the terms can be modified 
to more accurately set forth the settlor’s intent.518  When reformation is ap-
proved, it is effective ab initio and it affects the beneficiaries retroactively.519  
Typically, reformation requires clear and convincing evidence of the settlor’s 
intent.520  Modification, by contrast, represents a variation from the original 
trust terms.521  Modification is employed to modernize or update a trust, im-
prove on efficiency in trust administration, or address a change in circum-
stances unanticipated by the settlor.522  Deviation – a third doctrine – allows 
courts to depart from the terms of a trust when its administration has become 
 
 512. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000). 
 513. In re Latimer Trust, 78 A.3d 875, 880 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
 514. E.g., In re Pulitzer, 249 N.Y.S. 87 (Sur. 1931) (approving equitable deviation 
from the administrative terms of Joseph Pulitzer’s testamentary trust, which had origi-
nally prohibited the sale of any shares in the corporation publishing the World newspa-
pers when corporate losses mounted and share prices plummeted, reasoning that the 
settlor’s dominant purpose was to benefit the trust’s beneficiaries, not his corporation). 
 515. See Anthony G.D. Duckworth, The Trust Offshore, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 879, 939 (1999) (“It is in the nature of a purpose trust that in time circumstances may 
change such that continued adherence to the terms of the trust would not achieve the 
settlor’s original intent.”); Hirsch, Delaware Unifies, supra note 116, at 22 (“Dela-
ware’s extension of the cy pres doctrine to noncharitable purpose trusts is particularly 
commendable . . . .”); Hirsch, Trusts for Purposes, supra note 116, at 948 n.153 (“On 
the Isle of Jersey, the cy pres doctrine applies to noncharitable purpose trusts.”). 
 516. In re Ethel F. Peierls Charitable Lead Unitrust, 59 A.3d 464, 469–70 (Del. Ch. 
2012); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 62, 65 (2001). 
 517. Peierls, 59 A.3d at 470. 
 518. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 62. 
 519. See Peierls, 59 A.3d at 70. 
 520. Roos v. Roos, 203 A.2d 140, 142 (Del. Ch. 1964). 
 521. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65, with id. § 62. 
 522. In re Merlin A. Abadie Inter Vivos Trust, 483 So. 2d 1292, 1294 (La. Ct. App. 
1986); In re Riddell, 157 P.3d 888, 890 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). 
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impossible or circumstances unanticipated by the settlor would impair the ac-
complishment of the trust’s aims absent deviation.523  Deviation typically ap-
plies only to administrative modifications, not substantive ones.524  Decanting 
– a fourth doctrine – also permits changes to the terms of a trust.525  Decanting 
represents a trustee’s discretionary authority to distribute trust assets to another 
trust with different terms than the first.526  If all the assets are distributed to the 
new trust, the original trust has essentially been reworded and reframed.527  
With the exception of decanting, each of these four means by which trusts can 
be modified typically require some level of beneficiary consent, at least where 
beneficiaries are ascertainable.  Cy pres is unique insofar as it is not construed 
on a foundation of beneficiary involvement but is instead premised on attor-
neys’ general input. 
Cy pres, unlike deviation-related doctrines, may require a preliminary 
showing of not just frustration but a general charitable intention on the part of 
the settlor.528  Where the settlor’s intent was specific – such as directing trust 
distributions to a particular charity that had dissolved – cy pres was unavaila-
ble, and the trust simply failed.529  More recently, the prerequisite of a general 
charitable intent has been loosened.530  It seemed to have served as an unhelpful 
 
 523. PNC Bank v. N.J. State Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 2008 
WL 2891150, at *7 (Del. Ch. 2008); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66. 
 524. Wood v. Lincoln Gen. Hosp. Ass’n, 288 N.W.2d 735, 738 (Neb. 1980). 
 525. See UNIF. TRUST DECANTING ACT (2015).  Morse v. Kraft, 992 N.E.2d 1021, 
1024 (Mass. 2013) (quoting William R. Culp, Jr. & Briani Bennett Mellen, Trust De-
canting: An Overview and Introduction to Creative Planning Opportunities, 45 REAL 
PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 1, 2–3 (2010) (“Decanting is the term generally used to describe 
the distribution of [irrevocable] trust property to another trust pursuant to the trustee’s 
discretionary authority to make distributions to, or for the benefit of, one or more ben-
eficiaries [of the original trust].”). 
 526. Ferri v. Powell-Ferri, No. MMXCV116006351S, 2013 WL 5289955, at *6 
(Conn. Super. Ct. 2013). 
 527. William R. Culp, Jr. & Briani Bennett Mellen, Trust Decanting: An Overview 
and Introduction to Creative Planning Opportunities, 45 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 
1, 13 (2010) (“[P]ractitioners can use trust decanting to modernize the terms of a trust, 
correct drafting errors, or accommodate current administrative or management needs 
or the needs of the beneficiaries.”). 
 528. See generally EDITH L. FISCH, THE CY PRES DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES 
147–63 (1950) (discussing the general charitable intent prerequisite). 
 529. E.g., Merrill v. Hayden, 29 A. 949 (Me. 1893) (finding that where a residual 
trust distribution was to be carried out to the Maine Free Baptist Home Missionary 
Society which had dissolved and its property transferred to another entity for a different 
purpose, the legacy lapsed because cy pres was unavailable given the settlor’s specific 
charitable intent); John K. Eason, Motive, Duty, and the Management of Restricted 
Charitable Gifts, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123, 133 (2010) (“[T]he donor’s intentions 
must have been broad enough to transcend absolute adherence to the very particular 
restrictions that the donor placed on the use of the gifted assets now that current cir-
cumstances frustrate compliance with those restrictions.”). 
 530. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000) (creating a pre-
sumption of general charitable intent). 
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requirement in most cases.531  Cy pres enables the settlor’s intent to be effec-
tuated, not thwarted.532  It demands a return to the mind of the settlor.533  As 
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has explained, 
Only when the alternatives posed by the testator are exhausted and each 
of them has proved to be impossible, illegal, or impracticable, need the 
court resort to cy pres.  In the absence of such necessity, it is error to 
invoke the doctrine – to do so would permit a court to substitute its 
judgment and discretion and dispositive intent for that of the testator.534 
There is some – but not much – authority for applying cy pres to nonchar-
itable purpose trusts.535  In Edgerly v. Barker, for example, the Supreme Court 
of New Hampshire approved the application of cy pres to a trust for ascertain-
able beneficiaries, which violated RAP, by changing the words “age forty” to 
“age twenty-one.”536  Expansion of cy pres to noncharitable trusts, however, so 
 
 531. Id. (“Courts are usually able to find a general charitable purpose . . . no matter 
how vaguely such purpose may have been expressed . . . .”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TRUSTS § 67 cmt. b (labeling the general intent inquiry artificial and speculative); 
FISCH, supra note 528, at 159 (noting that overemphasis on the general intent require-
ment has impeded the solutions offered by cy pres); Ronald Chester, Cy Pres or Gift 
Over?: The Search for Coherence in Judicial Reform of Failed Charitable Trusts, 23 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 41, 46 (1989) (“[T]he general intent requirement is not only un-
clear but mischievous. . . .”); Laird, supra note 499, at 977 (asserting that a quest for a 
general charitable intent is unproductive). 
 532. In re R.B. Plummer Mem’l Loan Fund Tr., 661 N.W.2d 307, 312 (Neb. 2003).  
In Plummer, the court refused to grant the University of Nebraska Foundation’s request 
to modify a trust designed to provide student loans and instead provide scholarships.  
Id.  The court found that the facts failed to demonstrate that student loans had become 
impractical.  Id. at 313; accord, e.g., In re Estate of Berry, 139 N.W.2d 72, 78 (Wis. 
1966) (declining to apply cy pres under similar facts).  The Supreme Court of Wiscon-
sin stated: 
 
Perhaps greater social good can be accomplished by using these funds for direct 
grants to students, but it is not for this or any court to determine the relative 
wisdom of a bequest and to substitute its judgment for that of the testator.  The 
function of the court is to probate wills and not to write them. 
 
Id. 
 533. See Mark Sidel, Law, Philanthropy and Social Class: Variance Power and the 
Battle for American Giving, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1145, 1197 (2003) (“[C]y pres de-
mands a return to the mind of the testator . . . .”) (italics added).  
 534. Estate of Berry, 139 N.W.2d at 78. 
 535. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit 12, § 3541 (West 2018). But see In re Pierce, 136 
A.2d 510, 516 (Me. 1957) (“The doctrine of cy pres does not apply to private trusts.”) 
(italics added).  
 536. 31 A. 900, 916 (1891); see also SIMES, supra note 22, at 75 (approvingly de-
scribing the decision); accord In re Estate of Chun Quan Yee Hop, 469 P.2d 183, 187 
(Haw. 1970) (reforming a thirty-year contingency down to twenty-one years); see gen-
erally James Quarles, The Cy Pres Doctrine: Its Application to Cases Involving the 
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far seems limited to instances of RAP violations.  If RAP can be corrected by 
cy pres, then by extension, RAP-related problems, such as RAA and unreason-
able restraints on alienation, seem likely candidates for cy pres fixes to non-
charitable purpose trusts as well.537  Traditionally, cy pres seemed reserved to 
purposes that had become difficult or impossible to achieve over time and was 
not used to correct foundational problems with a trust such as a RAP viola-
tion.538 
Although the availability of cy pres (or some variation thereof) to non-
charitable purpose trusts is essential to permit the kind of periodic maintenance 
that ensures fully functioning trusts, the power, like any, is subject to abuse and 
misapplication.539  The workings – and potential shortcomings – of traditional 
charitable trust cy pres in action can be seen with two examples.  The first is a 
fairly typical application of cy pres in the nineteenth-century case of Jackson 
v. Phillips.540  In that case, an abolitionist-testator died in 1861, leaving several 
thousand dollars in trust to fan public sentiment in favor of emancipation.541  
After the Thirteenth Amendment was ratified, the court articulated a new, sim-
ilar purpose for the remaining funds – promoting the education and support of 
former slaves.542  Thus, the trust continued for a purpose as near as possible to 
 
Rule Against Perpetuities and Trusts for Accumulation, 21 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 384 
(1946). 
 537. See, e.g., Oldfield v. Attorney General, 106 N.E. 1015 (Mass. 1914) (“[T]he 
court will rather apply the doctrine of cy pres, where that can be done with due regard 
to the intention of the founder of the trust, than allow an indefinite or unduly prolonged 
accumulation of income . . . .”); In re Estate of James, 199 A.2d 275, 280 (Pa. 1964) 
(applying cy pres to remedy a charitable trust containing an invalid accumulation of 
interest provision). 
 538. E.g., Foshee v. Republic Nat’l Bank of Tex., 617 S.W.2d 675, 678–79 (Tex. 
1981) (declining to apply cy pres to remedy a trust’s violation of RAP). But see TEX. 
PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.043(b) (West 2017) (allowing cy pres to remedy RAP problems).  
The statute “was amended in 1991 to clarify that a noncharitable gift or trust [that] 
violates [RAP] can be reformed so that it does not violate the rule in order to avoid the 
confusion created by” cases like Foshee.  2 THOMAS M. FEATHERSTON, JR., ET AL., TEX. 
PRACTICE GUIDE: PROBATE Cy Pres and the Rules Against Perpetuities § 13:92, West, 
(database updated Dec. 2017). 
 539. E.g., Castle v. Cohen, 676 F. Supp. 620, 628, 628 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (adopt-
ing an approach analogous to cy pres to enforce contract with retirement trust trustees 
which could not be enforced according to its terms), aff’d and remanded, 840 F.2d 173 
(3rd Cir. 1988). 
 540. Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. 539 (1876).  Jackson represents “a fairly straight-
forward application of cy pres.”  Anton Chaevitch, Note, When Charity Meets Racism: 
The Story of Cy Pres in the United States and England, 54 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
502, 509 (2016). 
 541. Jackson, 96 Mass. at 541. 
 542. Id. at 599; U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.  The court refused to apply cy pres to 
modify the trust’s purposes towards the end of achieving voting rights for women.  
Jackson, 96 Mass. at 571. 
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the original purpose.543  The second example is the complex, atypical, but in-
structive case of the Barnes Trust. 
Dr. Albert Barnes grew up poor and worked his way through medical 
school using fees earned as an amateur boxer.544  He went on to help invent the 
pharmaceutical Argyrol and amassed a fortune that fed his hobbies, which in-
cluded collecting impressionist paintings (before impressionism was cool) and 
African sculptures.545  He and his agents purchased many works directly from 
the artists.546  His collection grew to include canvasses by Modigliani and 
Miró.547  In the end, there were 59 works by Matisse, 69 Cézannes, and 181 
Renoirs.548  Barnes had unconventional ideas about art and how to view it.549  
He insisted on education as part of his Argyrol workforce.550  He also empha-
sized education as a primary mission of his foundation, which took the form of 
a school more than a museum.551  Snubbed by snobs (he was a butcher’s son), 
he refused to let art critics see his collection even after it became celebrated 
 
 543. But see Thatcher v. Lewis, 76 S.W.2d 677, 678, 684 (Mo. 1934) (refusing to 
apply cy pres to an 1851 trust originally for the purpose of providing “relief to all poor 
immigrants and travelers coming to St. Louis on their way, bona fide, to settle in the 
West” so that “funds be used to erect a building for the administration of the relief.”). 
 544. JOHN ANDERSON, ART HELD HOSTAGE: THE BATTLE OVER THE BARNES 
COLLECTION 13 (2013). 
 545. Id. at 20–23, 27; HOWARD GREENFIELD, THE DEVIL AND MR. BARNES 67–71 
(1987); see also CHRISTA CLARKE, AFRICAN ART IN THE BARNES FOUNDATION: THE 
TRIUMPH OF L’ART NEGRE AND THE HARLEM RENAISSANCE (2015) (describing the 
Barnes’ African art collection in depth). 
 546. ANDERSON, supra note 544, at 24–27. 
 547. Jeffrey Toobin, Battle for the Barnes, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 21, 2002, at 34. 
 548. Id. 
 549. See id.  Some rooms featured only a single painter, but others featured a mash 
of styles, and eras of art.  Id.  Barnes aimed to use his art to “redress issues of inequality, 
particularly racial prejudice . . . .”  Id. 
 550. See id. (“Barnes’ multicultural agenda is what separates his foundation from 
the other collections turned museums . . . .”); ANDERSON, supra note 544, at 34 (“Barnes 
also rejected the conventional academic scholarship of his day . . . .”); SITKOFF & 
DUKEMINIER, supra note 253, at 777 (“Dr. Barnes had unconventional theories about 
art education.”).  See generally ALBERT C. BARNES, THE ART IN PAINTING (1925); 
ALBERT C. BARNES & VIOLETTA DE MAZIA, THE ART OF CEZANNE (1939). 
 551. Workers at Barnes’ Argyrol factory worked six-hour days with two hours each 
day dedicated to education.  Judith F. Dolkart, To See as the Artist Sees: Albert C. 
Barnes and the Experiment in Education, in THE BARNES FOUNDATION: 
MASTERWORKS 9, 17 (Judith F. Dolkart & Martha Lucy, eds., 2012).  Workers would 
listen to texts by authors such as John Dewey and Bertrand Russell.  Id.  Similarly, his 
foundation “launched educational courses and a robust publishing program.”  Id. at 21. 
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and barred entry to most all but the “plain people” (Barnes’ words).552  Some 
critics would sneak into his galleries disguised as miners or chauffeurs.553 
Barnes died unexpectedly in 1951, leaving an agreement, indenture, and 
charter for the Barnes Foundation with a number of stipulations for his art col-
lection.554  Barnes’ idiosyncrasies were worked into his foundation but were 
constrained, however, by the charitable character of the entity.555  For years 
afterwards, his handpicked successor, Violette de Mazia, ensured strict adher-
ence to Barnes’ original and eccentric vision, although the courts did require 
greater public access to the collection given its charitable and therefore public-
oriented nature.556  De Mazia had been a strict and faithful disciple during 
 
 552. ANDERSON, supra note 544, at 9.  Barnes desired that “the plain people, that 
is, men and women who gain their livelihood by daily toil in shops, factories, schools, 
stores and similar places, shall have free access to the art gallery and the arboretum 
upon those days when the gallery and arboretum are to be open to the public . . . .”  
Commonwealth v. Barnes Found., 159 A.2d 500, 502 (Pa. 1960) (quoting Dr. Barnes). 
 553. See THE ART OF THE STEAL (MPI Home Video 2010).  William Schack relates: 
 
A man out for a Sunday morning stroll met up with [Dr. Barnes] walking his 
dogs.  In an exchange of small-talk Barnes was so amiable that the man was 
emboldened to say that he had heard of the fine collection and would like to see 
it.  Barnes’s manner stiffened.  “I never admit curiosity-seekers to my gallery,” 
he said. That was the usual reply to mere neighbors.  “Well then,” retorted this 
one, “you can go to hell.  I was only trying to be polite.”  Barnes at once backed 
down: “I will be very glad to have you come in any time you want to.” 
 
WILLIAM SCHACK, ART AND ARGYROL: THE LIFE AND CAREER OF DR. ALBERT C. 
BARNES 178 (1960). 
 554. John Nivala, Droit Patrimoine: The Barnes Collection, The Public Interest, 
and Protecting Our Cultural Inheritance, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 477, 486, 492–50 
(2003); see also Barnes Found. v. Keely, 171 A. 267, 268–69 (Pa. 1934) (describing 
the legal structure Barnes Foundation in a dispute over the foundation’s eligibility for 
charitable exemption from city and school taxes). 
 555. See Wiegand v. Barnes Found., 97 A.2d 81, 86 (Pa. 1953) (Musmanno, J., 
dissenting).  Justice Musmanno, in his dissent, stated: 
 
Dr. Barnes, in his lifetime, not unlike other geniuses, leavened the force of a 
powerful personality with the yeast of whim and idiosyncracy [sic].  The Board 
of Trustees apparently are seeking to perpetuate an idiosyncratic trend . . . . 
Every one [sic] has the right to dispose of his money, property, and other pos-
session as he chooses, but once he stamps them with a public interest to the 
extent that they are exempt from public taxation he divests himself of the arbi-
trary control which was once his. 
 
Id at 86–87.  In the end, Barnes’ legacy paid a dear price for its charitable tax exemp-
tion. 
 556. Chris Abbinante, Comment, Protecting “Donor Intent” in Charitable Foun-
dations: Wayward Trusteeship and the Barnes Foundation, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 665, 
673 (1997) (“Adherence to Barnes’s intentions was due in large part to the tight-fisted 
control held by the last trustees Barnes had personally appointed, particularly Violette 
deMazia [sic].”); see Barnes Found., 159 A.2d at 506 (“[T]he trustees of the Barnes 
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Barnes’ lifetime and continued his vision after the doctor’s death.557  She sur-
vived him as the “keeper of the Barnes candle” for thirty-eight years.558  But 
de Mazia died in 1989.559  It then came to light that rigid investment re-
strictions, imposed by Barnes, coupled with the inflation of the previous dec-
ades had caused the purchasing power of the foundation’s endowment to dwin-
dle.560  Meanwhile, the institution’s infrastructure had aged while the market 
value (along with the conservation needs, presumably) of its collection had 
soared.561  Those weaknesses were pounced on by Philadelphia’s officials with 
ambitions to transform the collection at its outskirts into a downtown tourism 
bonanza.562  The officials succeeded.563  With cy pres and a series of court 
battles,564 Barnes’ unique educational institution in suburban Merion, Pennsyl-
vania, was remade into a major tourist draw in downtown Philadelphia right on 
Benjamin Franklin Parkway.  Barnes’ vision had been thoroughly transmogri-
fied from a unique educationally-oriented cultural asset into a slick “urban re-
development project.”565  Today, a wealthy Philadelphian can even rent the 
facilities for his daughter’s bridal shower.566  Barnes’ singular vision was sig-
nificantly and needlessly blurred by a politicized cy pres. 
 
Foundation may not exclude the public from the art gallery without offering explana-
tion as to why it ignores the expressed intention of Dr. Barnes that the gallery shall, 
within certain restrictions, be open to the public.”); see also Wiegand, 374 Pa. at 157 
(affirming the dismissal of a complaint about access to the art for lack of standing).  
Later, the Barnes Foundation agreed to a consent decree that guaranteed public admis-
sion on Fridays and Saturdays, but by appointment only.  ANDERSON, supra note 544, 
at 82. 
 557. GREENFIELD, supra note 545, at 144–45. 
 558. ANDERSON, supra note 544, at 57. 
 559. Id. 
 560. Id. at 49–50. 
 561. Id. 
 562. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 253, at 778–80 (describing the Barnes 
relocation plan pursued by “mainstays of Philadelphia philanthropy”). 
 563. ANDERSON, supra note 544, at 233-35. 
 564. In re Barnes Found., No. 58,788, 2004 WL 1960204 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Jan. 29, 
2004); In re Barnes Found., No. 58,788, 2004 WL 2903655 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Dec. 13, 
2004); In re Barnes Found., 684 A.2d 123 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996); In re Barnes Found., 
672 A.2d 1364 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1966). 
 565. GREENFIELD, supra note 545, at 302 (quoting art critic Christopher Knight); 
see also Abbinante, supra note 556, at 686 (“The deviations undertaken by the Barnes 
trustees . . . have effectively transformed the Foundation into a museum . . . .”). 
 566. See Weddings, BARNES FOUND., https://www.barnesfoundation.org/host-an-
event/weddings (last visited Sept. 1, 2018) (“[T]he Barnes – both inside and out – pro-
vides a stunning backdrop for weddings, as well as engagement parties, rehearsal din-
ners, and bridal showers.”).  Dr. Barnes would be disappointed.  See Wiegand v. Barnes 
Found., 97 A.2d 81, 86  (Pa. 1953) (Musmanno, J., dissenting) (quoting paragraph 33 
of the Barnes indenture) (confirming the “democratic and educational” character of 
Barnes’ gift and forbidding “special privileges” such as holding “tea parties, dinners, 
banquets, dances, musicales or similar affairs” in the buildings of the Barnes Founda-
tion). 
89
Simmons: A Will for Willa Cather
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
730 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
One final note on the manner in which the trajectory of long-term trusts 
can be properly adjusted from time to time as circumstances change is that, 
short of the rather blunt instruments of deviation variations or cy pres to liter-
ally change the text of a trust instrument, judicial direction may be sought as 
to the correct interpretation of that text.  In In Re Pierce, the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Maine considered a charitable trust for “the most good to the class of 
indigent seamen.”567  The original trust corpus was quite modest.  Indeed, the 
heirs of the settlor argued that the trust should fail for indefiniteness and be-
cause “the amount available was so small as to render it impossible to carry out 
the provisions of the trust . . . .”568  These objections were overruled.569  Later, 
the settlor’s investment in a start-up leather business organized by a friend bal-
looned from $3000 to more than $300,000, and a new problem was created.570  
There was an insufficient number of indigent seamen of the settlor’s class to 
allow the distribution of even the trust income.571  The settlor, Captain Joseph 
How, had commanded a square-rigged, three-masted vessel.572  He died in 
1870.573 
Some years after Captain How’s death, the trustee filed a petition asking 
for (1) permission under cy pres to expend funds for the benefit of other classes 
of seamen such as lobstermen and fishermen or (2) construction of the trust 
term “seamen” as including such other classes of individuals.574  The remain-
derman-heirs opposed the petition and argued that the trust failed and reverted 
to them.575  The court approved the trustee’s petition more as a matter of con-
struing the trust terms than as an application of cy pres.576  The court said, “We 
reach this conclusion not necessarily through the application of the cy pres 
doctrine [] but rather through an interpretation of the intention of the testator at 
the time be executed his will.”577  After reviewing dictionary definitions of 
“indigent” and “class” as well as case law construction of the term “seamen,” 
 
 567. 136 A.2d 510, 512–13 (Me. 1957) [hereinafter Pierce II]. 
 568. Id. 
 569. See id.  The charitable aspect of the trust was not challenged after Captain 
How’s death in 1870 until some forty years later because there were intervening private 
individual beneficiaries, including the Captain’s surviving spouse.  See In re Pierce, 84 
A. 1070, 1071 (Me. 1912).  The corpus in 1912 was only about $1500.  Id. 
 570. Pierce II, 136 A.2d at 513. 
 571. Id. at 514. 
 572. Id. at 512. 
 573. Id. 
 574. Id. at 514.  The attorney general took the same position.  Id. 
 575. Id. at 514–15.  The heirs argued (1) that the trust had failed; (2) that Captain 
How did not have a general charitable intent; and (3) that the trustee’s petition to con-
strue or amend the trust was barred under res judicata on account of the earlier decision 
construing the trust as sufficiently definite.  Id. 
 576. See id. at 521–522. 
 577. Id. (italics added).  Contra Roger G. Sisson, Comment, Relaxing the Dead 
Hand’s Grip: Charitable Efficiency and the Doctrine of Cy Pres, 74 VA. L. REV. 635, 
644 n.74 (1988) (italics added) (characterizing Pierce II as having applied “a cy pres 
analysis”).  
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the court concluded that the trustee was free to distribute not only for the ben-
efit of indigent seamen of Captain How’s class but also “crewmen of merchant 
vessels, oil tankers, and fishing vessels.”578  The lesson from Pierce is that a 
petition to construe the terms of a trust may be less radical, and therefore more 
easily achieved, than a petition to modify the trust’s terms under cy pres.579 
E. Noncharitable Purpose Trusts: Recognition Achieved 
1. The Evolution: Honorary Non-Trusts 
Noncharitable purpose trusts can be traced back several centuries.  The 
earlier historical evolution of noncharitable purpose trusts has been hinted at 
above, stretching back to the reign of Henry VIII and earlier.580  This Section 
outlines the evolution of noncharitable purpose trusts during the twentieth cen-
tury.  The First Restatement of Trusts, promulgated in 1935, took a baby step 
towards validating settlor attempts to create noncharitable purpose trusts, in-
cluding trusts to erect or maintain tombstones, the care of graves, the support 
of pets, and “saying masses in States in which a trust for the saying of masses 
is not charitable.”581  Section 124 explained that 
[w]here the owner of property transfers it upon an intended trust for a 
specific non[]charitable purpose, and there is no definite or definitely 
ascertainable beneficiary designated, no trust is created; but the trans-
feree has power to apply the property to the designated purpose, unless 
he is authorized by the terms of the intended trust so to apply the prop-
erty beyond the period of [RAP], or the purpose is capricious.582 
 
 578. Pierce II, 136 A.2d at 521–22.  “Seamen,” the court emphasized, “is a flexible 
word . . . .”  Id. (quoting 79 C.J.S. Seamen § 1(a), at 490 (currently at 78A C.J.S. Seamen 
§ 1, West (database updated 2018)). 
 579. See, e.g., Hinkley Home Corp. v. Bracken, 152 A.2d 325, 327–28 (holding 
that underutilization is no grounds for cy pres). 
 580. See supra Section II.C.2.a. 
 581. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS § 124 cmt. d (1935).  The Restatement noted 
that in most states, trusts for the saying of masses are held to be charitable.  Id. cmt. e. 
 582. Id. § 124; see also id. § 419(1) (“Where the owner of property gratuitously 
transfers it inter vivos for a purpose which is not enforceable because there is no definite 
or definitely ascertainable beneficiary designated, the transferee can properly apply the 
property to the designated purpose until his authority to make such application is re-
voked by the transferor or is terminated by the death or incapacity of the transferor.”). 
 
Thus, if the owner of certain animals pays a sum of money to another in trust to 
care for the animals as long as they live, and neither the transferee nor a third 
person is given a beneficial interest in the animals or in the money, the trans-
feree can properly apply the money for the care of the animals, but the transferor 
can at any time terminate the authority of the transferee and can compel him to 
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Section 124 thus exempted noncharitable trusts from the beneficiary prin-
ciple but not from the second major bar to their validity – RAP.  More signifi-
cantly, however, section 124 did not recognize noncharitable trusts as actual 
trusts.  Instead, it recognized noncharitable purpose trusts as “honorary” trusts, 
which is a misnomer because the section clear states that “no trust is cre-
ated.”583  An unenforceable trust, one might quickly conclude, is no trust at all.  
But there is a difference.  Typically, a trust that is void (say, for violating RAP) 
cannot be administered by the trustee and simply re-vests in the transferor or 
passes to the remaindermen.584  But an honorary trust can be administered so 
long as the trustee willingly administers it.585  Thus, noncharitable purpose 
trusts could be administered so long as the purpose satisfied the “non-capri-
cious” standard, RAP was not violated, and the trustee (actually more a trans-
feree) was willing to administer the trust.586  With “honorary” trusts, there was, 
at least, a chance that the settlor’s intent might find fulfillment. 
Under the First Restatement’s construction, a noncharitable purpose trust 
was especially fragile and subject to the willingness of a trustee (or transferee) 
to perform.587  Indeed, the Restatement characterized its recognition of trusts 
intended to be administered for a noncharitable purpose as non-trusts: “[I]t is 
more accurate to state that the trustee has a power than it is to state that he holds 
 
return the animals and so much of the money as he has not already expended in 
the care of the animals. 
 
Id. cmt. c.  In other words, under the First Restatement reasoning, an inter vivos con-
veyance to a pet trust would never qualify as a completed gift since the settlor always 
retained a power of revocation.  See I.R.C. §§ 2036, 2038 (2012). 
 583. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS § 124. 
 584. See, e.g., First Universalist Soc’y v. Boland, 29 N.E. 524, 525 (Mass. 1892) 
(holding where property was transferred to a church so long as devoted to certain reli-
gious beliefs, then to others, the gift over was too remote, so the church held a fee 
simple determinable, and when the land was no longer used for specified purposes it 
would revert to the grantor or his estate). 
 585. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS § 124 cmt. b (reasoning that a legatee can 
properly apply the property to the designated purpose, “if the purpose is not capricious 
and there is no violation of the principle of [RAP]”); see also UNIF. TRUST CODE § 408 
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000) (“[H]onorary trusts … are arguably no more than powers 
of appointment . . . .”). 
 586. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS § 124 cmt. g. 
 
It is impossible to draw a clear line between purposes which are capricious and 
those which are not.  A purpose is not capricious merely because no living per-
son benefit from its performance . . . .  [I]t is capricious to provide that money 
shall be thrown into the sea or that a field shall be sowed with salt or that a 
house shall be boarded up and remain unoccupied. 
 
Id. 
 587. See Favor of Animals, supra note 246, at 1291 (emphasizing the trustee’s 
“willing[ness] to perform”). 
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upon trust, whether honorary or otherwise.”588  How a transferee’s fiduciary 
obligations figured into this equation was unclear.  Since the remainder interest 
in a noncharitable purpose trust is almost always an ascertainable beneficiary 
(for example, the settlor’s estate or heirs-at-law), the transferee would be 
charged with a duty of impartiality.589  The transferee must always balance the 
interests of the ascertainable remaindermen against the interests of the non-
charitable purpose.590  If the transferee had powers (but no duties) with regard 
to the noncharitable purpose, it would seem that the duties to the remaindermen 
would always trump the purpose and compel the transferee to refuse to admin-
ister the trust for its noncharitable purpose, thereby accelerating the distribu-
tions to the remaindermen.591  This seems the logical outcome.  The Restate-
ment comments, however, failed to map any transferee liability if she chose to 
delay the remaindermen possession by applying funds to the noncharitable pur-
pose.592 
2. The Revolution: Enforceable Noncharitable Purpose Trusts 
The 1990 amendments to the Uniform Probate Code (“UPC”) were the 
first to provide a template for state legislatures in recognizing noncharitable 
purpose trusts as trusts.593  The amendments allowed both for trusts that iden-
tify a particular noncharitable purpose as well as for trusts that delegate the 
selection of noncharitable purposes to the trustee.594  Amendments by the Uni-
form Law Commissioners three years later authorized pet trusts.595  To deal 
with the RAP problem inherent in pet trusts, the UPC provided that the trust 
 
 588. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS § 124 cmt. c. 
 589. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907(c)(2) (providing that, upon termination of a 
purpose trust, the trustee will distribute the remainder as provided in the trust or, if the 
trust is silent, pursuant to the wills’ residuary clause where the trust was created in a 
nonresiduary clause, otherwise to the settlor’s heirs); see also UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 
408(c), 409(3) (providing that excess property trimmed from a purpose trust by a court 
will be returned to the settlor or her heirs). 
 590. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS § 183 (providing that a “trustee is under 
a duty to deal impartially” with beneficiaries); Id. § 232 (explaining that where there 
are successive beneficiaries, “the trustee is under a duty to the successive beneficiaries 
to act with due regard to their respective interests.”). 
 591. Id. § 124 cmt. a (“[T]he transferee is not under a duty and cannot be compelled 
to apply the property to the designated purpose . . . .”); id. cmt. b (explaining that where 
the transferee refuses to apply funds to the noncharitable purpose identified by the set-
tlor “he will be compelled to hold it upon a resulting trust for the settlor or his estate.”). 
 592. See id. cmt. d. 
 593. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907 (amended 1993); Ausness, supra note 116, 
at 351; Hirsch, Trusts for Purposes, supra note 116, at 916–17. 
 594. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907(a) (providing that “a trust for a specific law-
ful noncharitable purpose or for lawful noncharitable purposes to be selected by the 
trustee” which lack an ascertainable beneficiary is enforceable). 
 595. Ausness, supra note 116, at 352; see UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-207(b).  “[A] 
trust for the care of a designated domestic or pet animal is valid.”  Id. 
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would simply terminate upon the death of the last animal “covered by the 
trust.”596  Other noncharitable trusts would remain subject to RAP and possibly 
its common law variant.597  Additional influential provisions in the new code 
section created the office of a purpose enforcer and allowed a trustee to desig-
nate a replacement if the named trustee was unwilling to carry out the terms of 
the trust – a significant departure from the concept of an “honorary trust.”598  
Rather than collapsing the trust if the trustee was unwilling to perform, the 
UPC provided that another trustee could be appointed.599 
Ten years after the initial 1990 UPC amendments, the Uniform Trust 
Code (“UTC”) authorized purpose trusts without “a definite or definitely as-
certainable beneficiary.”600  The most common use that the UTC contemplated 
was preservation of a cemetery plot in perpetuity.601  The general rule under 
the UTC was that purpose trusts could last no longer than twenty-one years.602  
Most significantly, the UTC – like the UPC – permitted truly enforceable (and 
not merely honorary) noncharitable purpose trusts.603  The UTC allowed en-
forcement powers akin to those of an ascertainable beneficiary to be exercised 
by a person appointed by the terms of the trust (or by the court, if the trust 
instrument failed to do so).604  Courts were invited by UTC section 409 to re-
duce the amount by which the trust was funded in the event that the trust estate 
exceeded the sum needed to accomplish the trust’s purpose.605  A separate sec-
tion of the UTC authorized “pet trusts” with a parallel judicial de-funding in-
vitation and an enforcer provision.606  The current Restatement of Trusts 
agrees, treating what the Restatement (First) would have recognized as merely 
an honorary transfer as a true trust but still jeopardizing their enforcement by 
conditioning trust administration upon the trustee’s willingness to do so.607 
 
 596. Id.  The pet trust durational limitation to pet lives in being would seemingly 
eliminate any continuing trust after the pet’s death to maintain its gravestone.  Cf. JOHN 
IRVING, THE HOTEL NEW HAMPSHIRE 190–92 (1981) (wherein a taxidermist preserves 
a deceased family dog for the family’s ongoing enjoyment). 
 597. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907; Ausness, supra note 116, at 352.  See the 
secondary RAP rule applicable to noncharitable purpose trusts supra note 392. 
 598. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907(c)(4) (providing that the noncharitable pur-
pose “can be enforced by an individual designated for that purpose in the trust instru-
ment”). 
 599. Id. § 2-907(c)(7). 
 600. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 409(1) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000). 
 601. Id. cmt.  “The most common example of a trust for a specific noncharitable 
purpose is a trust for the care of a cemetery plot.”  Id. 
 602. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 409(1). 
 603. See Taylor, supra note 241, at 428–29 (“[T]he uniform law evolved incremen-
tally from no pet trusts to honorary pet trusts to enforceable pet trusts”). 
 604. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 409(2). 
 605. Id. § 409(3). 
 606. Id. § 408. 
 607. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 47 (2001) (characterizing the trans-
feree as a “trustee”); see id. cmt. c (citation omitted) (retaining the rule that where “the 
trustee is unwilling to exercise the power, fails within a reasonable time to do so, or 
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3. Statutory Approaches: A Selective Survey 
The primary trust jurisdictions in the United States are Alaska, Delaware, 
Nevada, and South Dakota.608  These states are particularly attractive to settlors 
because of their favorable state income tax rules and their settlor-favorable 
trust laws.609  The paragraphs that follow will briefly summarize these four 
jurisdictions’ purpose trust legislative frameworks and will conclude with a 
commentary on the Cayman Island’s purpose trust legislation.  The key ele-
ments of a particular state’s laws to be considered include the scope and clarity 
of its purpose trust legislation and the status of its RAP, its RAA, and its rule 
against unreasonable restraints on alienation.610  The purpose trust legislation 
itself should clarify the role of the enforcer, speak to the availability of cy pres 
(or its noncharitable equivalent), and clarify the availability and functionality 
of hybrid and res purpose trusts.  We will begin with Alaska. 
Alaska legislatively authorized noncharitable purpose trusts in 1996.611  
Alaska permits enforcement powers to reside in an individual named in the 
trust or appointed by a court.612  Alaska’s statutes limit the duration of purpose 
trusts to twenty-one years.613  Any governing instrument is to be liberally in-
terpreted to carry out the general intent of the transferor.614  In 1983, Alaska 
applied the wait-and-see approach to RAP, but, in 2000, Alaska repealed 
RAP.615  At the same time, however, some remnants of RAP were modified 
and left intact.616  In its current form, Alaska’s RAP applies to powers of ap-
pointment when “not presently exercisable because a condition precedent is 
invalid unless, within a period of 1[000] years after its creation, either the 
 
dies without having done so, ordinarily . . . the property is held in trust for distribution 
to the testator’s successors in interest”). 
 608. See Edward J. McCaffrey et al., The Advantages of Creating Out-of-State 
Trusts, L.A. LAW., Sept. 2005, at 19 (“[S]tates such as Alaska, Illinois, New Jersey, 
South Dakota, and Delaware are positioning themselves as trust-friendly places.”); 
Barry A. Nelson, Bacardi: The Hangover, FLA. B.J., Mar. 2014, at 40, 44 (listing 
Alaska, Delaware, Nevada, South Dakota as the best states for discretionary trusts). 
 609. See RICHARD W. NENNO, PERPETUAL DYNASTY TRUSTS: TAX PLANNING AND 
JURISDICTION SELECTION 179–209 (2011), https://www.naepc.org/journal/is-
sue10o.pdf. 
 610. See discussion of RAP, RAA, and unreasonable restraints on alienation supra 
Section II.D.1.a–c. 
 611. H.B. 308, 19th Leg., 2d Sess., 1996 Alaska Sess. Laws 75. 
 612. ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.907(c)(4) (2017). 
 613. Id. § 13.12.907(a). 
 614. Id. § 13.12.907(b). 
 615. ALASKA STAT. § 34.27.050 (repealed 2000).  See discussion of the RAP “wait-
and-see” approach supra note 419 and accompanying text.  States began repealing RAP 
in 1957.  Grayson M.P. McCrouch, Who Killed the Rule Against Perpetuities?, 40 PEPP. 
L. REV. 1291, 1295 n.17 (2013).  The first state to repeal the rule was Idaho in 1957.  
Id.  The second was Wisconsin in 1969.  Id.  South Dakota was third in 1983.  Id. 
 616. ALASKA STAT. § 34.27.051. 
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power is irrevocably exercised or the power terminates.”617  A prohibition 
against conditions which restrain alienation remains on the books.618  Suspend-
ing the absolute power of alienation for a period longer than the lives of persons 
in being plus thirty years is impermissible.619  The power is not suspended if 
the trustee can sell the property or at least one person can terminate the trust.620  
Limited exceptions apply with regards “to a transfer (1) made outright or in 
trust for a charitable purpose; (2) to a literary or charitable organization; (3) to 
a veterans’ memorial organization; or (4) to a cemetery corporation, society, or 
association.”621 
Delaware’s authorization of noncharitable purpose trusts is influenced by 
the UTC and divides the authorization into two statutory sections: one for pet 
trusts622 and another for other noncharitable purpose trusts.623  Alongside these 
two varieties of trusts are codified provisions for cemetery plot trusts.624  In 
addition to recognizing the role of an enforcer, either nominated by the trust 
instrument or appointed by the court, Delaware’s pet trust statute permits any 
“person who has an interest in the welfare of the animal or animals other than 
a general public interest” to move the court for appointment as an enforcer.625  
A similar enforcer appointment option exists for other noncharitable purpose 
trusts.626  Delaware also defines an “animal” that may be covered by a pet trust; 
the term “animal” includes “any nonhuman member of the animal kingdom,” 
excluding “plants and inanimate objects.”627 
The “stumbling blocks” for noncharitable purpose trusts in Delaware are 
relatively manageable.  Delaware’s abolition of RAP is less expansive than a 
 
 617. Id. § 34.27.051(a). 
 618. Id. § 34.27.100(a)(1)–(4). 
 619. Id. 
 620. Id. § 34.27.100(b)(2). 
 621. Id. § 34.27.100(c)(1)–(4). 
 622. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12 § 3555 (West 2018) (pet trusts). 
 623. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12 § 3556 (West 2018) (other noncharitable purposes).  
Interestingly – and uniquely – Delaware does not strictly bifurcate purpose trusts into 
charitable trusts and noncharitable trusts.  Instead, it authorizes charitable trusts and 
also trusts “for a declared purpose,” which “might not be deemed to be for charitable 
purposes.”  Id. § 3556(a). 
 624. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12 §§ 3551–3553; see also, e.g., In re Mary R. Latimer 
Trust, 78 A.3d 875, 885–86 (Del. Ch. 2013) (declining to reform a trust that directs the 
maintenance of burial lots); Anderson v. Mount Zion Cemetery Ass’n, 184 A.2d 86, 
89–90 (Del. Ch. 1962) (confirming that cemetery property was not encumbered by a 
restrictive burial trust). 
 625. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12 § 3555(c). 
 626. Id. § 3556(c). 
 627. Id. § 3555(g). 
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full repeal of the rule – its repeal only applies to interests in trusts.628  Moreo-
ver, as to real property held in trust, the limitations period is 110 years rather 
than perpetual.629  Delaware has repealed RAA.630 
Nevada recognized pet trusts in 2001.631  Only in 2017, however, did Ne-
vada adopt legislation to recognize other varieties of noncharitable purpose 
trusts.632  Under Nevada law, the purpose must “not [be] illegal or against pub-
lic policy” and must be “stated with sufficient particularity in the trust instru-
ment as to be ascertainable by a finder of fact.”633  A noncharitable purpose 
trust (other than a pet trust) may be enforced by a trustee, a trust advisor, a trust 
protector, a person appointed under the terms of the governing instrument, or 
by the court, but no provision is made for the court to appoint an enforcer.634  
Where the court determines that the value of the trust res exceeds the amount 
required for the trust’s purpose, excess property will be distributed back to the 
settlor or, if the settlor is deceased, to her successors unless the trust provides 
otherwise.635  No provisions for hybrid purpose trusts or res purpose trusts were 
included in the legislation. 
Nevada repealed RAP as it applies to property in 1987.636  Then, in 2005, 
Nevada modified RAP to permit vesting or termination of unvested interests 
within 365 years.637  When measuring a period from creation of a trust, any 
language that seeks to disallow vesting or termination of any interest is inop-
erative to the extent it produces a period of time that exceeds twenty-one years 
 
 628. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 25 § 503(a) (2017). 
 629. Id. § 503(b). 
 630. Id. § 506 (“No provision directing or authorizing accumulation of trust income 
shall be invalid.”). 
 631. Assemb. B. 33, 71st Leg., Reg. Sess, 2001 Nev. Stat. 203; see NEV. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 163.0075 (West 2017). 
 632. Assemb. B. 314, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess., 2017 Nev. Stat. 311; NEV. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 163.006(6) (West 2017).  Clumsily, Nevada law recognizes the creation of a 
trust “only if there is a beneficiary” but deems this requirement satisfied if the trust 
instrument provides for any “noncharitable trust without an ascertainable beneficiary . 
. . .”  Id. 
 633. Assemb. B. 314, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess., 2017 Nev. Stat. 311. 
 634. Id.  It is unclear how a court would enforce a trustee’s duties if no person has 
standing to enforce the trustee’s duties and also unclear how a trustee would enforce 
the trust unless the statute is contemplating a co-trustee or prior trustee seeking to en-
force another trustee’s obligations. 
 635. Id. 
 636. See NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 111.1031 (2017) (requiring the interest to vest or ter-
minate “no later than 21 years after the death of a natural person then alive.”); but see 
id. § 111.1037(7) (“111.1031 does not apply to . . .  [a] property interest, power of 
appointment or arrangement subject to the common-law [RAP] or is expressly excluded 
by another statute of this state.”). 
 637. S.B. 64, 73rd Leg., Reg. Sess., 2005 Nev. Stat 270; see also NEV. REV. STAT.  
§ 111.1031. 
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after the death of the survivor of the specified lives.638  Nevada retains a rule 
against unreasonable restraints on alienation.639 
Beginning in 2006, South Dakota authorized purpose trusts with a statu-
tory enactment, stating that “a trust may be performed if the trust is for a spe-
cific lawful noncharitable purpose.”640  Purpose trusts were described in two 
statutes: one for pet trusts641 and another for other noncharitable purpose 
trusts.642  Under South Dakota law, a purpose trust could be enforced by a per-
son designated by the trust instrument or appointed by the court.643  The court 
could also reduce a trust’s funding “if it determines that the amount substan-
tially exceeds the amount required for the intended use.”644  Nothing in the 
statutes barred the grantor from funding the trust with the property (a res pur-
pose trust), but nothing expressly allowed it either.645 
South Dakota has repealed RAA.646  South Dakota also repealed RAP in 
1983.647  A prohibition against conditions that restrain alienation remains.648  
Suspending the absolute power of alienation for a period longer than the lives 
of persons in being plus thirty years violates the rule.649  Suspending the power 
of a trustee to alienate trust property is similarly barred.650  The trustee must be 
given the power to sell trust property to avoid the application of this rule.651  
Limited exceptions apply with regards to charitable trusts and cemetery trans-
fers.652  Thus, under a typical dynastic trust, the trustee’s power to sell trust 
 
 638. NEV. REV. STAT. § 111.1031(5). 
 639. Id. § 111.860. 
 640. H.B. 1178, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess., 2006 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 247 § 1; see also 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-1-20 (2018).  See generally Krogstad & Bock, supra note 
307, at 376–77 (describing South Dakota’s purpose trust legislation). 
 641. H.B. 1178, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess., 2006 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 247 § 2; see also 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-1-21 (2017) (amended 2018). 
 642. H.B. 1178, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess., 2006 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 247 § 3; see also 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-1-22 (2017) (amended 2018). 
 643. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-1-22.4. 
 644. Id. § 55-1-22.2. 
 645. Cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12 § 3555(e) (2018) (authorizing the pet for which a 
pet trust is created to be transferred to the trustee in the event that the pet’s designated 
successor owner disclaims ownership). 
 646. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-6-4 (repealed 1998). 
 647. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-5-8 (2018) (“The common-law [RAP] is not in force 
in this state.”); see also S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-1-20 (2018) (confirming, in the pur-
pose trust context, the inapplicability of common law RAP, “any common law rule 
limiting the duration of noncharitable purpose trusts” and “any rule restricting the ac-
cumulation of income”). 
 648. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-3-5 (2018). 
 649. Id. § 43-5-1. 
 650. Id. § 43-5-4. 
 651. Id.  “[T]here is no suspension of the power of alienation by a trust or by equi-
table interests under a trust if the trustee has the power to sell, either express or implied, 
or if there is an unlimited power to terminate in one or more persons in being.”  Id. 
 652. See id. § 43-5-7. 
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property may be suspended for no longer than a period equal to the lives in 
being plus an additional thirty years.653 
In early 2018, the South Dakota Legislature amended and expanded its 
purpose trust statutes.654  The changes were part of the South Dakota Gover-
nor’s Task Force on Trust Administration Review and Reform’s annual work 
product.655  Three key elements of the statutes will be briefly explicated.  First, 
res purpose trusts are specifically authorized.656  The statute states, “Any prop-
erty may form a part or all of the trust estate, including some, all, or an interest 
in some or all of the property which is the subject or purpose of a purpose 
trust.”657  Second, hybrid purpose trusts are specifically authorized.658  When 
the interests of beneficiaries and the advancement of a purpose are concurrent, 
the trustee is directed to maintain separate shares – “one for the beneficiaries; 
and a second for the purposes . . . .”659  If a trustee fails to do so, the purpose 
trust is not rendered invalid, but the trustee “may be liable to the beneficiaries 
for the actual damages caused thereby, if any, for failing to do so.”660  Out of 
concerns with the uncertainty of how hybrid trusts might be treated for income 
tax purposes, the task force elected to direct trustees to segregate amounts for 
beneficiaries and purposes into separate trust shares.661  The separate shares 
should be taxed, at least in part, as if they were separate trusts.662  Third, the 
 
 653. See id. 
 654. H.B. 1072, 93rd Leg., Reg. Sess., 2018 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 275 §§ 2-20 (“An 
act to revise certain provisions regarding trusts.”). 
 655. See Al W. King, III, & Pierce H. McDowell, III, A Bellweather of Modern 
Trust Concepts: A Historical Review of South Dakota’s Powerful Trust Laws, 62 S.D. 
L. REV. 266, 266 n.4 (providing a history of the Trust Task Force). 
 656. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-1-20 (2018). 
 657. Id. 
 658. Id. § 55-1-22 (2018). 
 659. Id. § 55-1-22.1. 
 660. Id. 
 661. E-mail from Frances Becker, member, South Dakota Governor’s Task Force 
on Trust Administration Review and Reform, to author (Nov. 3, 2017, 11:42 CST) (on 
file with author). 
 662. See Morris Trs. v. Comm’r, 51 T.C. 20, 44–45 (1968), action on dec., 3324–
66, 6624–66, 3325–66, 6623–66 (Dec. 24, 1968), aff’d, 427 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1970); 
see also 26 C.F.R. § 1.641(a)–(c) (2017) (providing that multiple trusts without sub-
stantially independent purposes, the same grantor, the same beneficiary, and having as 
their principal purpose the avoidance or mitigation of progressive income tax rates will 
be treated as one trust for income tax purposes). But see Edward L. Stephenson Tr. v. 
Comm’r, 81 T.C. 283, 292 (1983) (reasoning that the foregoing trust consolidation reg-
ulations are invalid); Boyce v. U.S., 190 F. Supp. 950, 958 (W.D. La. 1961), aff’d, 296 
F.2d 731 (5th Cir. 1961) (holding that where trustee did not maintain separate accounts 
and books, ninety trusts should be consolidated for income tax purposes).  Technically, 
the foregoing authority deals with separate trusts, not separate shares.  See I.R.C. § 
663(c) (2012) (“For the sole purpose of determining the amount of distributable net 
income . . . in the case of a single trust having more than one beneficiary, substantially 
separate and independent shares of different beneficiaries in the trust shall be treated as 
separate trusts.”).  Separate shares as separate trusts under § 663(c) does not equate to 
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enforcer has a defined role.663  Enforcers are deemed to be fiduciaries and, as 
a default rule, are entitled to reasonable compensation for their role in trust 
administration.664  The imposition of this fiduciary duty addresses, in large 
measure, the concern with the lack of liability for an enforcer who fails to dil-
igently enforce the trustee’s obligations to the noncharitable purpose of a pur-
pose trust.  Enforcers may be removed for breaching their duties.665 
Purpose trusts were first recognized not in the United States but in over-
seas jurisdictions, which market their trust environments as a favorable situs 
for the wealthy.666  Although Nauru (in Micronesia) was the first statutory pur-
pose trust legislation jurisdiction, Bermuda was the first to adopt noncharitable 
purpose trust legislation that received substantial attention.667  The Cayman Is-
lands’ 1997 “STAR trust” legislation is often seen as the most flexible of any 
jurisdiction.668  The acronym “STAR” stands for Special Trusts (Alternative 
Regime) Law.669  The Cayman Islands expressly authorize both hybrid purpose 
trusts as well as noncharitable purpose trusts that blend in charitable provi-
sions: “(1) The objects of a special trust or power may be persons or purposes 
or both . . . (3) The purposes may be of any number or kind, charitable or 
non[]charitable . . . .”670  Thus, mixed charitable/noncharitable purpose trusts 
 
filing separate tax returns for each share or applying the progressive rate structure.  See 
26 C.F.R. § 1.663(c)-1(b)(1) (2017).  “The effect of having separate shares exists only 
in situations in which one beneficiary’s income is accumulated, whereas income is dis-
tributed to another beneficiary in excess of that beneficiary’s income share.”  JERE D. 
MCGAFFEY, MCGAFFEY LEGAL FORMS WITH TAX ANALYSIS § 16:23, West (database 
updated Apr. 2018). 
 663. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-1-21.4 (2018) (“The purposes of a purpose trust 
may be enforced by an enforcer . . . .”). 
 664. Id. 
 665. Id. § 55-1-21.5.  A purpose trust enforcer can be removed for a serious breach 
of trust, a lack of cooperation or hostility with the trustee, or “a substantial change in 
circumstances and removal of the enforcer would best serve the purpose or purposes of 
the trust.”  Id.   The trust “instrument may provide additional procedures for the removal 
of an enforcer.”  Id. 
 666. See R.F. Martin, Annotation, Validity, as for a Charitable Purpose, of Trust 
for Dissemination or Preservation of Material of Historical or Other Educational In-
terest or Value, 12 A.L.R.2d 849, West (database updated weekly) (originally pub-
lished 1950). 
 667. Duckworth, supra note 515, at 936–37. 
 668. Bove I, The Purpose of Purpose, supra note 116, at 36 (“[C]ommentators feel 
that one of the most flexible of the off-shore purpose trust statutes is that of the Cayman 
Islands . . . “); see also Duckworth, supra note 515, at 938–40 (summarizing the Cay-
man Islands purpose trust legislation). 
 669. Duckworth, supra note 515, at 938. 
 670. C.I. TRUSTS LAW § 99 (2011 rev.), http://www.gov.ky/portal/pls/por-
tal/docs/1/11524845.PDF.   However, strangely, ascertainable beneficiaries of a hybrid 
STAR trust lack any standing to enforce the trustee’s duties.  Id. § 100(1). 
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are permissible.  Enforcers are clothed with fiduciary responsibilities in enforc-
ing a purpose trust.671  A sort of noncharitable cy pres applies when a Cayman 
Islands purpose trust has become obsolete, impractical, or unlawful.672  Two 
limitations of the STAR trust should be noted, however.  First, at least one 
trustee must be a licensed Cayman Islands corporate trustee.673  Second, a 
STAR trust may not hold real property of the Cayman Islands.674  It may, how-
ever, own interests in an entity that owns Cayman Islands realty.675 
F. A Will (and a Testamentary Trust) for Willa Cather 
We are now ready to turn to our hypothetical client, Willa Cather, and her 
wish to keep her private correspondence mostly shielded from public view.  
Pulitzer Prize-winning Willa Cather is today remembered mostly for her novels 
set in the homesteading plains of Nebraska, such as My Antonia.676  She is “one 
of our greatest novelists.”677  When she was growing up, she often wore men’s 
clothes and occasionally adopted the name “William.”678  Throughout her life, 
the majority of her significant relationships were with women, including Edith 
Lewis who lived with Cather for thirty-nine years and became her literary ex-
ecutor.679  Cather neither identified with women’s political issues nor called 
herself a lesbian.680  She may or may not have had sexual relationships with 
women.  Her sexual identity remains a contentious point for scholars – some 
highlight what they see as important queer aspects of her fiction, and others 
minimize or deny those aspects.681 
 
 671. Id. § 101(2).  Typically, a STAR trust “enforcer has the same rights as a ben-
eficiary of an ordinary trust . . . .”  Id. § 102(a). 
 672. Id. § 104; see also id. § 103 (providing that a STAR “trust is not rendered void 
by uncertainty”). 
 673. Id. § 105. 
 674. Id. § 109; Isle of Man Purpose Trusts Act of 1996 § 5 (“No land or any interest 
in any land in the Island shall be held, directly or indirectly, in a purpose trust.”).  The 
author would speculate that this limitation is founded upon the concern that when a res 
purpose trust owns realty, the trustee is so inherently discouraged from encumbering or 
transferring the realty res that an unacceptable level of alienability limitations may re-
sult.  See discussion supra Section II.C.2.c.ii. 
 675. C.I. TRUSTS LAW § 109. 
 676. WILLA CATHER, MY ANTONIA (1918). 
 677. Christopher Benfey, Willa Cather’s Correspondence Reveals Something New, 
NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 12, 2013), https://newrepublic.com/article/114897/willa-cathers-
correspondence-reveals-something-new. 
 678. SHARON O’BRIEN, WILLA CATHER: THE EMERGING VOICE 96–113 (1987). 
 679. See generally EDITH LEWIS, WILLA CATHER LIVING: A PERSONAL RECORD 
(1976) (containing Lewis’ memoir of her life with Cather). 
 680. Janet Sharistanian, Introduction to MY ANTONIA xiii (1900) (Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2006). 
 681. Compare Melissa J. Homestead, Willa Cather, Sarah Orne Jewett, and the 
Historiography of Lesbian Sexuality, 10 CATHER STUDIES 3, 27 (2015) (arguing that 
uncovering “evidence documenting Cather’s life as she lived it” might “suggest new 
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It is unclear why Cather desired her letters to remain private.  That they 
remained private for as long as they did is a testament to the personal commit-
ment of her executors to her wishes rather than the enforceability of Cather’s 
admonitions; it was personal loyalty, not legal mandate, that actually kept her 
letters private until recently.682  One might speculate that Cather wished for her 
sexual orientation to remain private out of her own concerns for privacy and 
possibly out of her concerns for the privacies of others.683  Privacy is a value 
that the law is generally more predisposed towards than autocratic artistic vi-
sion, caprice, or whim.684  On the other hand, perhaps Cather’s desires derived 
instead from the fact that her letters just were not well written.  Perhaps – like 
Jerry Lewis685 – she wished to preserve her reputation because her personal 
correspondence was not “up to the standard of Flaubert and Mérimée . . . .”686  
Like Vladimir Narbokov, she may have wished to keep the lid on certain writ-
ings simply because of their poor literary quality.687  Perhaps all of these con-
cerns were in play in varying degrees. 
 
queer approaches to interpreting her fiction”), and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Across 
Gender, Across Sexuality: Willa Cather and Others, 88 S. ATLANTIC Q. 53 (1989) (con-
sidering sexuality and gender themes in Cather’s short story “Paul’s Case”), with 
CHRISTOPHER NEALON, FOUNDLINGS: LESBIAN AND GAY HISTORICAL EMOTION 
BEFORE STONEWALL 96 (2001) (“[N]ot everyone is going to want to hear that Cather’s 
literary value is utterly related, at every level, to her being a lesbian.”). 
 682. A collection of Willa Cather’s letters was published in 2013.  See SELECTED 
LETTERS, supra note 93.  The collection does not reveal any sexual privacies but does 
confirm Cather’s emotional attachments to some women in her life.  Benfey, supra note 
676; Schuessler, supra note 29. 
 683. With the benefit of twenty-first century hindsight, this explanation – sexual 
privacy concerns – seems less likely.  Of the several hundred of her letters are on sale 
in bookstores between the covers of The Selected Letters of Willa Cather, we know that 
– at least in these letters – there are no intimate revelations, so we might be prepared to 
speculate that private intimacies weren’t the issue.  SELECTED LETTERS, supra note 93. 
 684. See Lauren Henry Scholz, Privacy as Quasi-Property, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1113, 
1141 (2016) (“[P]rivacy as quasi-property provides hope for an avenue to predictably 
understand, frame, and ultimately systemize our moral intuitions about what should be 
protected at law.”). But see Tamar R. Lehrich, To Bedlam and Part Way Back: Anne 
Sexton, Her Therapy Tapes, and the Meaning of Privacy, 2 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 165, 
188 (1992) (“Clear distinctions between art and life rarely may be made when the sub-
ject is a writer, poet, or artist.”). 
 685. See discussion of Jerry Lewis’s wishes to largely secret but preserve his unre-
leased film, The Day the Clown Cried supra Section II.A. (describing Jerry Lewis’ 
wishes to preserve his reputation). 
 686. Benfey, supra note 677 (“[I]t seems likely that Cather wanted her letters, 
mostly written in haste and on the fly, to remain unpublished for the same reason that 
she avoided, for the last three decades of her life, lecturing, reviewing, and interviews: 
she simply didn’t have time for such things.”). 
 687. Vladimir Narbokov’s unfinished The Original of Laura was finally published 
in 2009 against the author’s testamentary directive to destroy it, and critics have been 
unkind to finally viewing what perhaps should have remained hidden as Narbokov had 
wished.  See JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 
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The foregoing illustrates that a particular wish to manage or control one’s 
artistic works or simply one’s surviving correspondence might rest on compli-
cated motivations.688  Privacy, secrecy, artistic integrity, quality control, or 
simply generalized discomfort may all be at work. It also demonstrates that 
there may be complicated motivations for wanting to jettison the author’s lim-
itations.  Some may simply be curious and prying.  Some may just be nosy.  
Others may have legitimate scholarly aspirations.  Still, others may simply be 
interested on account of their interest in the author and her works. 
The precise text of a will and testamentary trust for Willa Cather can now 
be mapped.  Let us attempt to give legal life to Willa Cather’s aims concerning 
her letters.  Her will must contain a bequest of all of the physical originals and 
copies of the letters that she wishes to secrete and preserve.  The bequest of 
letters (and their associated intellectual property rights) will be to the trustee of 
a testamentary trust.  The terms of the trust are contained within Cather’s Last 
Will and Testament.  It provides: 
1. The Trustee shall preserve, protect, and maintain my private corre-
spondence, and the copyright rights thereto (collectively herein, “let-
ters”), as private and neither permit, nor license, nor allow any person 
to reprint, copy, view, or know the contents of my letters except for 
limited uses by reputable scholars for legitimate research, as determined 
by my Trustee in its unfettered discretion. 
2. Edith Lewis shall act to enforce the Trustee’s obligations pursuant 
to section 1, as an enforcer.  Upon the death or resignation of an en-
forcer, the Trustee shall appoint successors if the former enforcer has 
failed to do so. 
3. Without diminishing the Trustee’s powers of sale, I confirm that the 
Trustee’s retention of my letters in trust will advance the Trustee’s abil-
ity to discharge its duties to preserve, protect, and maintain my letters.  
The Trustee shall be held harmless for holding my letters as an asset of 
this trust despite the fact that they may not produce income, appreciate 
in value, or otherwise represent an acceptable trust investment. 
4. The term of this trust shall be perpetual.  In the event of trust termi-
nation, however, the Trustee may appoint the remainder to or among 
such educational organizations as best represent my aims and values, as 
 
15 n.19 (9th ed. 2013) (quoting Boyd Tonkin, How to Ruin a Great Writer’s Good 
Name, INDEPENDENT 28 (Nov. 20, 2009)) (characterizing The Original of Laura as hav-
ing “a train-wreck fascination”).  See generally VLADIMIR NARBOKOV, THE ORIGINAL 
OF LAURA (2009).  
 688. See John K. Eason, supra note 529, at 130–32 (examining the difficulty with 
assessing the charitable donor’s wishes); Melanie B. Leslie, Time to Sever the Dead 
Hand: Fisk University and the Cost of the Cy Pres Doctrine, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. 
L.J. 1, 10 (2012) (“Because the donor is not available for consultation, the court must 
make an informed guess based on indirect evidence.”). 
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determined by the Trustee in its unfettered discretion.  To the extent the 
Trustee fails to do so, a court shall appoint the remainder consistent with 
the foregoing objectives.  This is a spendthrift trust. 
Let us also incorporate a bequest of the sum of $30,000 to the trust.  This 
sum can be invested and used for trustee costs and other costs in administering 
the trust.  These costs will include safeguarding and insuring the letters and 
also engaging staff to supervise access to the letters from time to time.  Acme 
Bank and Trust should be named as trustee.  The use of a corporate trustee 
helps ensure continuity over time.  We will situs the trust in a jurisdiction with 
favorable noncharitable purpose trust laws, such as South Dakota or the Cay-
man Islands.689  In this way, the majority of stumbling blocks (for example, 
RAP, RAA, etc.) can be safely avoided.690 
Willa Cather’s testamentary trust would constitute a “res purpose trust” 
insofar as the trust estate includes the copyright properties and physical letters 
that the trustee is directed to preserve.691  It is not strictly a “hybrid purpose 
trust” insofar as it lacks concurrent beneficiaries.692  The trust will continue so 
 
 689. The amount of cash or liquid assets to be conveyed along with the letters and 
copyrights ought to be sufficient to (i) reasonably compensate the trustee and the en-
forcer; (ii) store, insure, and preserve the assets; (iii) pay for administrative costs such 
as annual tax preparation and recordkeeping; (iv) supervise the access to and use of the 
letter texts; and (v) pay for any litigation necessary to enforce misuse or infringement. 
See Rahne & Shapiro, supra note 44, at 13 (“Aside from any financial recovery, litiga-
tion for IP assets in one’s estate can honor the original creator’s legacy”).  The $30,000 
conveyed in this hypothetical may be inadequate for any sustained litigation efforts 
unless administrative costs are kept to a minimum so as to allow the growth of principal.  
Suing for an injunction to remedy the misuse of Cather’s letters would be expensive.  
For this reason, a greater sum could be conveyed but at the risk that a trust may see the 
amount as excessive.  See, e.g., UNIF. TRUST CODE § 409(3) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000) 
(inviting a court to defund a purpose trust “to the extent the court determines that the 
value of the trust property exceeds the amount required for the intended use”).  Alter-
natively, a directive to simply ban all access to the letters – and thereby reduce overhead 
costs in deciding upon and supervising access – for a period of, say, three decades, 
would allow an accumulation of income and principal to more sustainable and viable 
levels. 
 690. See outline of RAP and RAA supra Section II.D.1.a & b. 
 691. See description of res purpose trusts supra Section II.C.2.c.ii. 
 692. See discussion of hybrid purpose trusts supra Section II.C.2.c.iii.  Adding con-
current beneficiaries to Willa Cather’s testamentary trust would be as straightforward 
as adding the following sort of provision: “In addition, the trustee may distribute in-
come and principal to Edith Lewis for her support, maintenance, and enjoyment for her 
surviving lifetime.”  Adding a beneficiary to a purpose trust helps insulate the trust 
from overfunding or surplus arguments since it would be typically difficult to ascertain 
what amounts could be reduced without depleting the availability of trust funds for the 
beneficiary.  Of course, this trust may continue beyond the lifetime of Edith Lewis and, 
as drafted in this footnote, the trust would cease being a hybrid purpose trust after 
Lewis’ death. 
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long as it remains financially solvent and the purpose continues to be achieva-
ble.  Typically, where a purpose becomes unachievable (and assuming the 
problem cannot be repaired with an application of noncharitable cy pres or eq-
uitable deviation), the remaining trust assets would be distributed to the testa-
tor’s estate or heirs.693  This creates an incentive for the remaindermen to chal-
lenge the trust on grounds of capriciousness or for other reasons.694  Cather’s 
trust, however, grants to the trustee a special power of appointment to direct 
any remaining funds to educational organizations.  In default of the exercise, 
the court will direct the funds.  It is still possible that a judge could rule the 
trust invalid in its entirety, in which case Cather’s residual devisees would have 
standing to challenge her estate plan. The use of a special power of appoint-
ment, however, does help to minimize this problem.695 
In addition to embodying a successor owner to her literary estate with her 
own literary aims and values, the use of a trust consolidates ownership and 
management and avoids fracturing her copyright interests among several own-
ers.696  A corporate trustee is typically viewed as more sterile and detached 
from a settlor’s peculiar individuality and values than an individual trustee who 
knew and respected the settlor.697  Still, a corporate trustee will bring a profes-
 
 693. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12 §§ 3592(2) (2018) (providing that if the trust does 
not provide for a directive of distributions upon trust termination, the remaining trust 
assets “shall be distributed as though the trustor had died on the date on which such 
failure occurred, a resident of the state of Delaware”). 
 694. See supra notes 464–79 and accompanying text.  
 695. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-604(a) (2018) (“[A] devise, other than a 
residuary devise, that fails for any reason becomes a part of the residue.”); see also In 
re Estate of Prynn, 315 A.2d 265, 267 (Pa. 1974) (reasoning that intestate heirs lack 
standing to challenge specific bequests which, if invalid, would pass according to the 
residuary clause). 
 696. See Hader, supra note 39, at 575–76.  Hader explains: 
 
Unified management and control of a creative person’s works and copyrights is 
essential.  Without it, the beneficiaries of an estate might compete with one 
another in their efforts to exploit the copyrights in the works, and this competi-
tion could impair or even destroy the value of the artistic property.  Further-
more, effective marketing of artwork, such as paintings or sculpture, could be 
inhibited if the beneficiaries are unable to reach an agreement on marketing 
strategy. . . . Even in the absence of potential competition or disagreement 
among beneficiaries, it may still be preferable to consolidate management and 
control of the assets in the hands of a fiduciary who will protect the interests of 
the estate and the beneficiaries and who will have sufficient expertise to exploit 
the assets properly. 
 
Id. 
 697. See John A. Warwick, The Ungrateful Living: An Estate Planner’s Nightmare 
– The Trial Attorney’s Dream, 24 LAND & WATER L. REV. 401, 413 n.62 (1989) (“No 
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sional and objective eye to the administration of the trust.  The enforcer pro-
vides the personal touch, ideally embodying Cather’s aim to correct and guide 
the trustee’s management of the letters.  Over time, successor enforcers sharing 
these same values will be critical to ensuring a long-term achievement of Ca-
ther’s goals. 
Significantly, no underlying motive or purpose has been articulated in the 
trust.  This may ultimately result in a court guessing at her motives or becoming 
more willing to consider deviation from her aims because her motives were 
unspoken.  On the other hand, articulation of a particular motive may give am-
munition to a petition to deviate or even terminate the trust.  For example, the 
trust might have provided: “It is my aim in preserving and secreting these let-
ters to avoid embarrassment to my correspondents so long as they are living.”  
Upon the death of the last of the correspondents, it seems likely that a petition 
to terminate the trust’s restrictions would receive favorable consideration.  Al-
ternatively, the trust may have provided: “I wish to maintain the economic and 
artistic vitality of my published works by closely restricting access to my let-
ters, many or all of which did not receive the same editorial rewriting or atten-
tion that I may have wished.”  Perhaps this sort of aim would result in a more 
stable trust – one less susceptible to cy pres.  At any rate, no such aims are 
articulated in our example. 
Let us now extend our hypothetical and consider how this trust may better 
respond to demands to publish and disseminate Cather’s letters to the general 
public.  Let us assume that following Cather’s death in 1947, her estate was 
administered, and ultimately her letters and $30,000 were conveyed to Acme 
Bank and Trust.  Edith Lewis accepted the role of enforcer.  The trustee admin-
istered the trust without any controversy until 1955 when it received news that 
one of Willa Cather’s addressees was planning to publish selected excerpts 
from letters she had received from Cather in a scholarly article studying Ca-
ther’s literary impact.  Prodded into action by Edith Lewis, the trust’s “purpose 
enforcer,” the trustee directed counsel to serve the addressee with a “cease and 
desist letter.”  The addressee replied that the contemplated selective publication 
fell within the Copyright Act’s fair use doctrine.698  Acting on advice of coun-
sel, the trustee did not litigate the issue and the article – with parts of Cather’s 
letters quoted – was published.  Later, in 1960, a second contemplated publi-
cation, which clearly fell outside of the fair use safe harbor, was quickly quelled 
by the trustee.  In response to these events, the trustee adopted a rather strict 
agreement with members of the public allowed to view the letters.  Scholars 
are required to sign an agreement that permits the trustee to more closely reg-
ulate the dissemination of the text of Cather’s letters.699 
 
matter how hard they try to improve their public image, corporate trustees, like Amer-
icans Abroad, are too often stereotyped as ‘arrogant’ and ‘insensitive’ to the needs of 
those around them.”). 
 698. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
 699. The agreement might provide, for example, that the trustee retains the right to 
review and approve any scholarship that quotes from the letters and provide for a forum 
selection clause and liquidated damages or injunctive relief for a breach. 
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Decades passed.  The physical letters themselves remained in the trustee’s 
possession, jealously guarded.  A successor purpose enforcer had just been ap-
pointed when, in 2018, the trustee received a letter from three English profes-
sors, including their vitae, asking for permission to read, review, and quote 
from the letters for research on the structural and intertextual analysis they were 
conducting on Cather’s novel.  The trustee promptly replied with a letter deny-
ing their request without explanation. 
Rather than challenge the trustee’s denial, the three frustrated professors 
filed a cy pres petition.  The petition asked a chancery court to order a deviation 
from the trust and permit the free and unrestricted dissemination of Cather’s 
letters.  The petition assumed that Cather’s purpose in keeping her letters pri-
vate was to hide her sexual orientation from the public eye after death just as 
she had during her life.  The petitioners noted that as late as the 1980s, Cather 
scholars referred obliquely to her relationships with certain close female com-
panions as “close friendships.”700  Later critics reduced “Cather’s imaginative 
life [to] a simple matter of repression” and viewed her fiction in uncomplicated 
terms.701  But today, critics recognize that claiming her work was “written only 
in order to express homosexual feelings in disguise” is narrow, reductive, and 
patronizing.702  The contemporary view is informed by queer theory and asserts 
that Cather’s sexual orientation is unimportant or at least less significant.703  
The trio of petitioners concluded that today’s progressive views of homosexu-
ality undermine Cather’s original aims in desiring her sexuality remain cov-
ert.704  The release of her letters, they argued, will advance the integrity and 
understanding of her fiction.705  The letters had been secreted long enough.706 
 
 700. KATHLEEN D. BYRNE & RICHARD C. SNYDER, CHRYSALIS: WILLA CATHER IN 
PITTSBURGH 1896–1906, at 42–43 (1980). 
 701. HERMIONE LEE, WILLA CATHER: DOUBLE LIVES 11 (1989). 
 702. Id.; see also JANIS P. STOUT, WILLA CATHER: THE WRITER AND HER WORLD 
55 (2000) (asserting that “it does not matter” whether some of Cather’s relationships 
were “physically lesbian”). 
 703. See LEE, supra note 701, at 192.  “[T]he thing not named remains unnamable 
– that is its point.  It is not a buried bone to be dug up, but the ‘luminous halo, the semi-
transparent envelope’ of atmosphere and feeling evoked by the writing.”  Id. (alteration 
in original).  Compare id., with Sharon O’Brien, “The Thing Not Named”: Willa Cather 
as a Lesbian Writer, 9 SIGNS 576 (1984) (“Cather’s startling phrase “the thing not 
named” has another connotation: an aspect of experience possessing a name that the 
writer does not, or cannot, employ.”). 
 704. E.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 705. See JOHN P. ANDERS, WILLA CATHER’S SEXUAL AESTHETICS AND THE MALE 
HOMOSEXUAL LITERARY TRADITION 12–13 (1999) (“[O]ur understanding and appreci-
ation are possibly diminished without an awareness of [Cather’s] sexual aesthetics.”). 
 706. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 440 (Tenta-
tive Draft no. 2, 2009) (“[A]fter the passage of a significant period of time following 
the creation of a charitable trust or gift instrument, the policy of adhering to the terms 
in the trust or gift instrument increasingly weakens[.]”).  The petitioners recognize that 
Cather’s trust is not a charitable purpose trust but cite to the passage of time and its 
effect upon review of another variety of purpose trusts: charitable ones. 
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The trustee resisted the petition.  The successor enforcer agreed.  The 
trustee asserted that Cather’s underlying aim in framing the purpose of her pur-
pose trust was not preserving her sexual privacy postmortem but was instead 
something more nebulous that was partly based on a simple desire to keep her 
private communications private and partly based on embarrassment that the 
letters would be examined for their literary merit, which they lacked (or so 
Cather thought).707  The judge questioned the trustee and the enforcer, asking 
whether – if these had been Cather’s aims – they would not have been better 
achieved by the destruction of the letters?  And because Cather had elected not 
to destroy her copies of the letters, can we assume that at some point she con-
templated the release of the letters?  After all, it would have been much simpler 
to destroy the letters than arrange for their perpetual preservation. 
After receiving a few exhibits and hearing the arguments of counsel, the 
judge retired to her chambers to consider the matter.  Within a week, she re-
leased her opinion and decision in a letter to counsel for the trust and the three 
English professors.  It rejected the petitioners’ demand, finding that it had not 
become illegal, impossible, or impractical to achieve Cather’s purposes as set 
forth in the trust, regardless of whether those purposes were motivated by mod-
esty about the quality of the letters, privacy concerns, or simply a desire to see 
her letters quoted and utilized only in serious scholarly pursuits.  The judge 
quoted Cather: “The condition every art requires is, not so much freedom from 
restriction, as freedom from adulteration . . . .”708  The judge observed that this 
is an aim with which the law is not offended.709  In fact, the judge continued, 
the values of individual autonomy and creativity find support in the core of 
copyright law.  The judge noted, however, that although the trustee had been 
vested with “absolute” discretion in admitting and denying access to the Cather 
 
 707. Cather’s motives in secreting her less-than-perfect letters might also be char-
acterized as grounded in economic efficiency.  See SAX, supra note 14, at 257 (explain-
ing that an owner might have a “good economic reason” to destroy or partly destroy 
their property).  Cather may have in mind enhancing the “brand value” of Willa Cather 
by eliminating evidence of her less successful literary efforts.  Access restriction may 
help to preserve the economic value of her published works (at least until the expiration 
of copyright).  There can also be expressive value in Cather’s motives.  Id. at 259 (citing 
Strahilevitz, supra note 95, at 800–03, 824).  By restricting dissemination of her letters, 
Cather is modulating the shading of her more polished creative works to some degree.  
However, there is evidence that the literary quality of the letters is quite excellent.  See 
Leon Edel, Editor’s Foreword in E.K. BROWN, WILLA CATHER: A CRITICAL 
BIOGRAPHY, at xxxiii (1953) (“[Cather’s letters] are touched with the cadence, as with 
the radiance, of her style; they reflect also, as letters can, the directness and generosity 
and charm of the personality, its courage and steadfastness.”). 
 708. Willa Cather, Escapism, in COMMONWEAL CONFRONTATIONS: LIBERAL 
CONVICTIONS, CATHOLIC TRADITION, at 371, 373 (Patrick Jordan and Paul Baumann 
eds., 1999).  Cather wrote this essay in 1936.  Id. at 371. 
 709. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 
(1984). 
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letters, even absolute discretion is reviewable by the chancery court.710  If the 
trustee abused its discretion, acted arbitrarily, or failed to adhere to the settlor’s 
intent, the trustee’s decision may be reversed by the court.711  Therefore, the 
judge’s letter concluded with a statement that the petitioners were free to re-
frame their petition as a review of the trustee’s decision rejecting their request 
and with a denial of their cy pres petition. 
Cather’s intent governing her letters thus far remains preserved.  It would 
seem that with the proper use of a funded res purpose trust, Cather’s privacy 
and aims concerning her letters could have been better secured.  With a purpose 
trust, the release and publication of her private letters may have been avoided, 
or at least further delayed. 
III. CONCLUSION 
This Article has considered in the preceding discussion the extent to 
which Willa Cather’s twin objectives to preserve and partially secrete her let-
ters could be achieved by means of a purpose trust methodology.  It has not 
examined whether Willa Cather herself enjoyed legally recognized rights to 
achieve postmortem control over her letters.  For the most part, an individual’s 
rights die with them.712  Some narrow exceptions can be noted, such as the right 
to maintain confidentiality, the right to preserve one’s reputation , and the right 
to control the disposition of one’s remains and organs.713  Perhaps some rights 
 
 710. See Bishop v. McNeil, No. Civ.A. 5508, 1999 WL 743489, at *18 (Del. Ch. 
Sept. 14, 1999). 
 711. Id. 
 712. Kollar v. Lozier, 669 A.2d 845, 851 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996). 
 713. See N.Y. City Health and Hosps. v. N.Y. State Comm’n of Corr., 969 N.E.2d 
765, 769 (N.Y. 2012) (considering the postmortem release of confidential healthcare 
information of an inmate); DANIEL SPERLING, POSTHUMOUS INTERESTS: LEGAL AND 
ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES 38 (2008) (proposing the concept of a “Human Subject” as a 
repository for after-life rights because “[c]onceptualizing our existence  only in terms 
of the concept of personhood is too narrow an approach and leaves many important 
human interests unprotected”); Shannon Flynn Smith, Comment, If It Looks Like Tu-
pac, Walks Like Tupac, and Raps Like Tupac, It’s Probably Tupac: Virtual Cloning 
and Postmortem Right-of-Publicity Implications, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1719, 1759–
60 (2013) (suggesting a trust to preserve rights of publicity after a celebrity’s death); 
see also Kenneth K. Lee, Attorney-Client Privilege – Dead or Alive?: A Post-Mortem 
Analysis of Swindler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 2081 (1998), 22 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 735, 746 (1999) (reasoning that although a postmortem exception to the 
attorney-client privilege “may not likely affect the candor of most clients, such an ex-
ception can have a profound impact on people who expect to die soon”); Kirsten Rabe 
Smolensky, Rights of the Dead, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 763, 763 (2009) (“[R]ecent case 
law suggests there may be a posthumous right to reproductive autonomy.”); Bo Zhao, 
Legal Cases on Posthumous Reputation and Posthumous Privacy: History Censorship, 
Law, Politics and Culture, 42 SYRACUSE J. INT’L. L. & COM. 39, 43 (2014) (“[T]he 
protection of posthumous reputation and privacy depends eventually on how a society 
treats the deceased in general.”); Erin Colleran, Comment, My Body, His Property?: 
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or property are so closely tied to personhood that the ability to posthumously 
control them (beyond mere testamentary freedom) should be extended.714  
Overvaluing concern with chattels may impinge on concern for individuals.715  
But that is a concern this Article has not taken up.  Instead, it has considered 
whether Cather could affect a transfer of chattels and intangible copyrights to 
an artificial person (a trust) of her own creation, clothing that trust-person with 
her own articulated values and objectives regarding the care and use of the 
property it holds.  It has not directly asked whether Cather could control her 
letters from the grave but instead whether she could invest a successor trust-
person with directives to accomplish her personal wishes – wishes that have 
become objectives held by her trustee.  It is not Cather’s agency but her trus-
tee’s agency that has been activated.  It is an expressive act as much as the 
expression which gave rise to the writing of the letters themselves.716  Attach-
ing strings in the form of use limitations to a testamentary gift may not be ef-
fective but investing the new trust-owner with values which mimic the author’s 
may.  So long as Cather’s intent is deemed neither capricious, illegal, nor un-
certain, it is her intent, embodied in her trust, that should control.717 
We permit testators to devote property for the benefit of their children in 
a long-term trust arrangement.  Willa Cather never had children.  In some ways 
her literary creations may have been comparable to children given the care and 
attention she devoted to them – just as beloved pets are for some a near equiv-
alent to biological issue.  When framed in terms of “dead hand control,” the 
willingness to honor post-mortem restrictions on the use of property held by a 
trustee is often checked.  If presented as an either/or proposition, the rights of 
 
Prescribing a Framework to Determine Ownership Interests in Directly Donated Hu-
man Organs, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 1203, 1220 (2007) (“[W]hile donating an organ results 
in the separation of personal property from the ‘owner,’ realizing the owner’s future 
expectation for that property is important to protecting his personhood.”); Melissa 
Gaied, Note, Data After Death: An Examination into Heirs’ Access to a Decedent’s 
Private Online Account, 49 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 281, 292 (2016) (“Originally, the right 
of publicity limited protections to the individual’s lifetime; however, over time, states 
enacted laws to extend its protections beyond death.”). 
 714. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 36–37 (1993) (pro-
posing a “personhood” model for deeply personal property that is integral to one’s iden-
tity); see also Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 
960 (1982) (“Once we admit that a person can be bound up with an external ‘thing’ in 
some constitutive sense, we can argue that by virtue of this connection the person 
should be accorded broad liberty with respect to control over that ‘thing.”). 
 715. Cf. Ellen Byron, Stuffed Animal Herds Need Culling, Too.  Experts Are Stand-
ing by, Time to Call the Exterminator, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 6, 2017, 12:26 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/is-it-time-for-teddy-to-go-better-call-a-stuffed-animal-
exterminator-1512581210 (suggesting that parents blindfold their children’s excess 
stuffed animals before throwing them out as the “eyes give off the energy that they are 
alive, so if we cover the eyes it won’t give off that energy anymore”). 
 716. David Horton, Testation and Speech, 101 GEO. L.J. 61, 89 (2012). 
 717. See Schenkel, supra note 123, at 200 n.120 (“Allusions to the intent of the 
donor as the highest normative ideal in trust law pervades the American law of trusts.”). 
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the living vis-à-vis property should prevail over the rights of the dead.  This 
Article would re-frame the issue: To what extent is it socially beneficial to per-
mit the personal to survive the person vis-à-vis the decedent’s creative works? 
An examination of the values projected by the recognition of postmortem 
rights in one’s organs, confidentiality, and reputation – concerns tightly aligned 
with the core of personhood – informs the approach courts will have in permit-
ting Cather to achieve her objectives with her artistic vision trust.718  Willa 
Cather’s trust presents some knotty problems on account of her particular pur-
pose as articulated in the trust instrument: to permanently suspend and super-
vise the limited enjoyment or release of property while, at the same time, pre-
serving and maintaining it.719  Arguably, such an instruction comes perilously 
close to an instruction to destroy her letters.  And also, arguably, Cather’s con-
straints represent a certain degree of waste.  Yet these concerns should be 
stacked against the humanitarian interests in celebrating extreme and idiosyn-
cratic personalities, especially artistic ones, and the goodness that adheres to 
their creations, their preferences, and their visions.720  Singular genius, properly 




 718. See Jessica Berg, Grave Secrets: Legal and Ethical Analysis of Postmortem 
Confidentiality, 34 CONN. L. REV. 81, 90 (2001) (“[Berg] argue[s] that – given the lack 
of legal guidance, as well as the theoretical and ethical framework that values both 
health and privacy – the extent of postmortem confidentiality protections should depend 
on an analysis of the interests served by confidentiality and the interests served by dis-
closure.”). 
 719. J.D. Salinger’s instruction to refrain from licensing movie rights to his copy-
righted works is “easier” because it affects only one aspect of property’s alienability – 
one particular right. 
 720. See Thomas W. Merrill, Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co. and the Doctrine of 
Waste in American Property Law, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1055, 1059 (2011) (“Property 
promotes autonomy, security, the ability to make long-term plans, the right to be dif-
ferent.”). 
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